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In this thesis, I position theology and theatre as conversation partners in order to argue 
that a dynamic, dramatic theology provides a viable and vibrant methodology capable of 
revealing what Swiss theologian Hans Urs von Balthasar identified as the “fire and light” at the 
heart of theology. This methodology stands firmly on the foundation of revelation through faith, 
tradition, and reason, but moves beyond this to dramatic encounter and the possibility of 
participation in the glory of God. At the intersection of theology and theatre I find three Yeses: 
divine invitation, human response, and divine/human collaboration or synergos. Using 
Balthasar’s Theo-Drama as a starting point, I engage with both theological and theatrical texts 
and practices in order to illustrate that the paradigm of gift as well as the aspects of “entering in,” 
movement, and embodied, live action are found in both disciplines. Four different approaches are 
utilised to illustrate the third Yes of divine/human collaboration: covenant, the plerosis of 
incarnation, theatrical and musical improvisation, and the concept of human interconnectivity in 
twentieth-century philosophy. Two important texts, the biblical book of Job and Luigi 
Pirandello’s play, Six Characters in Search of an Author, serve as proving grounds for the 
presence of the third Yes in both theology and theatre. By allowing the dialectic of divine 
initiative and human responsibility to play out within the context of drama, I seek to make room 
for a third way, one which is not biased toward either a theology from above or a theology from 
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glaring omissions in my first draft. Dr. Christine Jamieson was the first one to point out my 
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this dissertation.  
The entire faculty of the Department of Theological Studies has been supportive of my 
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I owe a large debt to Kit Brennan and her Playwriting class which served as a vibrant and 
supportive writing community. My story-telling skills are much improved thanks to the many 
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The Intersection of Theology and Drama 
 
Stories present us with gifts. We may choose to manipulate them by skillful interpretive 
devices, but stories that matter are greater than and outlive their interpretations. The 
temptation of theology has been to interpret the foundational stories given by religion 
and then to treat the interpretation as if it were that which was originally given. Perhaps 
that is what we have grown so tired of in theology and perhaps that is one of the 
contributing reasons for the return of stories in some quarters of the study of religion.1 
 
My introduction to the thought of Swiss theologian, Hans Urs von Balthasar, began one 
winter in the dimly-lit basement of the Theological Studies department at Concordia University. 
We were methodically working our way through a variety of texts in a graduate class focused on 
hermeneutics and ecclesiology, and I remember sitting at a brown folding table, papers and notes 
scattered before me, and experiencing the sensation of discovery and convergence, as if two of 
my favourite foods had just been combined into one tasty dish.  The article we were discussing 
that March evening was W. T. Dickens’s introduction to Balthasar which outlined the Swiss 
theologian’s non-systematic approach to theology. Dickens describes Balthasar’s fifteen-volume 
triptych (The Glory of the Lord, Theo-Drama, and Theo-Logic) as “rambling, repetitive, [and] 
occasionally contradictory” in nature.2  My class notes reflected a positive response to this mild 
critique: “The very untidiness of Balthasar’s theology is its beauty.”3 Specifically, I was taken by 
Balthasar’s respect for multiplicity, his refusal to reduce doctrine to a system, and especially his 
view of divine and human interaction as dramatic engagement.  
What do theology and theatre have to say to each other? 
My initial attraction to Balthasar, especially his five-volume Theo-Drama, led me to 
wonder about the connection between theology and theatre and whether these two disciplines 
could be shown to be compelling, compatible partners, each one enriching the other. To clarify, 
my question had less to do with the history of Christian-themed theatrical presentations or the 
enactment of biblical stories in the context of church liturgy and more to do with moving beyond 
                                                          
1 James B. Wiggins, “With and Without Stories,” in Religion as Story, ed. James B. Wiggins (New York: Harper & 
Row, 1975), 19. 
2 W. T. Dickens, “Hans Urs von Balthasar,” in Christian Theologies of Scripture, ed. Justin S. Holcomb (New York: 
New York University Press, 2006), 203. 
3 From my notes for Hermeneutics and Ecclesiology, THEO 604, Winter 2010, taught by Dr. Pamela Bright. 
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the somewhat scientific or philosophical stance behind much of systematic theology. My hope 
was that embracing Balthasar’s theological dramatic theory might lead me to discover more of 
the “fire and light” which he believed was at the heart of theology. Since that first encounter with 
Balthasar, my question has evolved to inquire after a third way, a third Yes which acknowledges 
both divine initiation and self-revelation (the divine Yes) as well as human experience, freedom, 
and responsibility (the human Yes) within the context of dramatic encounter. In other words, 
what does it look like for divinity and humanity to share the stage? And what is the outcome of 
this encounter? While these questions could be directed toward a study on the incarnation of 
Jesus Christ, and this event certainly makes appearances in later chapters, my question is not 
primarily a historical nor Christological one, but a contemporary one. The implications of God 
taking on human form will serve, in some respects, as a backstory to reveal how the 
divine/human drama continues to play out. 
It is tempting to be pulled toward emphasizing either the divine or the human element of 
dramatic theology; Balthasar identifies these two elements with the terms epic and lyrical, 
respectively. In epic theatre, the standpoint is outside the action, objective. In lyrical theatre, the 
viewpoint becomes submerged in the story, rendering it highly subjective.4 Balthasar posits that 
drama is a middle way, a way of engaging both divine and human characters without the 
isolation and distance characteristic of an epic stance nor the narrow, self-absorbed nature of a 
lyrical approach. In trying to avoid an either/or scenario where the two sides never meet, 
Balthasar introduces a dramatic analogy which allows one to view divine and human characters 
as members of an ensemble cast instead of competitors vying for the dominant role. Though 
Balthasar uses theatrical terminology in Theo-Drama, it serves mostly as a handmaiden for his 
theological exposition. It is my belief, and a fundamental assertion of this work, that a more 
robust engagement with theatre is necessary if one is to unearth the riches which these two 
disciplines offer each other. 
Dramatic art can be traced back to religious rituals where celebrants impersonated divine 
beings, portrayed divine actions, or enacted forces of nature which they considered sacred. These 
religious rituals served two purposes: 1) as reminders to worshippers by reinforcing and retelling 
past events which were central to the religious narrative, such as the birth or death of a hero or 
                                                          
4 Hans Urs von Balthasar, Theo-Drama: Theological Dramatic Theory, vol. 2, Dramatis Personae: Man in God, trans. 
Graham Harrison (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1990), 54ff. Hereafter referred to as TD2. 
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divine being, and 2) as means to highlight and commemorate a present event such as the return 
of spring or the bountiful harvest. According to drama historian Donald Clive Stuart, religious 
ritual becomes drama when the lines between reality and representation begin to blur: “Drama 
hovers on the threshold of existence when, under the stress of religious emotion, the celebrant 
unconsciously loses his own identity and begins to feel that he is the god or hero or someone 
closely connected with the god or hero in whose honor the ritual is being performed.”5 In other 
words, in drama the role and the person become aligned so closely that the actor as well as the 
spectator does not or cannot easily separate them.  
This is roughly what Samuel Taylor Coleridge meant when he coined the phrase 
“suspension of disbelief” at the beginning of the nineteenth century to refer to the leap of faith 
the reader makes when the momentum of a narrative is sufficiently compelling.6 Coleridge, in 
conversation with his neighbour and fellow poet, William Wordsworth, suggested two elements 
which provide the necessary environment for this to happen: “the power of exciting the 
sympathy of the reader by a faithful adherence to the truth of nature, and the power of giving the 
interest of novelty by the modifying colours of imagination.”7 What the two poets sought to 
accomplish in their writing was to set the reader at ease by being able to identify with the 
characters and situations they encountered while at the same time piquing the interest of the 
reader due to the presence of the unknown. The words had to evoke sympathy for the characters 
and the world created had to be believable, but there also needed to be an element of mystery or 
originality. 
Since that time, this term has been applied to a wider range of media including theatre 
and cinema, and the focus has come to rest more on the responsibility of the spectator or reader 
to enter the make-believe world through an act of the will. J. R. R. Tolkien took issue with this 
term, indicating that a well-written narrative would make no such demand on the reader. He 
explained: “What really happens is that the story-maker proves a successful ‘sub-creator.’ He 
makes a Secondary World which your mind can enter. Inside it, what he relates is ‘true’: it 
accords with the laws of that world. You therefore believe it, while you are, as it were, inside. 
                                                          
5 Donald Clive Stuart, The Development of Dramatic Art (New York: Dover Publications, 1960), 1. 
6 The full phrase reads “willing suspension of disbelief for the moment.” Samuel Taylor Coleridge, Biographia 





The moment disbelief arises, the spell is broken; the magic, or rather art, has failed.”8 Despite a 
difference of opinion regarding the use of the word, “disbelief,” both Coleridge and Tolkien 
agree that the potency of a good story lies in its ability to bring others into its world, a realm 
which is both coherent and attractive. While Tolkien preferred literature, with its capacity to 
create imaginative worlds, to drama, which by necessity is more closely tied to reality due to its 
reliance on human physicality, his observation that a well-crafted story exists to create a new 
world for the audience rings true for both genres. 
There are several elements which position theology and drama (or theatre) in close 
quarters.9 The first relates to Tolkien’s insistence that any presentation of a secondary world or 
alternative reality has to be consistent and desirable in order to be believable. Theology, like 
drama, asks to be believed not on the basis of facts, but on the strength of its characters and the 
dynamism of its narrative. It asks for a step of faith, a “suspension of disbelief” if you will, in 
order that one might enter into the drama and discover not only a new world but a new way of 
being. It is no coincidence that theologians spend much of their time trying to explain this drama 
and arguing for its cohesiveness; in large part, they are hoping to render it more attractive. 
Second, both theology and drama have an episodic organisation similar to most theatre 
productions in which the action is split into acts and scenes.10 In theology, this is especially 
evident in the collection of historic events, traditions, parables, stories, and prophecies found in 
the Bible. One feature of an episode is that while unique and dynamic, it is also nested within 
other episodes, in some ways a product of what has gone before and a precursor to what is to 
come. This nesting structure makes aspects of both drama and theology accessible through 
vignettes without having to comprehend the whole meta-narrative. Karen Kilby ably illustrates 
                                                          
8 J. R. R. Tolkien, “On Fairy Stories,” in Tree and Leaf (London: Unwin Books, 1971), 36.  
9 Ben Quash concludes that drama draws theology’s focus to the following three areas: 1) agency (people 
dimension), 2) necessary conditions (place dimension), and 3) wider plot (time dimension). To Quash, the central 
question remains that of freedom. See Ben Quash, Theology and the Drama of History (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2005), 4.  
10 The episodic nature of drama and society is discussed by Nelson N. Foote in “Concept and Method in the Study 
of Human Development,” in Life as Theater, eds. Dennis Brissett and Charles Edgley (New York: Aldine de Gruyter, 
1990), 63-72. New Testament scholar N. T. Wright divides the biblical story into five acts: 1) Creation, 2) Fall, 3) 
Israel, 4) Jesus, 5) the church and eschatology. See N. T. Wright, “How Can the Bible be Authoritative?” Vox 




this principle when she interprets Balthasar’s writings through several key images instead of 
attempting a summary of his prodigious work.11  
Third, I believe that theatre and theology, or more precisely, the story which theology 
interprets, can both be classified as “live action.” This infers that the incorporation of Tolkien’s 
necessary elements, consistency and coherence, are always paired with an element of risk 
stemming from the presence of unpredictability; this uncertainty is what garners excitement in a 
story. Balthasar equates this dynamic with the interaction between divine and human freedoms. 
A particular helpful analogy here is that of the stage actor versus the movie actor. Theologian 
Francesca Murphy draws attention to some important distinctions between the two: “The movie‐
actor donates himself to the camera, but he does not suffer the give and take of his audience, as 
theatre actors do. It is the camera and projector which pass on his now disembodied image, as it 
were, the idea of him.”12 Two principles are at work here. The first has to do with the interplay 
between actor and audience which takes place in real time, rendering each performance 
dynamically unique. This idea is easily transposed onto the theological concepts of revelation, 
reconciliation, salvation, and transformation, all of which could be described as the action of 
God impacting a receptive, human audience. None of these are single, one-time episodes; each 
interplay is acted and re-enacted again and again in various eras and places, each time in a 
slightly different way. The second principle Murphy mentions has to do with being “in the flesh” 
as opposed to on the screen. In a theatrical performance, the actor’s body becomes the medium; 
there is no cameraman to zoom in for a close-up and no editor to cut out unwanted scenes.13 
Because of this unedited immediacy, the audience is confronted much more directly in a live 
performance than when viewing a film.14 The incarnation of Jesus as God in the flesh speaks 
directly to this dramatic feature.  
                                                          
11 Karen Kilby, Balthasar: A (Very) Critical Introduction (Grand Rapids: W. B. Eerdmans, 2012), 8-9. 
12 Francesca Aran Murphy, God is Not a Story: Realism Revisited (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 64. 
13 “Movies engender literal identification because the synthesizing process of editing is a technological imitation of 
ordinary human neuronic processes: our minds are constantly editing our sense intake, cutting and pasting our 
neural reactions into meaningful images. We may fail to notice the structural similarity of melodrama to movie 
because our notion of melodrama is dominated by the idea that Victorian performance styles were histrionic, 
whereas movies seem naturalistic. But the lifelike absence of stagey exaggeration is an illusion created by the 
technology. Movie actors do not project when they act before a camera; this is done for them, first by the zooming 
camera lens and then by the editing process.” Murphy, God is Not a Story, 67. 
14 In a novel which chronicles the observations of a cinematograph operator in the early twentieth century, Luigi 
Pirandello writes about the transition from acting for a live audience to acting for the camera: “[actors] see 
themselves withdrawn, feel themselves torn from that direct communion with the public from which in the past 
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One final aspect of live action that should be noted is its irreversibility; what is done 
cannot be undone. The scene moves forward without hiatus, and whatever happens on stage, 
even if it is a digression from the script, becomes part of the performance. Well-seasoned and 
skilled stage actors are noted for their ability to incorporate malfunctioning props, dropped lines, 
and audience outbursts without breaking character or interrupting the story. Theology finds itself 
dealing with similar challenges to continuity and consistency: biblical accounts appear 
contradictory, factions and disagreements continue to arise within the church, and pressures 
mount from outside to adjust the biblical story to cultural norms. There are other characteristics 
shared between theology and drama which could be itemized here (such as the actor’s 
faithfulness to the author’s intent), but I trust that the three elements mentioned above provide 
enough of a foundation to move forward. What stands at the heart of both theology and drama is 
action and interaction and this, in essence, is what Balthasar devotes five volumes to in Theo-
Drama. 
Balthasar’s Theo-Drama 
Balthasar’s positioning of drama and theology as working partners has inspired 
contemporary scholars in numerous ways, but of special interest here are those who have applied 
aspects of Balthasar’s methodology to their particular field of study in order to glean new 
insights. For example, Kevin Taylor employs Balthasar’s dramatic theology to delve into the 
question of tragedy in the writings of Thomas Hardy.15 Samuel Wells acknowledges Balthasar’s 
influence in his book, Improvisation: The Drama of Christian Ethics, which utilises key dramatic 
concepts to serve as guidelines for contemporary ethics.16 Other scholars such as Kevin 
Vanhoozer and Ben Quash rely heavily on Balthasar’s thought as they explore particular themes; 
                                                          
they derived their richest reward, their greatest satisfaction: that of seeing, of hearing from the stage, in a theater, 
an eager, anxious multitude follow their live action, stirred with emotion, tremble, laugh, become excited, break 
out in applause. Here they feel as though they were in exile. In exile not only from the stage but also, in a sense, 
from themselves. Because their action, the live action of their live bodies, there, on the screen of the 
cinematograph, no longer exists: it is their image alone, caught in that moment, in a gesture, an expression, that 
flickers and disappears. They are confusedly aware, with a maddening, indefinable sense of emptiness, that their 
bodies are so to speak subtracted, suppressed, deprived of their reality…” Luigi Pirandello, Shoot!, trans. C. K. Scott 
Moncrieff (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2005), 68. 
15 Kevin Taylor, Hans Urs von Balthasar and the Question of Tragedy in the Novels of Thomas Hardy (New York: 
Bloomsbury T & T Clark, 2013). 
16 Samuel Wells, Improvisation: The Drama of Christian Ethics (Grand Rapids: BrazosPress, 2004). 
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in Vanhoozer’s case, the subject matter is doctrine and the biblical canon17 and for Quash, his 
engagement with Theo-Drama relates to the interpretation of history with input from 
philosophers, poets, and dramatists.18 Of considerable importance is the sizeable work of Aidan 
Nichols; his thorough and knowledgeable analysis of Balthasar’s thought has made the rambling, 
intricate nature of the theologian’s extensive writings more accessible to contemporary 
theologians and thinkers.19  
Helpful in situating Balthasar within other trends in twentieth century theology is 
Francesca Murphy who critiques narrative theology for its melodramatic and self-referential 
tendencies and points to Balthasar’s Theo-Drama as a truer representation of the divine/human 
encounter which is foundational to Christian doctrine.20 Her application of dramatic encounter 
also extends to film theory (specifically regarding the depiction of Christ) where she explores the 
implications of Balthasar’s aesthetics for Christology. Critics of certain aspects of Balthasar’s 
theology include Karen Kilby who finds fault with Balthasar’s over-emphasis on a theology from 
above which, she concludes, portrays the theologian’s speculations as authoritative missives 
reflecting the mind of God.21 Kilby posits that Balthasar’s creative, innovative approach to 
theology has resulted in a largely uncritical engagement with his ideas. Another critic, Ralph 
Martin, a proponent of renewal in the Catholic Church, takes issue with both Karl Rahner’s and 
Balthasar’s influence on Catholic theology in the past few decades, notably their leanings toward 
universalism and their break from traditional doctrine.22   
                                                          
17 Kevin J. Vanhoozer, The Drama of Doctine: A Canonical Linguistic Approach to Christian Doctrine (Louisville, KY: 
Westminster John Knox Press, 2005). 
18 Quash, Theology and the Drama of History. 
19 Aidan Nichols, The Word Has Been Abroad: A Guide Through Balthasar's Aesthetics (Washington, DC: Catholic 
University of America Press, 1998), No Bloodless Myth: A Guide Through Balthasar’s Dramatics (Washington, DC: 
Catholic University of America Press, 2000), Say It Is Pentecost: A Guide Through Balthasar’s Logic (Washington, 
DC: Catholic University of America Press, 2001), Scattering the Seed: A Guide Through Balthasar’s Early Writings on 
Philosophy and the Arts (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 2006), Divine Fruitfulness: A Guide 
to Balthasar’s Theology Beyond the Trinity (London; New York: T & T Clark, 2007), and A Key to Balthasar: Hans Urs 
von Balthasar on Beauty, Goodness and Truth (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2011). Nichols, who notes that the 
best way to understand something is to teach it or to write about it, has written these many volumes out of his 
desire to understand Balthasar better. See Aidan Nichols, A Key to Balthasar (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 
2011), viii. 
20 Murphy, God is Not a Story. 
21 Kilby, Balthasar: A (Very) Critical Introduction. 
22 Ralph Martin, Will Many be Saved? What Vatican II Actually Teaches and Its Implications for the New 
Evangelization (Grand Rapids: W. B. Eerdmans, 2012). 
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Based on this brief survey, it appears that Balthasar’s detractors are far outnumbered by 
his ardent supporters. As a case in point, Rodney A. Howsare and Larry S. Chapp have compiled 
a series of articles by theologians and scholars all centred on the rather ambitious title, How 
Balthasar Changed My Mind.23 While a few of the contributors downplay their so-called 
conversion experience with the person and/or writings of Balthasar, the tone of the book is 
overwhelmingly positive, almost gushing at points, as the various writers outline the effect the 
twentieth century Catholic theologian has had on them personally and professionally. That being 
said, one must keep in mind that rigorous examination of Balthasar’s contribution to theology is 
relatively recent. As scholars continue to converse and engage with the numerous works of 
Balthasar, I suspect that further critiques will be forthcoming. Hopefully, these will serve to 
confirm the merit and longevity of his creative approach to theology while providing necessary 
contextualisation, augmentation, and adjustment, thereby clarifying his theological contributions 
for future generations of scholars and practitioners.   
Hans Urs von Balthasar’s approach to theology, a unique conversation between 
systematics, aesthetics, theatre, and philosophy, stems in part from his experience as a Jesuit 
novice studying theology near Lyon in France. In particular, the young theologian reacted 
strongly against the Neo-Scholasticism pervasive in Jesuit schools at the time, a method of study 
Kilby describes as “a complete, self-enclosed whole … a thought world [which] was tidy, 
orderly, and in no need of anything.”24 For a young man schooled in music and literature, it was 
torture. Balthasar wrote about his frustration with what he called “the desert of neo-
scholasticism” many years later: “My entire period of study in the Society was a grim struggle 
with the dreariness of theology, with what men had made out of the glory of revelation. I could 
not endure this presentation of the Word of God.”25 His determination to right what he saw as the 
wrongs of Neo-Scholasticism led him to write prolifically in support of a theology characterised 
by “fire and light.”26 As a result of his reaction against a closed system, Balthasar’s work comes 
across as somewhat dense and untidy; his extensive excurses, unrestrained use of far-reaching 
                                                          
23 Rodney A. Howsare and Larry S. Chapp, eds., How Balthasar Changed My Mind (New York: Crossroad Publishing 
Co., 2008). 
24 Kilby, Balthasar: A (Very) Critical Introduction, 17. 
25 Quoted in Peter Henrici, S.J., “Hans Urs von Balthasar: A Sketch of His Life,” in Hans Urs von Balthasar: His Life 
and Work, ed. David L. Schindler (San Francisco: Ignatius, 1991), 12-13. 
26 Stratford Caldecott, “An Introduction to Hans Urs von Balthasar,” Second Spring (2001). Accessed February 15, 
2016. http://catholiceducation.org/articles/religion/re0486.html.  
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references, and a certain meandering style often make it difficult for readers to engage with his 
thought.  
Nevertheless, there is something approaching a system in his unsystematic work and in 
my opinion, Kilby manages to come very close to describing it successfully without doing it the 
disservice of dissecting it. She does this by steering clear of condensing Balthasar’s work and 
thereby reworking it into linear, logical form, a virtually impossible and ultimately self-defeating 
task. Instead, Kilby identifies four central images which appear repeatedly in the Swiss 
theologian’s work, a method of engagement which serves two purposes. First, by focusing on 
metaphors and illustrations, Kilby provides a way for the reader to trace the various threads of 
thought woven throughout Balthasar’s work. The images hint at an underlying unity similar to 
the recurring leitmotifs found throughout a symphonic piece of music. Appropriately, this 
approach turns the focus away from engaging with Balthasar on a solely rational, philosophical 
level and retains the element of mystery which Balthasar insists must be central to theology. 
Second, Kilby honours Balthasar’s intention by not forcing the theologian back into a closed 
system. By plucking out a few images for inspection instead of attempting a cohesive, 
overarching summary, Kilby leaves space for Balthasar’s work to retain its characteristic 
untidiness while still making it more accessible to the reader. I draw attention to Kilby’s 
particular treatment of Balthasar because it has some bearing on the methodology of this thesis. 
In putting forward theology and theatre as conversation partners, it is important to give adequate 
breathing room to both parties in order to avoid oversimplifying the connections between the two 
or reducing either discipline. In the following pages, my aim is to avoid squeezing theology back 
into yet another enclosed system by allowing it to unfold within the spacious realm of the 
dramatic Yes.  
Theatre, Drama, Narrative, and Story 
At this point, it seems appropriate to clarify some of the terms which will appear 
frequently in these pages. It would be unfortunate if any of the ideas in this thesis were 
misunderstood due to ambiguous terminology. Therefore, in the interest of consistency and 
clarity, I offer definitions for the terms “theatre,” “drama,” “narrative,” and “story” in this 
particular context. 
 1) Theatre: The word “theatre” has three primary uses: 1) a building or auditorium which 
houses performances, plays, or other formal presentations, 2) the world of actors, directors, 
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plays, and theatrical companies, and 3) a play or other presentation noted for its dramatic 
quality.27 A further demarcation of the word is offered by theatre professionals: “Live 
performances by skilled artists for live audiences, performances that engage the imagination, 
emotion, intellect, and cultural sensibilities of spectators – at varying levels.”28 The live aspect 
and the presence of spectators is inherent in the etymology of the word; “theatre” is derived from 
the Greek verb θεάομαι (theaomai) which means to “see, look at, behold.”29 For my purposes, I 
will be using the word primarily in the sense of a presentation with dramatic qualities which 
engages the spectator’s imagination, intellect, and emotion. Though theatre history spans a vast 
breadth of forms and styles including shamanistic and religious rituals, Greek comedy and 
tragedy, Italian commedia dell’arte, Japanese kabuki theatre, Shakespeare’s innovative use of 
language, musical comedy, realism and the “fourth wall,” avante-garde theatre, surrealism, and 
theatre associated with revolution, for the most part I draw upon the modern, mostly naturalistic 
understanding of theatre which has been prevalent in the past hundred years or so.30 While still 
allowing for the presence of symbolism and expressionism, my use of the word “theatre” in these 
pages refers to presentations that seek to show the world in a readily recognisable form. This 
particular notion of theatre, one which puts humanity and the world we live in at its core, serves 
a practical purpose when associated with theology. Balthasar writes: “For in the theatre man 
attempts a kind of transcendence, endeavoring both to observe and to judge his own truth, in 
virtue of a transformation – through the dialectic of the concealing-revealing mask – by which he 
tries to gain clarity about himself.”31 Theatre, then, incorporates the notions of live action, 
presentation and performance, spectators, and a mixture of concealing (playing roles) and 
revealing (exposing truth).  
 2) Drama: This term has a wider range than theatre. For theatre practitioners, drama 
simply refers to plays in general or the activity of acting.32 However, in common usage it also 
                                                          
27 “Theatre,” at www.oxforddictionaries.com.  
28 Phillip B. Zarrilli, Bruce McConachie, Gary Jay Williams, and Carol Fisher Sorgenfrei, “Preface: Interpreting 
Performances and Cultures,” in Theatre Histories: An Introduction, 2nd ed., ed. Gary Jay Williams (New York: 
Routledge, 2010), xx. 
29 “theaomai,” in Walter Bauer, A Greek-English Lexicon of the New Testament and Other Early Christian Literature, 
2nd ed., eds. F. W Gingrich and Frederick Danker (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979), 353. 
30 By naturalistic I mean theatre which reflects the human condition and experience instead of creating an 
unfamiliar, fantastical world.  
31 Hans Urs von Balthasar, Theo-Drama: Theological Dramatic Theory, vol. 1, Prologomena, trans. Graham Harrison 
(San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1988), 12. Hereafter referred to as TD1.  
32 “Drama,” at www.oxforddictionaries.com; Zarrilli et al., Theatre Histories, xx. 
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encompasses real life situations which carry a heightened sense of emotion, conflict, or 
excitement: in other words, scenarios which are particularly comic or tragic. When Balthasar 
speaks of drama, it becomes somewhat of a synonym for action or that which is not static. It 
seems reasonable to conclude that his emphasis is a reaction against the lofty philosophy and 
orderly systematic theology he found so distasteful in Neo-Scholasticism. I would like to fine-
tune Balthasar’s use of the word by suggesting that in addition to being dynamic, dramatic action 
must invite reaction. It may be poignant or pleasantly predictable, calming or shocking, slow-
moving or fast-paced, but it must be action that engages the participants and offers them an 
opportunity for transformation. In this way, life itself can be said to be a drama, a unique blend 
of comedy (an upward trajectory) and tragedy (a downward trajectory), of epic (objective) and 
lyrical (subjective), of initiation and reaction. This broad sense of drama is what I reference 
when I use the word in these pages.  
3) Narrative: At least one adherent of a dramatic interpretation of theology, Francesca 
Murphy, believes that the idea of narrative is somewhat limiting and carries with it certain 
negative connotations in theological applications. This seems to be, in part, a reaction to a branch 
of theology which appeared on the scene in the 1970s intending to reclaim the idea of story as a 
paradigm for God’s relationship to the world. The narrative emphasis was itself a reaction to the 
pervasive adoption of the historical-critical method for interpreting the scriptures which, 
according to its critics, neglected analogy and imagination as important interpretive tools. 
According to Murphy, narrative theologians came on so strong with their case for the narrative 
quality of the Bible that they succeeded in supplanting God with the category of story; the meta-
narrative (instead of God) became the subject matter of the biblical texts. Hence the catchy title 
of her book on the subject: God is Not a Story. Her warning is certainly one to be heeded by 
narrative theologians, but I would like to once again draw attention to Murphy’s insightful 
juxtaposition of film and theatre because it has bearing here.  
Film’s primary medium is image; because of this (and especially since the introduction of 
computer-generated images), there is a certain flattening of the characters we encounter through 
film, characters who are constructed through editing, camera angles, and numerous other 
cinematic techniques. On the live stage, no such illusions are possible. As Murphy states, “Our 
bodies are the locus of our unity or singularity; you and I are whole or one because each of 
us is a certain physical space. And so, the stage actor uses her body to make her character a 
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unity, so as to project an integrated ‘stage image’ throughout a play.”33 In other words, drama 
portrayed on the stage is essentially linked with the body and not with image. The only medium 
the stage actor has with which to project the narrative is her body. This is why theologians such 
as Murphy insist that drama is live action, not because action is the essence of drama, as 
Balthasar seems to suggest, but because both action and existence are rooted in the body. The 
purpose of narrative, then, is to provide a backbone for drama. Of narrative and story, narrative is 
the more technical of the two, being a representation or a particular way of telling a story. 
Narrative is closely associated with text (though I would include oral history within narrative as 
well) and as such, can become the basis for drama or live theatre. It is essentially a way of 
organizing a story for performance or presentation to others; narrative can be non-linear and 
selective, but its task is to find a way to connect vignettes or episodes into a unit.  
4) Story: Scholars and writers have different ideas regarding the relationship between 
narrative and story. Some see narrative as open-ended and story as closed, a story thus being a 
subset of a well-crafted narrative which may not offer final closure.34 It is commonly agreed that 
a story has a beginning, a middle, and an end. In contrast to a narrative which might offer 
information through indirect means, a story consists of actual events or direct action. A story can 
be defined simply as “what happens” without any commentary, judgment, or historical context. 
One writer notes that story “encompasses all the events, settings, and characters within a story-
world.”35 Story, then, is a relatively broad and simple term which makes few claims or demands 
on form but refers to the presentation of an event or series of events which are bound into one 
cohesive unit. To sum up, here is how I would contextualize the four terms. When a person 
wants to tell a story, they fashion a narrative which captures the ideas and characters in an 
organized manner. From this narrative, a dramatic script can be written which gives voice and 
embodiment to the story utilising dialogue and action. This script, when performed live in front 
of spectators, is theatre. 
 
                                                          
33 Murphy, God is Not a Story, 65-66. 
34 Steven R. Corman, “The Difference between Story and Narrative,” Center for Strategic Communication, Arizona 
State University. Accessed February 15, 2016. http://csc.asu.edu/2013/03/21/the-difference-between-story-and-
narrative/. 




Setting the Stage: Methodology 
It is important to note that this thesis is not meant to be a substantial critique of Theo-
Drama but seeks to use elements of Balthasar’s theological dramatic theory as a jumping off 
point from which to place theology in direct contact with theatre. In relation to recent literature 
on Balthasar, this work is perhaps most closely situated to Kevin Taylor’s engagement with the 
Swiss theologian’s ideas. However, instead of using the literature of Thomas Hardy as a 
conversation partner, I propose a work by Italian playwright, Luigi Pirandello. In contrast to 
Taylor’s focus on tragedy and Christ’s descent into death, I will be looking at the concept of gift, 
a theme which figures prominently in both theological and theatrical applications. The five 
volumes of Theo-Drama serve as a general source for my engagement with Balthasar with 
specific focus given to “Elements of the Dramatic” in the first volume (Prologomena) and 
“Infinite and Finite Freedom” in the second volume (Dramatis Personae: Man in God). 
The first Yes (chapter one) focuses on Balthasar’s basis for Theo-Drama: the generous 
invitation God extends toward humanity to join in what is essentially God’s drama. In casting 
God in all the primary roles - God the Father as author, God the Holy Spirit as director, and Jesus 
Christ as the actor - Balthasar showcases his reliance on divine initiative, a theology from above, 
if you will. While Balthasar insists on divine primacy, it is important to remember that he comes 
to this position by first addressing human experience in The Glory of the Lord. I believe that 
Balthasar’s skew toward a theology perceived from above is a valid one and worth defending to 
a certain extent, specifically because of its implications for further theological exploration. When 
human experience and reason are positioned as the primary access points (and the only reliable 
measuring tools) for theology, the divine subject matter quickly exceeds the grasp of the 
methodology. There is no doubt that Balthasar was, to some extent, reacting to the influence of 
modernism when he chose to address beauty and goodness before venturing on to the subject of 
truth in his theological triptych. This historical context cannot be ignored. However, I believe 
Balthasar understood the trajectories which starting points can set in motion and, for that reason, 
was emphatic about landing on the side of primary divine initiative. On the other hand, 
Balthasar’s position tends to place humanity in an overtly passive and underdeveloped role. 
Balthasar himself realised the conundrum when he wrote, “…who else can act, if God is on 
stage?”36  
                                                          
36 Balthasar, TD2, 17. 
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The necessity of establishing parameters concerning divine initiative leads to an 
examination of the concept of gift in the second chapter. Engaging with the findings of 
sociologist Marcel Mauss in his careful observance of cultures based on gift exchange,37 I posit 
that, within a theological context, the idea of gift is enlarged and expanded from a practice which 
reflects societal obligations and animates sociological attachments to a concept which points to 
transcendent attributes such as love, grace, mercy, forgiveness, and sacrifice. According to C. S. 
Lewis, taking the natural self as the starting point results in an unsustainable position for 
followers of Christ, putting them at odds with their stated purpose to imitate Jesus Christ.38 
Similarly, when one defines the concept of gift based solely on human experience and cultural 
practice (as Mauss does), the result is a significantly reduced understanding. Philosopher Jacques 
Derrida, aware of the incongruence between the concept of gift and its practice, concludes that 
the idea of genuine gift is realistically impossible, thereby alluding to the transcendent notion of 
gift. He writes: “An expected, moderate, measured, or measurable gift, a gift proportionate to the 
benefit or to the effect one expects from it, a reasonable gift... would no longer be a gift; at most 
it would be a repayment of credit, the restricted economy of a difference, a calculable 
temporization or deferral.”39 Drawing from both Mauss’s observations and Derrida’s 
speculations, I propose that a robust dramatic theology must be grounded in the practice of 
genuine gift-giving.  
The role of gift (in both theology and theatre) quickly becomes apparent in the 
application. In improvisational theatre, gift is unapologetically placed at the forefront. The first 
rule of improvisation is “Say Yes – and.”40 Basically, this means that the actor must accept 
whatever is offered (say Yes) and in response, add her own contribution to the scene (and). If an 
actor is unable to receive (as gifts) the words and actions offered by other actors, the 
improvisation inevitably flounders. In theology, gift can be interpreted through a comprehensive 
view of love, this is, the notions of agape (self-giving), eros (desire), and philia (mutuality). 
                                                          
37 Marcel Mauss, The Gift: the Form and Reason for Exchange in Archaic Societies, trans. W. D. Halls (London: 
Routledge, 1990). 
38 C. S. Lewis, Mere Christianity (San Francisco: HarperSanFrancisco, 2001), 86-87.  
39 Jacques Derrida, Given Time I: Counterfeit Money, trans. Peggy Kamul (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1992), 147.  
40 My experience is that this basic rule is taught and reinforced at every improvisational training session. For a 
written version, see David Alger, “David Alger’s First Ten Rules of Improv.” Improvencyclopedia.org. Accessed 
February 15, 2016. http://improvencyclopedia.org/references/David_Alger%60s_First_10_Rules_of_Improv.html.   
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These three elements of giving love ultimately find their fulfilment and expression in the action 
of God through Christ.  
This brings us to the second part of the dialectic: human response (the second Yes). 
Admittedly, human perception is the chronological starting point for any science, even theology, 
for we cannot know anything unless it passes through our own experience, understanding, and 
reason. However, when referring to the first Yes and second Yes, I am not using a chronological 
designation nor addressing the matter of causation, but speaking of foundational matters, that is, 
I am establishing a starting point which lays the foundation for all other premises moving 
forward. 
On the matter of starting point, it is helpful to position Balthasar’s Theo-Drama in 
relation to Friedrich Schleiermacher’s writings, specifically select portions of The Christian 
Faith and his earlier book, On Religion, which is often identified as the beginning of modern 
religious thought or theological liberalism. Schleiermacher, responding to the Enlightenment’s 
emphasis on rationality and science, situates the basis of religion in the realm of sense or self-
consciousness.  He writes: “The strength and compass, as well as the purity and clearness of 
every perception, depend upon the keenness and vigour of the sense. Suppose the wisest man 
without opened senses. He would not be nearer religion than the most thoughtless and wanton 
who only had an open and true sense. Here then we must begin.”41 Schleiermacher’s work 
occupies a unique position between Romanticism and the Enlightenment, a tension which he 
harnesses in order to provide reasonable arguments for the experiential nature of religion. 
Balthasar’s distinct proposal of a divine starting point (in part a response to modern liberal 
theologians) and Schleiermacher’s preference for human experience comprise two of the 
elements which inform the second Yes.  
In order to establish a robust human response, it is vital to view divine revelation and 
divine freedom as constructive, creative functions which serve to open up the necessary space for 
humanity to exercise true freedom as well. This makes the second Yes more than assent or 
compliance. Nevertheless, it is obvious that there are limits to human freedom, and the thought 
of Augustine (emphasizing divine determination) and that of Pelagius (emphasizing human 
                                                          
41 Friedrich Schleiermacher, On Religion: Speeches to its Cultured Despisers, trans. John Oman (London: K. Paul, 




freedom) illustrate the necessity of embracing both divine sovereignty and human responsibility 
in dramatic theology. 
Having introduced the characters (divine and human) and the modus operandi (gift), we 
now find ourselves at the moment of dramatic encounter when the actors engage with each other. 
Chapter four addresses the question of whether it is possible for divine and human characters to 
share the stage in true ensemble fashion. I have chosen the word “collaboration” to describe the 
third Yes, but, admittedly, it is not entirely up to the task. Therefore, I also employ an expanded 
definition of the Greek term synergos in order to flesh out the idea of loving collaboration. The 
first portrayal of collaboration is the idea of covenant in the Hebrew Bible, with special emphasis 
on the inclusion of a divine participant, a feature unique within the Ancient Near Eastern culture. 
A second model is the incarnation of Jesus Christ, God in human form. As stated previously, this 
thesis is not an attempt to crystalize a concise Christology, but the incarnation, and most notably 
the idea of plerosis, serves to demonstrate the interaction between divine and human by looking 
at the synergy of two natures in a single character. The third paradigm is improvisation, both in 
theatrical and musical settings, which lends the language of attunement to the idea of 
collaborative, dramatic encounter. Finally, three philosophical voices from the twentieth century, 
Paul Ricoeur, Martin Buber, and Jean-Luc Nancy, round out the portrayal of dramatic 
collaboration and interconnectivity through their insights into the innate relationality of humanity 
and the concept of “we.” Though by no means an exhaustive treatment of the subject, this 
chapter offers four vignettes meant to reflect the cohesive but, in some ways, unpredictable “live 
action” nature of divine/human collaboration in dramatic theology.  
In order to put Balthasar’s Theo-Drama to work and my thesis concerning divine/human 
interaction to the test, the next chapters focus on two different dramas, one a biblical text and the 
other a stage play. In both cases, links are made to the three Yeses of invitation, response, and 
collaboration. In the first example, the biblical story of Job, we find one of the most well-known 
biblical narratives; portions of the text are frequently used in church liturgies and the book as a 
whole is prevalent in various theodicies. Numerous adaptations of the classic story (when bad 
things happen to good people) exist in contemporary culture. Drawing on the biblical text as well 
as theatrical plays based on the story, I explore the presence of Yes in the context of suffering 
and address some of the problems commonly identified in the story: the nature of the characters, 
the roles assigned to divine and human parties, and the ending which seems forced, clashing with 
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many of our contemporary sensibilities. This chapter serves to illustrate how a dramatic 
interpretation of scripture can inform and enrich theology by revealing the ultimate outcome of 
collaboration: through divine vulnerability, humanity becomes a participant in glory.  
In the theatrical play, Six Characters in Search of an Author by Italian playwright Luigi 
Pirandello, we find a direct contrast to the divine, first Yes. In Pirandello’s tragedy we encounter 
a family of characters whose creator refuses to tell their story; in effect, it is a divine No. As a 
result of this rejection, the characters find themselves caught in the impossible position of having 
a dramatic story to tell but being incapable of realising it. The character of the Son refuses to 
enact the tragic role written for him, and in the final scene he exclaims, “I’ll have nothing to do 
with this! Nothing! And that’s how I interpret the will of the author who didn’t want to put us on 
the stage.”42 The negations abound in this modern script which dismantles the conventions of 
theatre in order to showcase human powerlessness. Commenting on the play, Balthasar observes 
the effect of these refusals: “Existence is negated. The ideal and the real radically cancel each 
other out.”43 This drama offers numerous theological parallels, especially regarding the 
relationship between the author/creator and his characters. Pirandello’s play creatively reveals 
the power as well as the limitations of rejection, but its most pertinent contribution for dramatic 
theology is the effectiveness with which it illustrates the eternal, static moment as the antithesis 
to dramatic movement and encounter. Some of the insights in this chapter come from research I 
conducted on a contemporary adaptation of Six Characters in Search of an Author at the 
University of Notre Dame in South Bend, Indiana. The inclusion of a theatrical production in this 
thesis serves to establish theology and theatre as genuine conversation partners (which I suggest 
is a step further than Balthasar goes in his theological dramatic theory) and gives space for 
theatre to speak and theology to listen. 
The concluding chapter summarises the three affirmatives (Yeses) and relates them back 
to Balthasar and his desire for a dynamic theology, one with “fire and light” at its core. The 
question remains: has this been merely a theoretical exercise or are there real benefits to be 
gained from placing theology and theatre on the stage together? I suggest that there are at least 
two. The first is a fuller understanding of the theological concept of perichoresis, a term which 
                                                          
42 Luigi Pirandello, Six Characters in Search of an Author, trans. Martha Witt and Mary Ann Frese Witt (New York: 
Italica Press, 2013), 86. 
43 Balthasar, TD1, 246. 
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applies not only to the societal Godhead but to divine/human interaction as well. The second is a 
call to action, to embrace “the other” with a resounding Yes. A fitting illustration of this can be 
found in Miroslav Volf’s book, Exclusion and Embrace.44 Volf describes four distinct steps in 
what he calls “the drama of embrace:” opening one’s arms, waiting for a response, closing one’s 
arms, and opening the arms again in a gesture which extends freedom to the other. The ideas of 
gift, freedom, invitation, response, collaboration, and unity are all present in this simple, 
dramatic action. 
In this thesis, I argue that a dynamic, dramatic theology is possible (and necessary) in the 
twenty-first century, a theology which stands firmly on the foundation of revelation through 
faith, tradition, and reason but moves beyond this to responsive action, loving collaboration, and 
ultimately, the possibility of participation in the glory of God. This pattern, which I believe can 
be found at the intersection of theology and theatre, I have distilled into three affirmatives 
(Yeses). By allowing the dialectic of divine initiative and human responsibility to take place 
within the context of drama, I seek to open the door to a third way, one which is not biased 
toward either a theology from above or a theology from below, but one which reflects a lively 







                                                          




The First Yes – Invitation 
 
The fullness of what it means to be human resides in our longing for the wholeness that is 
brought to fulfilment in our falling in love with the Divine Other, who has grasped us 
first. As Pascal put the matter, we would not be seeking God if he had not already found 
us.1 
 
At the heart of dramatic theology is the coming together of initiator and responder in a 
collaborative, covenantal encounter. However, in order to arrive at this dynamic engagement 
between human and divine, this mutual Third Yes, we must establish certain groundwork. 
Specifically, it is necessary to differentiate the divine and human roles, to put forth our list of 
dramatic characters so to speak, before commenting on their interaction. This chapter deals with 
divine initiative, emphasising the primacy of God in setting the drama in motion. I rely heavily 
on the thought of Hans Urs von Balthasar for this task. First, his theological dramatic theory 
serves as a framework for positing the importance of divine invitation as a starting point for 
dramatic theology. Second, the density of Balthasar’s work provides a convenient model for 
demonstrating how different foundational starting points establish different methodologies and 
interpretations. The final section of this chapter will deal with the question of passivity, a 
problem which inevitably surfaces when one employs a theocentric approach where God is 
viewed as the primary actor and humanity is relegated to the role of audience.  
One could trace Balthasar’s theological starting point back to his revelatory experience 
on a Jesuit retreat in 1927 during his doctoral studies. He writes about the abiding impact of that 
encounter:  
Even now, thirty years later, I could still go to that remote path in the Black Forest, not 
far from Basel, and find again the tree beneath which I was struck as by lightning …. 
And yet it was neither theology nor the priesthood which then came into my mind in a 
flash. It was simply this: you have nothing to choose, you have been called. You will not 
serve, you will be taken into service.2  
 
                                                          
1 Brian J. Braman, Meaning and Authenticity: Bernard Lonergan and Charles Taylor on the Drama of Authentic 
Human Existence (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2008), 100. 
2 Hans Urs von Balthasar quoted in Peter Henrici, S.J., “Hans Urs von Balthasar: A Sketch of His Life,” in Hans Urs 
von Balthasar: His Life and Work, ed. David L. Schindler (San Francisco: Ignatius, 1991), 11. 
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Though previous influences were arguably at play, and these influences become apparent in his 
writings, this moment is the one which Balthasar identifies as the beginning of his call. The 
notion of call or invitation is central to Balthasar’s theology. One image which he employs to 
explain this dynamic is that of the early interaction between mother and child. The child’s first 
sense of awareness, an awareness which carries with it the idea of existence as gift, comes 
through the mother. Balthasar writes: “But just as no child can be awakened to love without 
being loved, so too no human heart can come to an understanding of God without the gift of free 
grace – in the image of his Son.”3 The underlying concept of gift will be addressed in more depth 
in the next chapter, but here we note that Balthasar’s emphasis on the primacy of God and God’s 
initiative toward humanity seems to have roots in his own experience. Note that Balthasar’s 
words concerning his call are decidedly passive (“you will be taken into service”) instead of 
actively responsive, and he states that he had no choice in the matter. It seems reasonable to 
suggest that this pivotal experience which emphasised the primacy and sovereignty of God 
flavoured his theological viewpoint going forward.     
Balthasar’s Theology From Above 
Balthasar states that, “Only God can express God authentically.”4 In seeking not only to 
describe but also engage with the Trinitarian God, Balthasar chooses what could loosely be 
identified as a theology from above as his starting point, meaning he attempts to investigate 
theological concepts from a divine standpoint. However, there are some indications that this 
might not be the best classification of his stance. By starting with beauty in The Glory of the 
Lord, Balthasar recognises that all knowledge of God is filtered through human experience and 
interpretation. In a brief article titled, “A Résumé of My Thought,” in which Balthasar sets out to 
reveal the heart of his theology, he writes: “We start with a reflection on the situation of man. He 
exists as a limited being in a limited world, but his reason is open to the unlimited, to all of 
being.”5 This statement is closely aligned with the image of a child awakening to encounter in 
the mother’s smile, for it suggests that humanity’s self-realisation is found through awakening to 
                                                          
3 Hans Urs von Balthasar, Love Alone is Credible, trans. D. C. Schindler (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2004), 76. 
4 Hans Urs von Balthasar, The Glory of the Lord: A Theological Aesthetics, vol. 1, Seeing the Form, trans. Erasmo 
Leiva-Merikakis, eds. Joseph Fessio S.J. and John Riches (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1982), 615. Hereafter 
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something or someone greater; it is the realisation that humanity has been granted the gift of 
existence.  
Can one deduce from this that Balthasar is using human experience not only as a source 
of theology but as a foundational starting point? No, I believe that would be a misrepresentation 
of his intent. Because Balthasar is all too aware of the trajectory which starting points set one on, 
his initial focus on beauty is a means of introducing the foundational aspect of encounter. 
Consider a person gazing at a work of art. The human figure is at the forefront, but one’s eyes 
are soon drawn to the object of the person’s attention. Perhaps more precise terminology for 
Balthasar’s theological starting point would be invitation; this idea places God clearly in the 
active, initiating role but also situates humanity in the constant and cooperative role of responder. 
Since we are only, always able to view existence through the eyes of the responder, Balthasar’s 
attempt to characterise or define the nature of the divine initiator and recount the drama of 
divine/human encounter takes one into the realm of hypothesis to a certain degree.  
This speculative aspect of theology, an attempt to describe or define the ineffable, creates 
certain complications for those who practice theology, and Balthasar is no exception. Let me 
draw attention to three difficulties which arise from Balthasar’s use of a dramatic framework in 
Theo-Drama, particularly due to his tendency toward a theology which originates from above. 
The first is the impossibility of summarizing a divine drama which remains, in large part, beyond 
the grasp of human knowledge or understanding. Describing the interplay between divine and 
human characters can only be done from a human standpoint, and while Balthasar acknowledges 
that there can be “no external standpoint,”6 his overarching theological dramatic theory often 
lands on the epic side of things, as if he were a narrator looking on from the outside. Karen Kilby 
is rather strong in her critique of Balthasar’s point of view: “[his] use of the image of the drama, 
fascinating though it is, seems implicitly to locate him well above all that he speaks of, so that 
ultimately he is in a position to survey not only all of world history, but all of history in relation 
to God, and God’s own inner life, and describe the whole to us as a single play.”7 Though Kilby 
overstates Balthasar’s stance, her point merits some consideration. 
                                                          
6 Hans Urs von Balthasar, Theo-Drama: Theological Dramatic Theory, vol. 2, Dramatis Personae: Man in God, trans. 
Graham Harrison (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1990), 54-62. Hereafter referred to as TD2. 
7 Karen Kilby, Balthasar: A (Very) Critical Introduction (Grand Rapids: W. B. Eerdmans, 2012), 64. 
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A secondary complication associated with the image of a theatrical play is the 
demarcations (such as actor versus role and divine freedom versus human freedom) which it 
brings to the theological forefront. On the one hand, Balthasar manages to straddle seemingly 
opposite poles (most notably in the incarnation of Christ) with admirable skill by finding unity in 
the distinctions, but as Ben Quash observes, he seems unable to totally escape his Hegelian debt 
and resist “theoretical reduction.” In other words, a commitment to dramatic unity means that 
Balthasar sometimes has tendencies to conflate elements which should remain distinct.8 One case 
in point: despite Balthasar’s commitment to freedom in drama, he is prone to sacrifice the human 
will to the purposes of the divine will and, according to Quash, assimilates drama into his own 
theological meta-narrative, thereby rendering the characters as pawns instead of free agents.9 
Balthasar’s perceived need to represent the drama in complete form results in downplaying the 
role of the individual actor in order to serve the mission or the story. Perhaps one could say that 
Balthasar’s theology stumbles when it forces the play metaphor instead of engaging with it as a 
dialogue partner. As mentioned earlier, both theology and drama must be given some breathing 
room in order for the interaction to be fruitful. 
The third challenge one encounters in Balthasar’s use of dramatic and theatrical 
categories has to do with methodology. In The Glory of the Lord, Balthasar states that, “The 
particular nature of one’s subject-matter must be reflected first of all in the particular nature of 
one’s method.”10 When Balthasar writes words on a page concerning the action and immediacy 
of drama, he is employing a medium which cannot fully deliver the content of his argument; it is 
too static. A book can be put down and picked up at a later time, but there is no such luxury in 
drama. Drama is confrontational; it demands to be paid attention to, to be entered into, to be 
acted out, to be responded to. It cannot be presented as an idea one can consider or ponder at 
leisure. While Balthasar does resist what Quash identifies as “narrowly ‘modern’ or 
Enlightenment modes of reasoning,” the theologian’s apologetic for Theo-Drama remains in the 
                                                          
8 Ben Quash, Theology and the Drama of History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 137. 
9 “But the content of his discussion of specific dramas (especially of tragedy) shows a familiar preoccupation with 
what looks like the subordination of individual characters to the divine will - even, perhaps, their self-immolation - 
and an identification of this divine will with that of the Christian God. What this shows us is that his belief in a 
divine realm of glory, beyond all being and bestowing all being, can itself be requisitioned to serve as something 
like a meta-narrative, to which particular plays are assimilated.” Quash, Theology and the Drama of History, 138. 
10 Balthasar, GL1, 39. 
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realm of “aesthetic persuasion” instead of dramatic encounter.11 Balthasar’s means of engaging 
with drama is to offer interpretations of numerous theatrical performances including works by 
Calderon, Goethe, Schiller, and Shakespeare. These often-times extensive excurses are meant to 
draw the reader into the action of the theatre and offer an immersion into the divine/human story 
on an extra-theological level. It never totally succeeds, in my opinion. Instead, it appears that 
Balthasar seeks to persuade more by sheer volume of words and knowledge than by actual 
dramatic engagement, perhaps because that is all he has at his disposal. Even though he 
acknowledges the need for his methodology to reflect his theme, determining that, “we shall only 
know whether our ‘dramatic’ approach is fruitful or not by actually going ahead with it,”12 
writing or reading about drama proves to be no substitute for actually getting on the stage.    
Nevertheless, I would not conclude that Balthasar fails in delivering a working 
theological dramatic theory. As he himself suggests, Theo-Drama is meant to serve as an 
apparatus or structure on which to explore and create and not as an enclosed or complete system. 
What Balthasar does manage to do particularly well is to communicate, through both biblical and 
theatrical examples, the theme of divine invitation. In fact, as I have already suggested, the idea 
of invitation seems to be a better assessment of his standpoint than that of a theology from above, 
which can be seen as too objective or removed from the drama. While Balthasar places the triune 
God in all the primary theatrical roles (author, actor, director), the drama plays out on a broad 
and open platform where, due to the generous invitation found in divine initiative, space is made 
for humanity to be a participant.  
In order to unpack some of the elements in Balthasar’s invitational theology, I turn to a 
section entitled “Elements of the Dramatic” found in the first volume of Theo-Drama. The first 
question to be addressed is this: What exactly does Balthasar mean by God as author, director, 
and actor? In Balthasar’s theological dramatic theory, the author (Creator God) is the originator, 
the creative authority behind the story, the one who is responsible for its overall integrity. The 
author could be said to be “immanent in all the characters” because they are his creation, and yet 
he stands apart from them.13 The author’s aim is to unveil the secret, or as Goethe says, to “let 
                                                          
11 Quash, Theology and the Drama of History, 137. 
12 Hans Urs von Balthasar, Theo-Drama: Theological Dramatic Theory, vol. 1, Prologomena, trans. Graham Harrison 
(San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1988), 25. Hereafter referred to as TD1. 
13 Ibid., 272. 
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the cat out of the bag,”14 but above all, the author is associated with a quality of magnanimity, 
making room for an extensive array of characters and forms.15 Through the drama, the author 
seeks to open up a horizon to the audience, a horizon which offers meaning and results in an 
epiphany. The author seeks to give the audience an encounter with reality that is more real than 
what they experience in their everyday existence.16  Balthasar writes that, “The author, with his 
shaping role, stands at the beginning of the whole production triad and ensures that it has an 
effect, beyond itself, on the audience, that audience which the author has envisaged right from 
the start and with whom, over the heads of the actor and the director, he has established an 
understanding.”17 What Balthasar does here is connect the author to the audience at the point of 
creation, before the audience ever becomes an audience. In fact, it could be said that the author 
creates the audience at the same time as his play, and in doing so, issues an invitation for the 
audience to become participants in the development of the story.  
The task of translating the ideal into the real, of bridging the gap between the concept of 
the story and the story as live action, belongs to the director. The director’s function is to 
transpose the author’s intent into a live performance which compels the audience to feel and 
know that, essentially, it is their own story being told. The director guides the ensemble and 
oversees the interplay of the characters, integrating the vision of the author’s script with the 
abilities of the actors.18 Balthasar cautions against the author or the director overpowering the 
freedom of the actor, indicating that “the director is not a conductor and the actor is not a mere 
musical instrument. The director should devote his energies to rendering himself superfluous.”19 
In seeking to be a meeting point between the author and actor, the director must exhibit 
receptivity and flexibility, patiently guiding the actors toward unity throughout rehearsals.20 In 
terms of the triune God, the director translates to the Holy Spirit, the one who guides and 
teaches, making the divine author’s intentions known to humanity via direct presence. This 
metaphor seems to fall short in one important aspect: in most cases, the director leaves the actors 
                                                          
14 Johann Wolfgang von Goethe quoted in Balthasar, TD1, 272. 
15 Balthasar, TD1, 274. 
16 “Even when showing life ‘as it is’, the drama must show how it ought to be and why it appears in such a way, or 
why things are not as they seem.” Balthasar, TD1, 262. 
17 Ibid., 279. 
18 Ibid., 298. 
19 Ibid., 300. 
20 Ibid., 300-1. 
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to their own devices after the play opens. However, if reality is viewed more as a rehearsal than a 
finished performance, it is possible to extend the dramatic metaphor a bit further.  
The actor or player, according to Balthasar, is the one who personifies a synthesis 
between existence and truth: “On the one hand, there is the sphere of reality, embodied in the 
audience, to which the actor belongs by virtue of his humanity; and there is the sphere of an 
‘ideality’ that is not directly accessible to this reality and that is presented by the performed 
play.”21 God as actor, then, is situated at the intersection of ideal and real, truth and form, the 
intermediary between author and audience. What this entails is the idea of “making things 
present,” rendering a story three-dimensional, embodied, live and in person, and temporal.22 The 
actor needs the author and the author needs the actor; both participate in creative acts which 
imply mutual interdependence as well as freedom. Balthasar describes it this way: 
…there is nothing mechanical about this making-present; it is a creative act for which the 
poet explicitly and necessarily leaves room in his work, both in terms of the depth of 
inspiration (the ‘higher task’) and of the details of gesture, intonation, and so forth. The 
actor too, in recreating the author’s character, is a free creator who, like the author, must 
conceive and execute his role on the basis of a single, unified vision.23 
  
One will recognize something of the author in the performance of the actor and similarly, one 
should be able to see something of the actor in the role he is performing. Ideally, the actor puts 
himself, his emotions, his body, his will, and indeed his very soul at the disposal of the work of 
art, the play. In the process, he issues an unspoken invitation to the audience to validate his 
representation by accepting it as real. The acceptance of this invitation, this reciprocity of the 
audience, creates a communion between the actor and the audience.24 Once again we see that 
self-giving, this time on the part of the actor, results in a generous invitation for participation. In 
Theo-Drama, the role of actor is exemplified by Jesus Christ in whom divine and human 
existence cohabit. Seen as a mediator, Christ advocates for the author by rendering the drama 
into live action for the human audience to witness; at the same time, Christ represents the 
audience, identifying with their hopes, perceptions, questions, and reactions. The action which 
originates from the author, is realized through the director, and brought to life by the actor is 
ultimately on behalf of and for the audience; it is action resulting from selfless love.  
                                                          
21 Ibid., 261. 
22 Ibid., 281. 
23 Ibid., 284. 
24 Ibid., 285. 
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In light of the above, it might be more accurate to describe Balthasar’s theology not as 
one attempting to represent the divine viewpoint but one intent on describing and affirming the 
dynamic nature of the divine/human relationship.25  
Divine Initiative: God as Primary Actor 
The first Yes which we encounter in Theo-Drama is the divine Yes.26 In order to 
understand the impetus behind this particular presentation of divine initiative, we must recognise 
two tensions or paradoxes which Balthasar works from in Theo-Drama. The first is the essential 
abyss between divine and human which he believes cannot be circumvented and the second is 
the tension between infinite and finite freedom. These two seemingly irreconcilable quandaries 
(the first relating to being and the second referring to action) are addressed on several levels in 
Balthasar’s theology. First, in the simple scenario of the child awakening to the mother’s smile, 
we find one existence birthing another existence and one freedom awakening another freedom. 
One could say that the mother in this image is both originator and initiator. Balthasar writes: 
“Unless a child is awakened to I-consciousness through the instrumentality of a Thou, it cannot 
become a human child at all.”27 For him, the essence of humanity (a self-conscious awareness in 
relation to others) is essentially a response to an outside initiative; it is never fabricated or 
created from within one’s own psyche.  
A second level of engagement with these two tensions can be found in Balthasar’s 
Christology which demonstrates the ideal pattern for divine initiative and human response. It is 
the person of Jesus Christ who bridges the great abyss by possessing both divine and human 
natures, and the person of Jesus Christ who serves as the perfect example of finite freedom 
operating within infinite freedom. Ultimately, Christ’s finite freedom finds its full expression in 
surrender to divine freedom and thus becomes a model for the union of the Christian’s purpose 
and will with God’s purpose and will. The abyss between human and divine and the tension 
between infinite and finite freedom set the stage for Balthasar to position Christ as a necessary, 
mediating character, Christ as a revelatory, analogia entis character, and Christ as a unifying 
character in whom the drama finds its final fulfillment.  
                                                          
25 “…our starting point is always the given relationship between God and man as set forth in biblical revelation…” 
Balthasar, TD2, 229. 
26 Balthasar, TD2, 123. 
27 Hans Urs von Balthasar, Theo-Drama: Theological Dramatic Theory, vol. 3, Dramatis Personae: Persons in Christ, 
trans. Graham Harrison (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1992), 175. Hereafter referred to as TD3. 
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Let me return to the image of the child awakening to the smile of the mother for a 
moment. Though the child could be said to be a free participant, not coerced into action in any 
way, the child’s response is nevertheless contingent on the initial invitation (smile) issued by the 
mother.28 This is the same line of reasoning Balthasar uses when he writes about finite or human 
freedom: “Here we have man, both singular and plural, thrown onto the stage, endowed with 
freedom, condemned to freedom and given grace to exercise it, with the power of becoming what 
he can on the basis of his own nature and constitution and yet unable to do this outside the divine 
freedom but only in it and with it.”29 Human freedom, then, is intricately tied to and given its 
capacity through a first act, a first Yes which is borne out of infinite freedom. In other words, the 
divine Yes, the Yes of infinite freedom, speaks finite freedom into existence. A closer look at the 
concept of freedom and especially the terms “finite” and “infinite” might be helpful in teasing 
out how these two freedoms are inter-related. 
At first glance, it might appear that infinite freedom limits itself by making space for 
finite freedom, or that finite freedom is not worthy of the expansiveness associated with true 
liberty.30 However, it is important to note that Balthasar is not speaking primarily about abstract 
concepts here, but is using the descriptors “finite” and “infinite” to indicate the type of person 
who exercises freedom. Therefore, an infinite being exercises infinite freedom and a finite being, 
of necessity, is confined to finite freedom. Because God is viewed as the primary initiator, 
human freedom is seen as originating and operating within divine freedom, and anthropology is 
said to find its “full stature” only within the person of Christ.31  
Religious scholar James P. Carse, in writing about the difference between finite and 
infinite games, explores some of the same territory as Balthasar does in Theo-Drama. Carse 
observes that, “While finite games are externally defined, infinite games are internally 
                                                          
28 “Finite freedom only exists in the interrelationship of human beings, particularly since each new human being 
comes about through other human beings and only awakens to ‘being human’ through the encounter with others, 
with their freedom and free response. The child arrives with its own freedom; and it is given (by its mother) this 
other freedom that comes from being in a society with other.” Balthasar, TD2, 203. 
29 Ibid., 196. 
30 “The concept of finite freedom seems self-contradictory, for how can something that is continually coming up 
against the limits of its nature (not only of its action) be free? How can it be anything but a prisoner? Nonetheless 
our direct experience of freedom cannot be expressed in any other way but in this apparent contradiction. For if, in 
the face of all objections, we still have an irrefutable awareness of our freedom, we are equally aware that our 
freedom is not unlimited, or more precisely that, while we are free, we are always only moving toward freedom.” 
Ibid., 207. 
31 Ibid., 202. 
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defined.”32 What he means is that something in the finite realm (such as human freedom) must 
have an external regulator while matters in the infinite realm (such as divine freedom) are free to 
regulate themselves. This differentiation allows for a type of freedom which has definite limits 
and is not open to every possible alternative. In terms of human freedom, a person acts within 
externally set boundaries, however, these boundaries are of the sort which the person cannot 
naturally control, access, go beyond, or even fathom. Therefore, all finite play is still free play 
because the freedom which is experienced is in keeping with the nature and ability of the player. 
A finite human with infinite freedom is simply not plausible. 
In contrast, infinite freedom is a freedom which is internally defined and regulated. This 
freedom is distinct from chaos, a state in which anything is possible and probable. In chaos the 
choices are endless and there is no discernable pattern. Infinite freedom, however, is 
characterized by integrity and consistency, for even infinite freedom cannot say Yes and No at 
the same time. This would not be freedom, it would be confusion. Freedom is closely linked to 
the idea of telos, because in exercising freedom, one’s character is revealed. Every choice or act 
exhibits a definite bias, pattern, or direction. Freedom could be defined as the ability to direct 
one’s energies toward a certain goal.33 However, true freedom must also include the options of 
rebellion and rejection, the choice to either embrace or refuse a directive. In essence, freedom 
becomes an impetus which sets one on a distinct trajectory, every choice directing, and thereby 
limiting, future choices.34 It is important to note that Balthasar carefully separates his particular 
approach to freedom from philosophers such as Aristotle and Descartes who focus on the 
unfettered will. For Balthasar, finite freedom must always be embedded within infinite freedom, 
for the connection between the two is key to revealing the nature and character of divine 
freedom. Referencing Irenaeus, Balthasar states that, “in generosity God gave man his freedom; 
in forbearance he not only allows him to continue on his erring path but actually accompanies 
him, supporting him with his Providence, so that all man’s error takes place within the realm of 
                                                          
32 James P. Carse, Finite and Infinite Games: A Vision of Life as Play and Possibility (New York: Free Press, 1986), 7. 
33 In a similar vein, Bernard Lonergan references Joseph de Finance in describing the distinction between a 
horizontal and a vertical exercise of freedom. “A horizontal exercise is a decision or choice that occurs within an 
established horizon. A vertical exercise is the set of judgments and decisions by which we move from one horizon 
to another.” Bernard J. F. Lonergan, Method in Theology (Toronto, ON: University of Toronto Press, 1971), 237. 
34 Balthasar, TD1, 255. 
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divine love.”35 For Balthasar, infinite freedom must never be separated from love, for love is the 
self-regulating characteristic of the divine. 
Balthasar identifies two expressions of finite freedom or what he calls “openness to all 
being:” the first is freedom as autonomous motion and the second is freedom as consent.36 
Freedom as autonomous motion describes a freedom which reveals the person as self-
determining, free in their own willing and choosing. This exercise of freedom allows them to 
differentiate themselves from others.37 The second expression of freedom which Balthasar 
examines is freedom as consent in which a person freely aligns their purpose with another. 
Instead of being characterized by differentiation from the other, freedom of consent results in 
what Balthasar calls, “going out of ourselves and into ‘the other.’”38 For Balthasar, the opening 
of the finite self for the purpose of giving itself over to the infinite Being unlocks the potential 
latent in human freedom. Words such as “selflessness” and “self-disclosure” can be found in 
Balthasar’s expansion on the idea of freedom as consent, and there is much time spent in teasing 
out the movement from finite freedom toward infinite freedom, coming from God and being 
drawn back to God. In Engagement with God, Balthasar uses the example of God delivering the 
nation of Israel from slavery to illustrate the idea that divine freedom, motivated by love, begets 
finite freedom. He writes:  
[Israel] knows rather that she has been liberated in order that, through her following of 
the God of liberty, she may enter upon a freedom that is truly her own.  The foundation of 
her choosing, which is God’s innate freedom, must correspond with the ultimate purpose 
of her choosing, namely, that she may participate in the liberty of God himself. Hence all 
obedience serves as a preparation for freedom.39 
 
Balthasar posits that the only way a finite being can comprehend freedom is to see it 
enacted by another finite being, and thus he brings the subject of the two freedoms back to the 
person of Christ.40 Besides establishing God as the initiator and originator (uttering the first Yes) 
and Jesus Christ as the willing recipient of finite freedom (uttering a responsive Yes), the 
relationship between God as author and God as actor situates freedom within a social setting. 
                                                          
35 Balthasar, TD2, 217. 
36 Ibid., 211.  
37 Ibid., 213. 
38 Ibid., 228. 
39 Hans Urs von Balthasar, Engagement with God: The Drama of Christian Discipleship, trans. R. John Halliburton 
(San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1986), 15. 
40 Balthasar, TD3, 19. 
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Balthasar holds that freedom cannot be manifested by a single entity; it requires an “other” for it 
to find expression. Therefore, the model for human freedom functioning within a social 
dimension stems from a Trinitarian understanding of God. One of the riches to be extracted from 
Balthasar’s dramatic model is his emphasis on community and relationship. True freedom is not 
freedom for the individual, but mutual freedom enacted within society. Since finite freedom, 
according to Balthasar, is a reflection of infinite freedom, we can conclude that community and 
“being-for-another” are first and foremost at the heart of the divine.41  
The Implications of Starting Point 
Balthasar’s insistence on the primacy of divine action is necessary if he means to frame a 
theocentric instead of an anthropocentric theological dramatic theory. The theology and logic 
behind identifying first cause is perhaps best illustrated by the thirteenth century father of 
Scholasticism, Thomas Aquinas, who composed five different avenues of reason (ways) which 
point back to a primary cause, that which we name God.42 His five ways refer to finding primacy 
through observing motion, cause, necessity, degree, and design or harmony. Though not 
scientifically verifiable, Aquinas’s five ways serve as a model for how one can, given humanity’s 
limited and temporal status, make reasonable deductions about first causes. A starting point, 
however, need not always refer to causality or temporality. In some cases, it indicates an initial 
interaction which sets one on a specific trajectory, and I contend that this type of starting point, 
an encounter, is at the heart of Balthasar’s Theo-Drama. 
One way to illustrate the importance of starting point is to take Balthasar as a case study. 
The Swiss theologian’s work has a reputation for being notoriously dense and difficult to grasp 
as a whole, due in large part to Balthasar’s purposely unsystematic style and frequent, unedited 
ramblings.43 I have already mentioned Karen Kilby’s innovative approach which draws attention 
to significant recurring images in Balthasar’s writings. To this I would like to add the 
                                                          
41 Balthasar, TD2, 203-06. 
42 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, trans. Fathers of the English Dominican Province (New York: Benziger 
Brothers, 1947), Question 2: the Existence of God. 
43 Edward T. Oakes observes that “Hans Urs von Balthasar has bequeathed to the world a theology that is 
extremely hard to assess. Subtle and vast, his theology is also composed of parts so densely and tightly interwoven 
that no component can be jettisoned, or even much altered, without affecting the whole.” Edward T. Oakes, 
“Envoi: The Future of Balthasarian Theology,” in The Cambridge Companion to Hans Urs von Balthasar, eds., 
Edward T. Oakes and David Moss (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 269. Kilby identifies the following 
three obstacles to understanding Balthasar: 1) the size of his canon, 2) his indirect style of writing, and 3) his 
originality. See Kilby, Balthasar: A (very) Critical Introduction, 3-4.  
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observations of two other noted scholars, Aidan Nichols and Rodney Howsare, both of whom are 
well-versed in Balthasar’s work. All three writers suggest different frameworks or keys through 
which to access Balthasar’s thought; their various approaches serve to demonstrate my assertion 
that the most pertinent characteristic of a starting point, at least for my purposes here, is not its 
causality (first mover) nor its temporal primacy (begin at the beginning) but the trajectory which 
it sets in motion. Balthasar alludes to this notion on the first page of his trilogy: “the beginning is 
… a primal decision which includes all later ones for the person whose life is based on response 
and decision.”44 He continues, specifying the importance of an adequate theological starting 
point: “Whoever confronts the whole truth … desires to choose as his first word one which he 
will not have to take back, one which he will not afterwards have to correct with violence, but 
one which is broad enough to foster and include all words to follow, and clear enough to 
penetrate all the others with its light.”45 In this way, Balthasar acknowledges the difficulty of 
choosing a starting point which is robust enough to serve as a theological and philosophical 
foundation, flexible enough to allow for future questions and discoveries, and yet characterised 
by a simple clarity which allows it to pierce through a breadth of subject matter. In the preface to 
Theo-Drama, Balthasar employs the metaphor of a gymnast’s apparatus, built for athletes to 
exercise upon.46 It is an especially suitable metaphor for a treatise dealing with theological 
action, because it carries within it two necessary elements: a solid foundation as well as 
sufficient flexibility for progress. While Balthasar’s metaphor lacks sufficient breadth to fully 
embrace the third element I have identified here (clarity), it is nevertheless another image to 
assist the reader in understanding the importance of starting point and its implications for 
trajectory.  
I will use these three criteria (foundation, flexibility, and clarity) when evaluating 
Howsare’s, Nichols’s, and Kilby’s means of interpreting Balthasar. Because an extended 
treatment of the Swiss theologian is beyond the scope of this thesis (which is meant to be a 
conversation between theology and theatre inspired by Balthasar’s Theo-Drama), I will be 
engaging with their thoughts on Balthasar at some length not only to address the issue of starting 
                                                          
44 Balthasar, GL1, 17.  
45 Ibid. 
46 Balthasar, TD1, 9. 
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point, but to provide some additional context for the selections of Theo-Drama cited in this 
thesis.    
1) Rodney Howsare on Balthasar 
Rodney Howsare observes that Balthasar’s approach to the question of Being is centred 
upon the image of a child first awakening to encounter through the smile of its mother. Though 
Howsare does not devote much space to explaining the metaphor in his book, Balthasar: A 
Guide for the Perplexed, he goes back to it frequently, noting how the image provides Balthasar 
with the flexibility to avoid the polarization of either/or and enabling him to draw on both 
traditional and modern theology, to connect finite and infinite freedom, and to show how 
comsocentric and anthropocentric approaches must give way to a Christocentric union of subject 
and object47 and a Trinitarian model of Being.48 The image of the mother and child also reflects 
Balthasar’s practice of distinguishing but not separating, a tendency which Howsare connects to 
Balthasar’s goal of wanting to bring the strands of theology together in unity instead of pitting 
them against each other. What Howsare has managed to pinpoint is that this simple picture of a 
mother interacting with her child brings clarity to some rather complex existential, philosophical, 
and theological concepts. Howsare draws out several ontological points which he believes are 
resident in the experience of the mother with the child:49 1) the child knows (and this is not an 
intellectual knowledge) that it owes its existence to another, 2) the child experiences awakening 
to Being as joy (the child returns the mother’s smile), 3) the child comes to realise that existence 
is not necessity, but gift (life would go on even if the child were not there), and 4) the child’s 
distinction from the mother is encompassed within a larger relationship, a union of love.50  
Similar observations were made by psychologist Dr. John Bowlby in the mid-twentieth 
century when he developed his ground-breaking attachment theory through studying the effects 
of maternal bonding and deprivation. In fact, Bowlby went so far as to suggest that affectional 
                                                          
47 Rodney Howsare, Balthasar: A Guide for the Perplexed (London; New York: T & T Clark, 2009), 70-71. 
48 “…since the measure of all things is finally in God, and since God is a Trinity of person in one Being – and this is 
something that comes out in the explicitly theological second volume [of Theo-Logic] – it should not surprise us 
that reality itself is structured trinitarian-ly.” Ibid., 73. 
49 These differ slightly from those identified by Balthasar himself: “The infant is brought to consciousness of 
himself only by love, by the smile of his mother. In that encounter the horizon of all unlimited being opens itself for 
him, revealing four things to him: (1) that he is one in love with the mother, even in being other than his mother, 
therefore all being is one; (2) that that love is good, therefore all being is good; (3) that that love is true, therefore 
all being is true; and (4) that that love evokes joy, therefore all being is beautiful.” Balthasar, “A Résumé of My 
Thought.” 
50 Howsare, Balthasar: A Guide for the Perplexed, 57-58. 
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bonding is a survival instinct, more primal than the drive for food or sex, and its deprivation is 
linked to psychological disorders ranging from depression to sociopathy.51 If the maternal bond 
is indeed central to human development and well-being, Howsare is right in putting the child’s 
early, positive experience of the mother at the forefront of Balthasar’s theology and his analogy 
of existence (analogia entis), thereby suggesting that the metaphor is foundational enough to 
hold strong throughout Balthasar’s trilogy. Howsare makes this point by linking the metaphor to 
each subject matter of the trilogy: “If, again, we begin with the encounter between the child and 
his mother and understand Being in this light, we will see that Being appears (the Beautiful), 
Being gives itself (the Good), and Being speaks (the True).”52 In addition, Howsare believes that 
the image is both simple enough to bring clarity to Balthasar’s labyrinthine thought process and 
also flexible enough to apply to the various philosophical and theological subjects Balthasar 
covers. Based on Howsare’s observations, it would appear that Balthasar has carefully chosen an 
elementary but powerful image which proves helpful in accessing much of his theology. By 
placing the interaction of mother and child at the heart of Balthasar’s theology, Howsare gives a 
decidedly relational slant to the interpretation of Balthasar’s work; this proves to be an especially 
important concept in Theo-Drama.  
Another theme to which Howsare returns throughout his introductory treatment of 
Balthasar is a question posed to Maurice Blondel by one of his fellow students regarding the 
importance of the person of Jesus: “Why should I be obliged to inquire into and take account of a 
casual event which occurred 1900 years ago in an obscure corner of the Roman Empire?”53 For 
Howsare, this question serves two purposes. First, it illustrates the context in which Balthasar 
was writing, addressing what Howsare identifies as both the “false objectivism and extrinsicism 
of the neo-scholastics and the false subjectivism of the modernists.”54 Balthasar’s theological 
choices, when viewed as responses to the rigidity of Neo-Scholasticism and the humanist 
tendencies in modernism, become clearer, particularly his insistence on the primacy of God and 
his unorthodox methodology. Second, and perhaps more importantly, the question of the 
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relevancy of the Christ-event highlights the essential, foundational nature of Christology to 
Balthasar’s entire scheme of theology.   
2) Aidan Nichols on Balthasar 
Aidan Nichols, our second example, chooses to focus not on a relational scenario but on 
four words to interpret the works of Balthasar (being, form, freedom, logic).55 In essence, he 
takes Balthasar’s theology back to the philosophical transcendentals of beauty, goodness, and 
truth and indicates that Balthasar believes one engages with reality through the senses and 
particular, concrete experiences.56 Nichols also makes note of Balthasar’s emphasis on reality as 
a gift, thereby placing humanity in the position of responder instead of creator.57 According to 
Nichols, Balthasar sees the transcendentals as bonds between God and the world, and even 
though each element has its distinct function in Balthasar’s theology, his inclusion of the three 
together in one trilogy demonstrates a commitment to unity and harmony of being. Nichols cites 
one of Balthasar’s favourite sayings, Die Wahrheit ist symphonisch (truth is symphonic), to 
explain Balthasar’s choice of structure and theological methodology.58  
Nichols’s second word, form, relates to Balthasar’s treatment of aesthetics and his 
attempt to answer the question of how we receive revelation. For Balthasar, it is through the 
beauty of creation and through the person of Jesus Christ who is the ultimate expression of 
revelation. Balthasar borrows his definition of beauty from Aquinas, locating it at the 
intersection of form59 and splendour, and has no trouble translating this into the union of human 
and divine and extending the analogy to Christ’s death and resurrection. By viewing these 
elements (form and splendour) as one instead of two separate entities, Balthasar draws a 
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connection between beauty and love, noting that a confrontation with mystery, specifically in 
something removed from the observer, draws forth wonder, admiration, and even ecstasy.  
The third word, freedom, is Nichols’s choice for the theme of Balthasar’s Theo-Drama. 
As we have already noted, for Balthasar, freedom has two expressions: freedom of determination 
and freedom of consent. As is to be expected, he finds both in Christ who is not only the actor in 
God’s drama but also the one who consents to a sacrificial self-emptying in order to take on the 
role of mediator between God and humanity. Freedom, however, is ultimately demonstrated for 
Balthasar in the Trinitarian relationship, what Nichols describes as the “greatness and liveliness 
of their loving interaction.”60 Absolute freedom is expressed not only as continuous self-gift 
within the divine Trinity but in the generous invitation to humanity to partake in the triune life, a 
life of eternal increase. Nichols’s treatment of Theo-Drama is more philosophical than dramatic 
as he traces Balthasar’s movement from explicating the analogy of being to describing the 
analogy of freedom to focusing on the analogy of charity or love.61 According to Nichols, 
Balthasar’s analogy of being will always find its way to love because for him, existence is 
ultimately a gift. 
Nichols’s explanation of the final word, logic, begins with this statement: “Balthasar is 
not so much interested in absolute reason as in unconditional love.”62 For this reason, Balthasar’s 
treatment of truth involves four aspects: nature, freedom, mystery, and participation. It is this last 
aspect of participation which lends some insight into Balthasar’s perspective of truth. For him, 
things are knowable because God knows them, therefore all knowing, all truth, and all logic, are 
simply participation in what God already knows, in God’s self-communication. As a result, all 
truth points toward the transcendent, triune God.63 Nichols rightly surmises that while these four 
words (being, form, freedom, logic) might be major themes within Balthasar’s work, they all end 
up, sooner or later, at love.  
How does Nichols fare with regard to the three-fold criteria of bringing clarity to 
Balthasar’s work, establishing the foundation of Balthasar’s thought, and allowing for flexibility 
in interpretation? My assessment is that Nichols’s concentration on four words does bring a good 
amount of clarity and focus to Balthasar’s thought. As well, Nichols’s expansion of each concept 
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uncovers Balthasar’s emphasis on love as a foundational, motivating element in his theology. 
Where Nichols seems to fall short is in allowing for flexibility; having corralled Balthasar’s ideas 
neatly around four posts, Nichols has managed to summarize and, to some extent, systematize 
the theologian’s purposely unsystematic (traditionally speaking) writings. To say that Nichols is 
working at cross-purposes to Balthasar would be an overstatement, but perhaps one could say 
that Nichols is not attentive enough to Balthasar’s methodology and therefore, glosses over some 
of the deliberate, creative excursions scattered throughout Balthasar’s trilogy because he views 
them as inessentials.  
3) Karen Kilby on Balthasar 
Karen Kilby, our final example of a contemporary theologian engaging with Balthasar 
(specifically his trilogy), draws the reader’s attention to four recurring images: the picture, the 
play, fulfillment, and the circle. These are worth looking at in some detail because of their value 
in deciphering Balthasar’s work and their unique position in the spectrum of theological 
methodology. By employing images instead of resorting to summarization or thematic reduction, 
Kilby succeeds in following Balthasar’s lead by incorporating theological aesthetics as method 
instead of merely treating it as subject matter. This places her work in close proximity to 
Balthasar’s proposal to make beauty the first access point for encounter. It is important to note 
that I cite Kilby’s work primarily to highlight her approach to Balthasar via images and not to 
incorporate her overall critique of Balthasar which is a bit heavy-handed.64    
The first significant image which Kilby sees in Balthasar’s trilogy is a person viewing a 
great work of art. This image, which is arguably the focal point of The Glory of the Lord, 
captures two moments which, according to Balthasar, characterise the encounter of beauty: 
beholding and being enraptured.65 By using these two ideas, Balthasar seeks to bring Aquinas’s 
species and lumen (form and splendour) into one scene, inseparable. Balthasar states that “the 
content (Gehalt) does not lie behind the form (Gestalt), but within it,” thereby identifying 
content with an interior light or radiance.66 What Kilby finds significant about this image 
(looking at a work of art) is how it not only insists on a deep connection between the beholder 
and the splendour she beholds, but how it demands that the unity between content and form be 
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maintained in order for beauty to remain. She observes that, “If perceiving beauty requires the 
perception of form, and form essentially has to do with the totality of a work, then an approach to 
Scripture which systematically pulls the totality apart in order, as it imagines, really to get to the 
bottom of things, is doomed from the start to miss all that is of most value.”67 While this is 
clearly in reference to Balthasar’s critique of biblical criticism, an interpretive method which was 
gaining popularity among theologians in his time, it would be a shame to dismiss his emphasis 
on beauty as merely reactionary. What Balthasar manages to accomplish by utilizing the simple 
image of a person beholding a work of art is to bring together numerous theological themes such 
as unity, revelation, faith, grace, experience, witness, and surrender. This defining image also 
deftly sets a distinct trajectory for the practice of biblical scholarship, philosophy, and 
spirituality, keeping these disciplines away from the pitfalls of foundationalism and 
sensationalism. Beauty, as Balthasar’s first word, serves him well.   
The second image which Kilby identifies is the play. This figures prominently in the 
second part of Balthasar’s trilogy, Theo-Drama. The metaphor of a theatrical play offers a way 
to interpret history as a dramatic story. At the heart of this image (perhaps more accurately 
termed a performance) is the interplay of divine and human freedom, and specifically, human 
freedom viewed as a direct result of divine freedom. In using the concept of drama, Balthasar 
seeks to showcase not only unity, as he does with beauty, but the totality of God’s interaction 
with the world. Because Balthasar sees humanity as being thrust upon the stage of the divine 
author’s play, there are no spectators to this drama. As Kilby observes, “the drama of God’s 
dealings with the world is all-encompassing, sucking everything into itself, making impossible 
the notion of any place – or indeed any person or any thinking – outside the play.”68 In effect, 
Balthasar situates world history as a play within a play, the drama of humanity becoming a mere 
scene in the unfolding drama within the Trinity. Incorporating the image of a divine play proves 
to be a viable and unique theological approach and yet, it does not come without complications, 
specifically the fact that human beings, even theologians, can only ever have a very limited 
understanding of the divine story.  
Fulfillment, the third image in Kilby’s short list, is more of a writing device than an 
actual image. It refers to Balthasar’s tendency to set out an array of options, all of which fall 
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short of adequately addressing a complex theological issue. He then proceeds to present the 
reader with a concept which encapsulates all the fractured ideas into one overarching theory, 
bringing them into completion and fulfillment much like a dramatic denouement. A prime 
example of this appears in the first volume of Theo-Drama where Balthasar lists nine different 
trends of modern theology: event, history, orthopraxy, dialogue, political theory, futurism, 
function, role, and freedom and evil. Balthasar admits that each “contains something right, even 
something indispensable,”69 but concludes that none are adequate to provide a strong theological 
basis.70 Balthasar suggests that his theological dramatic theory is the meeting point, the 
fulfillment, indeed the culmination of these nine theological streams. A few questions arise from 
Balthasar’s proposal. Was this culmination inevitable? Has theology been moving all along 
towards a dramatic theology? Or has Balthasar cleverly set up a multi-limbed straw man in order 
to knock it down and build a better version? The answer, I believe, is No on all counts. Though 
the totality of a theological dramatic theory is no doubt overstated by Balthasar, he does prove it 
to be a fairly robust apparatus on which to practice a living and lively theology.  
Kilby cautions the reader against accepting Balthasar’s premise that not only has he 
managed to identify the limited theological options available, but he has also found the solution 
which will draw them together into one all-encompassing theological theory. What Balthasar has 
succeeded in doing is to demonstrate a novel approach to theology which bypasses many of the 
pitfalls found in the rational bias characteristic of modern theology and Neo-Scholasticism in 
particular. This is due in large part to Balthasar’s Christo-centricity which serves as a guiding 
force throughout all of his works. In reference to his penchant for speaking in terms of 
fulfilment, Balthasar is not really touting a new methodology but a new way of framing 
Christology. As mentioned earlier, Kilby believes that at times the theologian oversteps his 
authority in its application. She states: “…to suppose that all things must be related to Christ is 
one thing, but to suppose that one can know the relation of all things to Christ is quite a different 
thing.” She goes on to say that, “the strong sense that Balthasar has of Christ as fulfillment of all 
things seems matched by an equally strong sense of his own capacity to see and describe this 
universal fulfilling.”71 While this is a valid critique in some ways, it is one which could be 
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levelled at most theologians, Kilby included. We are always speaking of matters beyond our 
reach. That being said, I believe Balthasar’s specific tendency in this regard is perhaps a 
symptom of occasionally slipping outside the drama into the role of an exterior narrator, or to put 
it another way, lapsing into epic mode. In an attempt to bring all things together under Christ and 
establish the unity of truth, Balthasar can wander into ambitious extrapolation. Perhaps his 
overreaching is also a by-product of his ability as a polymath; whatever the case, at times it does 
threaten to put the cohesiveness of his work at risk.  
It is possible to view the final image identified by Kilby, a radiating circle, as somewhat 
of an antidote to Balthasar’s tendency to overreach. One of the advantages of the image of the 
radiating circle is that it clearly identifies the centre (for Balthasar, it is ultimately Christ) while 
at the same time allowing for variance and divergence in theological application and 
development. This points to an open-ended and generous theology unlikely to fall into the trap of 
enforcing a closed system, a weakness which I suggest is present in the concept of fulfillment.  
The rays of the circle run both ways, and for Balthasar this means that all things originate in 
Christ and return to Christ. As a side note, Kilby places Balthasar’s convergence of nine modern 
theological trends in this category. However, I believe they are better suited to the previous 
concept due to Balthasar’s conclusion that in Theo-Drama, “each of them can find what it 
lacks,”72 a statement resonant with finality and fulfillment and the suggestion of a closed 
system.73 Of particular importance to radiance is the idea that the centre, to some extent, is 
shrouded in mystery, undefinable and invisible.74 The person of Christ and the action of the 
Cross can be identified as central, but they cannot be dissected or definitively explained. Of all 
the images, the one of a radiating circle seems to best capture Balthasar’s commitment to a 
theology rooted in mystery and freedom. In addition, the circle also provides a way for Balthasar 
to embrace multiplicity instead of scaling down or even bankrupting certain perspectives or 
narratives. What the radiating circle does not provide is a strong framework for relating the 
different rays which are streaming from or moving toward the centre; it merely pulls all things 
back to the core. This is where the other three images identified by Kilby (picture, play, and 
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fulfilment) must step in to provide a frame of reference and some context for relationship 
between different streams, characters, events, actions, and viewpoints.    
I realize that I have taken a great deal of time to introduce the four images which Kilby 
uses as keys to engage with Balthasar’s theology. The reason, I hope, is rather obvious: of the 
three scholars mentioned above, I believe that Kilby comes the closest to finding a starting point 
which sets her on a trajectory analogous to Balthasar’s. She makes very little attempt at 
summarization or consolidation or even systematization, but wisely pulls on a few threads which 
are meant to lead the reader into the rich tapestry of Balthasar’s variegated thought, free to 
explore for themselves. Howsare, through his repeated reference to the scenario of the mother 
and child, succeeds in setting the reader on a relational, encounter-based trajectory which is 
robust enough to guide one through Balthasar’s themes of beauty, freedom, and truth. However, 
the simple scenario is rather limited in illuminating specific, complex theological concepts such 
as the Trinitarian community and the Passion of Christ. His use of a question regarding the 
relevance of the historical event of Jesus Christ is an attempt to fill in these gaps, but proves to 
be mostly referential and static, originating outside of Balthasar’s work itself and thus providing 
no compelling impetus into his ideas.  
In contrast to Kilby and Howsare, Nichols chooses to focus not on images or scenes 
which open up to multiple perspectives and foster engagement and fascination (as Balthasar so 
aptly illustrates with his example of someone gazing at a work of art), but more on delivering a 
concise treatment of Balthasar’s trilogy through philosophical concepts and key words. His 
summarisation is no doubt meant to be helpful for someone new to the Swiss theologian’s works, 
but Nichols’s approach ends up resembling an attempt to contain the prolific theologian instead 
of opening a door for further investigation. While Nichols, with his “Coles Notes” version of 
Balthasar, does indeed make the ideas of Balthasar much clearer than the theologian manages to 
do himself, the beauty and surprise of encounter are mostly lost. If one is to set a trajectory for 
engaging with Balthasar’s work, the starting point must be closely tied to wonder and 
fascination, remembering that Balthasar chose beauty as his first word, not reason or truth.  
The Passivity Problem 
Having taken some time to address and illustrate the implications of starting point, I now 
turn my attention to an issue which arises from Balthasar’s choice of starting point: divine 
initiative. Because Balthasar casts the Godhead in all the primary creative and dramatic roles 
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(author, director, actor) the only allocation left for humanity is as the audience, a decision which, 
at first glance, suggests divine exclusivity instead of invitation. However, when one begins to 
unpack Balthasar’s treatment of the role of audience, it becomes apparent that though a 
heightened view of divine initiative is definitely present, it is not meant to isolate or alienate 
humanity. Instead, it is meant to emphasise the abundant nature of divine generosity and the 
extreme lengths to which God goes to include humanity in the divine drama.  
Balthasar indicates that in Theo-Drama, “man is startled out of his spectator’s seat and 
dragged onto the ‘stage’; the distinction between stage and auditorium becomes fluid,”75 leaving 
no one excluded from the story. While this (especially the use of the verb “dragged”) is strong 
language and seemingly indicative of a heavy-handed theology from above instead of an 
interplay of freedoms, one must view this phrase in the context of Balthasar’s whole theological 
dramatic theory. Elsewhere, Balthasar tempers this idea of imposition with gentler references to 
freedom: “Through the paradigm of life presented on the stage, the spectator is invited to fashion 
his life along the lines indicated by the play’s solution; at the same time he is free to distance 
himself from it critically.” And later on, Balthasar writes that, “the audience’s presence is not 
passive – quite the reverse; if the performance is to succeed, it must be active, a willingness to 
enter into the action.”76 Balthasar cites German philosopher and playwright, Johann Christoph 
Friedrich von Schiller, to reinforce his stance regarding a free audience:  
True art is not concerned merely with some momentary illusion. Its concern is a serious 
one: it does not wish merely to transport man to a momentary dream of freedom, it wants 
to make him really and truly free, by awakening a power in him, and by exercising and 
shaping it, so that he may transform the world of the senses … into a free creation of our 
spirit.77  
 
I am making a case for the invitational and responsive nature of Balthasar’s Theo-Drama, 
but his exposition of the topic is not without problems. For instance, in his description of the 
theatrical dynamic in erotic terms, he states that the stage is “resolute aggression” and the 
audience is “female, expectation.”78 It is not uncommon for dramatists to associate the stage, 
especially the thrust stage which is closely affiliated with Shakespearean plays, with similar 
sexual imagery (stage as male and audience as female). Though the power of the stage is 
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acknowledged in these gendered metaphors, the sense need not be one of dominance; the 
depiction carries an implication of intimacy between the actors onstage and those witnessing the 
performance. Nevertheless, Balthasar’s statement above strikes a discordant note when read in 
tandem with his writings on finite and infinite freedom.79 A case could be made that Balthasar is 
merely citing one viewpoint found in theatre theory, or perhaps his inclusion of this metaphor is 
partially a reaction to modernist, self-reliant tendencies, but I believe that it does hint at 
Balthasar’s occasional over-zealous characterisation of the divine actor’s initiative which results 
in a lessening of human freedom.  
These lapses in consistency notwithstanding, in general Balthasar infuses the audience 
with considerable potency, despite shutting it out of any performing role, at least initially. 
Balthasar calls members of the audience to be both spectators in the theatre while at the same 
time being actors in the “play of existence.”80 In straddling the two realms, the audience becomes 
aware that the stage, though not equal to real life, is not entirely cut off from the world. Balthasar 
also refers to the pleasure of witnessing a live, theatrical performance. This pleasure goes beyond 
the excitement an audience experiences when viewing an aspect of life on display, even beyond 
the anticipation of encountering meaning in the midst of that experience. Balthasar locates the 
pleasure of the theatrical audience in the uniting of two elements: self-projection (with the 
possibility of transformation) and solution (insight). Shakespeare famously wrote that, “All the 
world’s a stage and all the men and women merely players.”81 These lines lead into a monologue 
by the melancholy character, Jacques, in which he describes the seven stages of man’s life and 
compares them to seven acts in a play. Because of its sobering tone and its depressing last line 
which alludes to the hopeless end of man, “sans teeth, sans eyes, sans taste, sans everything,” the 
speech serves as a sobering reminder of the fate that awaits all human beings.82 However, its 
main purpose is to heighten the joy contained in the following acts and ultimately, prove the fool, 
Jacques, wrong. This famous monologue illustrates the point being made by Balthasar about the 
audience: it comes not only to witness life in its joys and sorrows but also to feel alive. In order 
to do this, Balthasar insists that the audience must come to the performance open, responsive, 
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and willing to be drawn into the drama. There must be no room for neutral or objective 
observation, for this would defeat the audience’s ability to be carried away to places it might 
otherwise avoid, places which deeply disturb, places which are painful, or places which urge one 
toward transformation.83 
Nevertheless, the openness of the audience is not without qualification. Though not 
technically an actor on the stage, the audience nevertheless has an active expectation, “hoping to 
discover itself in this projected form, hoping to find its own tracks – and the excited anticipation 
of what may be encountered along this road, what will happen wither from without or from 
above.”84 Balthasar indicates that the audience has various expectations: there is an expectation 
that the performance will have some sort of effect, there is an expectation that the play will both 
resemble life and be more than life, and there is also an expectation that the performance will 
offer a solution or revelation to the audience, be it as simple as the ability to laugh in the face of 
troubles or as profound as a call to action. Balthasar suggests that, “the performance lets the 
audience participate … in a way that seems to give it a sense of supernatural insight.”85 At the 
heart of these expectations is the desire to be changed.  
The expectations which the audience brings into the theatre are necessarily accompanied 
by choices: the audience may judge the performance to be substandard and demonstrate that 
disappointment by boo-ing, hissing, or leaving the theatre. The audience may choose either to be 
carried along by the performance or to disengage from it, refusing to believe the story presented 
by the actors. While an audience sitting in its seats might appear relatively passive and purely 
receptive, this is simply not the case.  
Philosopher Jacques Ranciére insists that listening and gazing are not passive pastimes, 
and challenges what he believes is an artificial opposition between viewing and acting. “The 
spectator also acts, like the pupil or scholar. She observes, selects, compares, interprets. She links 
what she sees to a host of other things that she has seen on other stages, in other kinds of 
places.”86 Instead of trying to close the divide between the actor and spectator, thereby making 
the spectator part of the action, Ranciére suggests that we adjust our perception of the spectator:  
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Being a spectator is not some passive condition that we should transform into activity. It 
is our normal situation. We also learn and teach, act and know as spectators who all the 
time link what we see to what we have seen and said, done and dreamed. There is no 
more a privileged form than there is a privileged starting point. … We do not have to 
transform spectators into actors and ignoramuses into scholars. We have to recognize the 
knowledge at work in the ignoramus and the activity peculiar to the spectator. Every 
spectator is already an actor in her story; every actor, every man of action, is the spectator 
of the same story.87 
 
What Ranciére so insightfully points out here is that the theatre has overvalued the actor and 
underestimated the watching, listening spectator. While Balthasar would have the audience of 
humanity dragged on stage in his theological dramatic theory, Ranciére sees no need to eject the 
audience from its place. He views the actor and the spectator as two different members of a 
community, a community composed of narrators and interpreters, of teachers and learners. The 
theatre is best served by a robust community of actors and narrators as well as spectators and 
interpreters. The emancipation of the spectator, according to Ranciére, is obtained by blurring the 
lines between those who act and those who look, and by making the boundary between stage and 
audience fluid, as Balthasar suggests. This is achieved not by making everyone an actor but by 
recognizing that spectators are important and vital members of a collective body.88  
 Re-thinking the role of spectator is helpful in offsetting or reframing some of Balthasar’s 
apparent heavy-handedness when it comes to divine initiative.89 Placing all the emphasis on the 
authority, sovereignty, and absolute action of God in Theo-Drama runs the risk of having divine 
freedom overshadow human freedom. Therefore, it seems more fitting to reorient dramatic 
theology around the idea of invitation. What comes to the forefront, then, is a benevolent author 
offering a grand story, an epic drama, an all-encompassing performance to an expectant, 
watchful audience, and inviting its participation. Invitation is a forceful concept in many ways, 
because though it can be refused, it can never be undone, and though it is compelling, it should 
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89 To be fair, Balthasar does not portray the human subject as entirely passive. Rodney Howsare comments: “Now, 
for Balthasar, the subject is not simply passive in this process. The subject is clearly spiritually equipped to receive, 
judge and name the things which appear. Knowing occurs as a result of an encounter between a subject and an 
object – and their common belonging in Being must always be kept in mind – but what is known is determined by 
what the object gives of itself. The proper attitude of the subject, then, is not that of grasping or attempting to 
control the object (which is why Balthasar rejects the modern notion that knowledge is power), but is that of an 
active receptivity which makes a space for the object to unfold for the subject.” Howsare, Balthasar: A Guide for 
the Perplexed, 79.   
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never be associated with aggression. Every invitation requires at least two parties, the initiator 
and the responder, but these parties must never be posed as opponents or rivals; invitation cannot 





Is Gift Possible? 
 
The name of God is an event, or rather … it harbors an event … An event is an irruption, 
an excess, an overflow, a gift beyond economy, which tears open the closed circles of 
economics.1 
 
Before moving on to examine the element of human response, the second Yes, it is 
necessary to look more closely at the concept of gift which I believe is foundational to both 
theology and theatre. Dramatic theology must have generosity at its core in order for genuine 
encounter to occur. More specifically, divine initiative and human responsiveness are 
meaningless without the presence of self-gift. If there is no benevolent offer from one party to 
another, their coming together can never escape the dynamics of control and power; in other 
words, authentic collaboration and community rely on gift-giving. In this chapter, I look at the 
concept of gift in sociology (Marcel Mauss) and philosophy (Jacques Derrida and Jean-Luc 
Marion) in order to bring some precision to the term before explaining the function of gift in 
both theology and theatre. I contend that the outward-focused, over-abundant nature of gift is in 
constant operation behind the scenes in dramatic theology, generating forward motion while 
resisting self-serving egoism, entropic disorder, and rigidity. One could say that the power of 
Yes is found in its dynamic and catalytic quality. Yes is an invitation, a gesture of communion, a 
declaration of intent, and an opening up of possibilities, but all this is true because it is first a 
gift. It is vital to understand the risky magnanimity of gift in order to fully grasp the potency of 
the dramatic Yes. 
If we take a moment to think about gift-giving rituals in contemporary society, the 
experience is, for the most part, an impoverished one. Instead of involving genuine, loving 
generosity, our gift-giving rituals tend to revolve around transactions, expectations, status, and 
even forms of bribery. Despite this tarnished model of gift, people nevertheless instinctively 
seem to recognise the difference between good and bad gifts and have some concept of the 
perfect gift. Russell W. Belk, who researches consumer practices and their relation to material 
goods, finds six characteristics of the perfect gift revealed in the O. Henry story, “The Gift of the 
                                                          




Magi.” The story tells of a young, destitute couple who give Christmas gifts to each other at 
great cost to themselves. When the husband presents his wife with jeweled combs for her hair 
(which she has cut off to fund her purchase for him) and the wife gives her husband a gold watch 
chain (for a watch which he has sold to acquire his gift for her), they are both left with, for all 
intents and purposes, useless gifts. And yet, Belk observes, “we are moved by the certainty that 
each lover has given to the other a pure and perfect gift.”2 This recognition suggests that what is 
most important in a gift is not the actual, material item, but the intent and symbolic message 
behind it. How do we recognize or characterise the perfect gift? Belk suggests that the giver’s 
“agapic love” toward the recipient, a concept which has much in common with the Hebrew idea 
of chesed (mercy and kindness based on relationship), is what fuels the perfect gift.3 “When 
apagic love motivates a gift, it is not selected and given to communicate a calculated message at 
all, but rather to express and celebrate our love for the other. It is spontaneous, affective, and 
celebratory rather than premeditated, cognitive, and calculated to achieve certain ends.”4  
Gift, according to Belk, must be free from conditions and manipulation. Drawing from 
the story of Della and Jim in “The Gift of the Magi,” Belk highlights six characteristics of the 
perfect gift: 1) Sacrifice. The giver exhibits selfless generosity and commitment to the beloved 
through their willingness to make an extraordinary sacrifice. 2) Altruism. The perfect gift 
displays the giver’s concern for the recipient’s well-being apart from self-serving egoism or 
utilitarian motivation. 3) Luxury. The perfect gift is not a necessity filling lower-order needs; it 
falls within the category of extravagance, being a “tangible demonstration of the richness and 
depth of the love the giver feels toward the recipient.”5 4) Appropriateness. The perfect gift is 
unique and specifically suited for the recipient. It reveals that the giver is attentive to the 
recipient’s wishes and desires without being told outright what they are and shows a profound 
understanding of and empathy toward the recipient. 5) Surprise. A gift that is requested negates 
its value, Belk insists. The perfect gift is given sans obligation, reflecting magnanimity on the 
part of the giver. Its spontaneity reveals its altruistic motive. 6) Delight. The perfect gift is 
something the recipient desires and it brings them delight. Despite being extravagant, it carries 
                                                          
2 Russell W. Belk, “The Perfect Gift,” in Gift Giving: A Research Anthology, eds. Cele Otnes and Richard F. Beltramini 
(Bowling Green, OH: Bowling Green State University Popular Press, 1996), 59. 
3 Belk, “The Perfect Gift,” 60. 
4 Ibid., 61. 
5 Ibid., 65. 
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no indication of bribery, expectation, or manipulation. It is entirely outside the realm of a 
reciprocal transaction, seeking only to bring delight to the recipient, asking for nothing in return.  
Belk admits that the perfect gift, at least according to his definition, remains an elusive 
ideal instead of common practice. Nevertheless, he believes that the ideal should inform the 
donor’s underlying motivations and serve as a helpful guide for gift-giving practices. Perhaps the 
most difficult aspect to accept is Belk’s insistence that the giver is free from all self-interest and 
seeks only to delight the recipient. Ethicist Paul F. Camenisch fills in what might be seen as a 
gap in Belk’s treatment of the ideal. What Camenisch recognises, and some of this is no doubt 
due to Marcel Mauss’s influential work on the topic, is that the relational aspect of gift means 
that the motivations cannot be as carefully parsed as Belk supposes. In other words, self-interest 
cannot be totally eradicated from the donor because the nature of the relationship or bond 
between the giver and the recipient means that it is impossible for them to be completely 
separated from each other. The desires of lovers are often intricately entwined, and to suggest 
that the perfect gift divorces these desires instead of bringing them into union is a somewhat 
ironic result of Belk’s definitive shunning of egoism and, one could add, would demonstrate a 
lack of self-awareness on the part of the ideal donor. In fact, Camenisch makes the bond between 
the giver and the recipient an integral part of his rather precise definition of gift: 
…a gift therefore will be understood as 1) some value 2) intentionally bestowed by a 
donor who gives it primarily to benefit the recipient upon 3) a recipient who a) accepts it 
knowing that it is given as a gift, b) agreeing with the donor that it is a benefit, c) who has 
no right to or claim upon it and d) who is not expected to pay for it in the future in any 
usual way (i.e., in no specific way in which roughly equivalent value is returned); and 4) 
which brings into being a new moral relationship between recipient and donor, part of 
which consists of recipient obligations to the donor and the acceptance of limits upon the 
use of the gift.6 
 
His fourth point, in particular, contrasts quite noticeably with Belk’s insistence that a pure gift is 
free from obligation or expectation of any sort. Highlighting the bond which a gift forges 
between the donor and the recipient, Camenisch has no qualms about using words like 
“obligations” and “limits” to describe what comes into play when a gift is given. While Belk 
attempts to isolate the perfect gift, Camenisch contextualises it by viewing it as a catalyst for a 
“new moral relationship.” In order to better understand these different approaches to gift (ideal 
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and relational), I turn to the works of two seminal thinkers on the topic: Marcel Mauss and 
Jacques Derrida. In addition, I will incorporate some of the ideas of French philosopher Jean-Luc 
Marion as a corrective to certain extremes encountered in Mauss and Derrida.   
The Relational Gift: Marcel Mauss 
French sociologist Marcel Mauss’s influential work, Essai sur le don (The Gift), 
originally published in 1925, is liberally cited in articles, chapters, and books written on the topic 
of gift. This is not without reason. Mauss’s second-hand observations of gift-giving practices in 
what he terms “archaic societies” in Polynesia, Melanesia, and the Pacific Northwest led him to 
conclude that societal ties are formed through practices of reciprocity and exchange which serve 
as informal (and sometimes formal) contracts between individuals and groups. Mauss calls this 
system “total services,” indicating that the so-called gift economy provides expression for 
religious, juridical, economic, familial, moral, and political structures and values.7 In Mauss’s 
view, there is no such thing as a free gift. He writes: “Almost always such services have taken 
the form of the gift, the present generously given even when, in the gesture accompanying the 
transaction, there is only a polite fiction, formalism, and social deceit, and when really there is 
obligation and economic self-interest.”8 This statement, somewhat contradictory in nature, brings 
up an important question. If the social practice of generosity is associated with, as Mauss 
observes, obligation, deceit, and self-interest, can it really be termed a gift?  
Throughout Mauss’s treatment of the subject, he uses various terms to delineate different 
aspects of the gift economy practiced in certain regions. In the aboriginal tribes of the American 
Northwest, potlatch, a Chinook term meaning “to feed” or “to consume,” is used to describe the 
highly developed network of rites, political ranking, and economic services which stem from an 
assumption of rivalry and hostility. What is at stake in the giving of gifts is one’s honour, 
prestige, and authority, and failure to comply with expected contractual obligations regarding 
gifts brings with it severe consequences.9 In societies that are not agonistic in principle, other 
terms reflect the role that gifts play in the economics of the clan. In Samoan and Maori contexts, 
taonga (personal possession) is closely linked to identity of the person, the clan, and the earth, 
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and because of this, is seen to possess a spiritual power, a hau. When taonga is given to another 
person, the hau of the person goes with it. For these tribes, the gift is not merely an inanimate 
object but an animated commodity. Mauss explains: “Even when it has been abandoned by the 
giver, it still possesses something of him. Through it the giver has a hold over the 
beneficiary…”10 The strength of the taonga’s hau is seen to be so far-reaching that it serves to 
facilitate the circulation of wealth as goods are passed or traded from one to another until the 
item eventually lands back in the original donor’s hands, having strengthened societal ties 
through bestowing authority, prestige, and honour as it made the rounds.11  
While these examples of “total services” seem to have more in common with exchange 
and transaction than gift, one can observe certain key elements of Belk’s “perfect gift” making 
an appearance. Sacrifice, appropriateness, and perhaps even delight can be found as one reads 
Mauss’s observations of reciprocation and transaction in various archaic societies. While the gift 
economies which Mauss describes miss the mark on many fronts as true gifts, there is one 
component, most notably present in the Maoris, which seems of special importance: the idea of 
hau or spiritual animation in the object itself. If one accepts that a gift is more than a material 
object, more than a symbolic representation, more than a mere tool used to convey the donor’s 
intent, then the gift itself takes on an elevated status. This merit comes not from its monetary 
value but because of its unique association with the giver. In effect, it carries the giver to the 
recipient and becomes a bonding agent between them. Mauss observes that in Maori tradition, 
“[T]o make a gift of something to someone is to make a present of some part of oneself.”12 He 
goes on to explain how this idea becomes the basis of societal ties: “In this system of ideas one 
clearly and logically realizes that one must give back to another person what is really part and 
parcel of his nature and substance, because to accept something from somebody is to accept part 
of his spiritual essence, of his soul.” 13  
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There are two parts to the concept of hau which I have chosen to exclude from the 
definition of gift because, in my estimation, they appear as distortions instead of central aspects 
of spiritual animation. The first is the idea that the hau of an object is always trying to get back 
to its place of origin; therefore the recipient is obliged to pass on, exchange, or return the gift (or 
something seen to be its equivalent). To retain the so-called gift would be to put oneself in 
opposition to a powerful spiritual force and risk great personal peril.14 The second is the idea that 
by giving a gift, the donor is able to exert magical or religious power over the recipient. Because 
the recipient is thought to accept part of the donor’s soul by accepting the gift, the object 
becomes a medium of control, a means whereby the donor takes up residence in the recipient’s 
life and influences it.15 In my view, these two aspects suffuse the ritual with occult powers which 
are at cross-purposes to the intent of gift, serving to enslave and curse the recipient instead of 
delight or bless them. While I acknowledge that these magical notions are traditionally 
associated with the idea of hau, I believe they are more a reflection of the desire to dominate 
others through manipulation than an inherent trait of spiritual animation or, for that matter, gift. 
Philosophers Jean-Luc Marion and Jacques Derrida argue that Mauss is not writing about 
gift at all, and his use of the words, gift and exchange, as if they are synonymous (evident even 
in the title of his book, The Gift: The Form and Reason for Exchange in Archaic Societies) is 
highly problematic. I will engage more fully with the ideas of Derrida and Marion in the next 
section, but I bring up the argument in order to make an important point. The insistence that gift 
and exchange cannot exist in the same space situates gift, for the most part, outside of 
relationship. The notion of pure gift tends to force all action to be focused in one direction: from 
donor to donee. Virtually no room is given for the donee to become, in turn, a donor, because the 
event would then become an exchange and not a gift, or so the reasoning goes. Admittedly, in 
most of Mauss’s examples, this is indeed the case. Gift and exchange are equated with 
obligation, and therefore it is no surprise that certain scholars find the two concepts 
incompatible. However, if the idea of exchange is viewed through the lens of relationship, the 
reciprocal action then becomes natural instead of forced.  
                                                          
14 While one could interpret this aspect of hau as a further expression of benevolence, a recognition that an object 
cannot be definitively owned, that the creation always returns to its creator, I believe it is mostly a reflection of 
power dynamics.   
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with the idea of sacrament. However, the negative consequences associated with the ritual (enslaving the 
recipient to the donor) seem to make this correlation untenable.   
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Within relationship, an act of reciprocity does not negate a gift as much as it validates the 
bond. The strength of Mauss’s work, I believe, comes from his emphasis on the connections 
which gift exchange forms between people. One could say that gifts carry the glue which binds 
primitive societies together. Mauss does not attempt to isolate gifts from gift practices nor does 
he feel the need to carefully separate pure gift from obligatory exchange. What results is a mixed 
bag or melting pot, Mauss admits.16 By allowing the idea of magnanimity to bump up against 
aspects of economics, religion, and politics, Mauss illustrates that in most societies, these 
elements are intertwined in a way which fosters mutually beneficial relationships between 
individuals and groups. In his conclusion, Mauss writes: 
All in all, just as these gifts are not freely given, they are also not really disinterested. 
They already represent for the most part total counter-services, not only made with a 
view to paying for services or things, but also to maintaining a profitable alliance, one 
that cannot be rejected. … We can therefore see where this force resides. It is one that is 
both mystical and practical, one that ties clans together and at the same time constrains 
them to carry out exchange. Even in these societies, the individual and the group, or 
rather the subgroup, have always felt they had a sovereign right to refuse a contract. It is 
this that gives the stamp of generosity to this circulation of goods.17 
 
What Mauss brings to the discussion is the notion that a gift cannot be observed or studied in 
isolation. Gift-giving practices are always situated within some type of relationship or 
community, and to dissect the event, separating the gift from the interested parties in order to 
arrive at pure gift, strips it of its very power to bind people together. There are (at least) three 
valuable insights one can glean from Mauss’s observations of primitive gift-giving practices 
which are particularly applicable to the topic at hand.  
The first is that gifts build relationships and connect people. Mauss, imperfectly to be 
sure, attempts to show that gifts are more than the sum of their parts. Whenever a gift is given, 
whenever something passes from one hand to the other and a change of possession takes place, 
relationship comes into play. The two parties, donor and donee, are connected in a way they 
were not connected before. Even if the gift becomes an article of contention, such as when the 
would-be recipient refuses the gift, or in a case where the donor takes back what was originally 
intended as a gift, the relationship has, technically, progressed. The connection between the 
donor and donee shifts when a gift changes hands; hopefully, there is an increase in camaraderie 
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and intimacy, but there could also be a move toward antagonism. Whatever the outcome, 
Mauss’s case studies demonstrate that gift-giving changes relationships and ties people together 
in ways they were not connected before. Commenting on Mauss, Paulette W. Kidder notes that 
“gift exchange builds long-term bonds of trust among participants.”18 Similar to the idea of 
invitation discussed in the previous chapter, a gift, once offered, cannot be un-given. This means 
that no matter how the gift scenario plays out, something is set in motion between the giver and 
the recipient, and as a result, the relationship cannot remain static. 
The second insight I take from Mauss is that gifts are not selfless; they carry something 
of the giver. This is related to the concept of spiritual animation or hau which Mauss describes in 
the Maori tribe.19 The gift is not merely a material object moving from one person to the next; 
the gift bears within it a part of the giver. It may be a symbolic gesture demonstrating the giver’s 
feelings of love, it may be a step toward reconciliation - a peace offering meant to extend 
forgiveness and a second chance - or it may be a simple token of familial tenderness, such as 
when a child brings a parent a spontaneous gift of some object they have found or created. The 
gift is unique in that its transference from the donor to the donee conveys an exclusive message 
between the two. An identical gift given between two other parties would not confer the exact 
same communication, because the gift itself is never the message; the real gift is the part of the 
self which the giver is sending with the gift. The material object becomes a medium through 
which the donor can give his or herself to the donee.  
The idea that a gift should be selfless and disinterested is, for the most part, counter-
productive, because holding a gift to this standard eliminates some of the most personal and 
intimate offerings a donor might make. Gifts which are by nature inextricably linked to the giver 
are (mis)interpreted as self-serving gestures under this criterion of selflessness, even though they 
are meant to be vehicles of loving generosity. Items crafted by the donor, personal effects from 
the donor’s collection, photos of the donor, and items which the donor would use together with 
the donee could be perceived as having selfish or mixed motives. However, I posit that these so-
called self-interested gifts are often given with great vulnerability, expressing a desire for closer 
intimacy with the recipient. These types of gifts are perhaps most easily identified in children 
who offer others their scuffed toys and indecipherable drawings. A child might also make a gift 
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of a rock found in their wanderings or some half-eaten bit of candy. Though it is impossible to 
declare these childish gifts completely altruistic, one can identify a certain desire to connect with 
another person in the spontaneous giving of what is close at hand or what is associated with a 
pleasant experience. In fact, the more an object or item is identifiable with the child, the greater 
its value as a gift.  
Contemporary gift-giving etiquette reflects a similar value. David Cheal observes that 
when it comes to gifts, money is thought to be too impersonal and therefore inadequate to fully 
express the commitment and care of the donor.20 Since a monetary gift is a direct result of the 
donor’s hard work and effort, why would it be considered impersonal? The most obvious 
response is that money does not bear the donor’s mark in a unique way; there is no obvious 
connection between a hundred dollar bill and the donor. If one is seeking to reinforce the 
relationship between the giver and the recipient, the gift must be identifiable as coming from a 
particular donor and intended for a particular donee. This uniqueness is highly valued because it 
is seen to convey the care, commitment, and concern which the giver has for the recipient, and 
beyond that, to make the donor more present to the donee, much as the hau did for the Maoris. 
 The third insight found in Mauss’s treatment of gift follows closely from the second, and 
it is the observation that gifts are given in the context of community. Due to the inter-connected 
nature of relationship, what affects one party in the gift equation ends up affecting the other as 
well. Therefore, if a gift given by the donor makes the donee happy, the donor will in all 
likelihood experience an increase in happiness as well. Conversely, a gift which causes distress 
to the donee will no doubt result in stress for the donor and most likely cause him or her to 
initiate a plan of action to rectify the disappointing turn of events. To insist that the donor, in 
order to remain truly altruistic, not share in the joy or disappointment of the recipient, is to deny 
and repress the connection between the two.21 This inter-relational dynamic becomes readily 
apparent in communal settings where gifts given to one person directly or indirectly benefit the 
family, friends, and perhaps even neighbours of the recipient. 
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Likewise, when a gift results in misery or conflict, the donee’s community will be the 
first to know. Sherry, McGrath, and Levy, writing about “The Dark Side of Gift,” conclude that 
because of the role gifts play in a social context, they can have a significant negative impact on 
the individual: “The gift threatens social ties as much as strengthens them. Gifts create internal 
stress by requiring an examination of the canons of propriety and a negotiation of identity: 
imputation and resistance of inauthentic versions of the self are critical elements of this stress.”22 
In other words, social mores serve to make gift-giving practices a slim tightrope which one must 
walk with care, careful not to make a misstep. This brings us back to “total services,” the archaic 
gift economies described by Mauss in intricate and complex detail. Here we also find 
tremendous pressure on donors to convey the correct message through being attentive to the 
timeliness of gifts, through the extension and acknowledgment of credit which accompanies gift-
giving, and through recognition of honour and prestige codes.23 Pointing out the pressure to 
conform to social constructs, as Mauss and Sherry, McGrath, and Levy do, serves to reinforce 
the notion that gifts cannot be viewed solely as binary transactions. We must acknowledge that 
gifts are always given within social contexts.  
The Unconditional Gift: Jacques Derrida and Jean-Luc Marion 
Having highlighted Mauss’s emphasis on the relational aspect of gift, we now turn our 
attention to the other end of the spectrum: the gift in isolation, free from all attachment. The 
thought of Derrida is important here not only because of his deconstruction of certain premises 
associated with gift, but because he provides the dialectic to Mauss’s largely uncritical treatment 
of the concept of gift. Derrida contends that although gift is related to the circulation of goods, it 
should also be that which interrupts reciprocity. He writes: 
If there is gift, the given of the gift (that which one gives, that which is given, the gift as 
given thing or as act of donation) must not come back to the giving. … It must not 
circulate, it must not be exchanged, it must not in any case be exhausted, as a gift, by the 
process of exchange, by the movement of circulation of the circle in the form of return to 
the point of departure. If the figure of the circle is essential to economics, the gift must 
remain aneconomic. Not that it remains foreign to the circle, but it must keep a relation of 
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foreignness to the circle, a relation without relation of familiar foreignness. It is perhaps 
in this sense that the gift is the impossible.”24  
It is important to note that Derrida makes a distinction between “impossible” and “the 
impossible.” Gift, he insists, is the impossible. In this way he seeks to render the notion of gift 
not merely an impossibility within the economic circle of society, but through the addition of the 
definite article, Derrida places gift altogether outside the system of exchange, and ultimately, 
outside time. For Derrida, gift is annihilated or destroyed if there is any “reciprocity, return, 
exchange, countergift, or debt.”25 When a gift is countered with another gift, Derrida holds, the 
gift is, in effect, annulled. When the gift results in a debt, the gift becomes a burden instead of a 
boon. For this reason, the recipient should never give back. In fact, both the recipient and donor 
should not recognise a gift as gift, because as soon as this becomes a factor, the gift has begun to 
give back, if not in material form, then in a symbolic equivalent. The gift, when recognised as 
such, enters into the economic circle and by doing so, is destroyed. Derrida contends that “the 
gift as gift ought not appear as gift: either to the donee or to the donor. It cannot be gift as gift 
except by not being present as gift.”26 As soon as the gift is acknowledged by the donor, Derrida 
insists, it gives back, whether praise, approval, gratification, self-congratulation, or some value 
associated with the giver’s generosity.27 Similarly, as soon as the recipient receives a gift, as 
soon as they take and keep the so-called gift, they are saddled with a debt. It is a debt of gratitude 
and an awareness that the donor has now gained some measure of credit with them.  
What Derrida suggests is that a perfect forgetting on the part of both the donor and the 
donee must take place the instant the gift is given. This keeps the gift from becoming an occasion 
for restitution and repayment. Derrida writes: “From the moment the gift would appear as gift … 
it would be engaged in a symbolic, sacrificial, or economic structure that would annul the gift in 
the ritual circle of the debt.”28 What is also at play here is desire or intent. A gift is fuelled by the 
intent of one person to give something to another. The intent itself, Derrida posits, taints the gift. 
But without desire, without wanting-to-give, without significance as a gift, is it still a gift? 
Because Derrida insists that the gift must simultaneously appear and not appear, one can 
                                                          
24 Jacques Derrida, Given Time: I. Counterfeit Money, trans. Peggy Kamul (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 
1992), 7. 
25 Ibid., 12. 
26 Ibid., 14. 
27 Ibid. 
28 Ibid., 24. 
57 
 
understand why he concludes that it is impossible to converse meaningfully about gift. It 
becomes another name for the impossible.29 
As far as Mauss is concerned, Derrida concludes that the sociologist speaks of 
“everything but the gift.”30 All of Mauss’s work is positioned firmly within the exchange 
economy which Derrida maintains destroys the very idea of gift. Derrida and Mauss are 
obviously speaking about two very different things when they refer to gift. Derrida practically 
chafes at Mauss’s careless juxtaposition of the two words “gift” and “exchange” as if they were 
practically synonymous31 and dedicates an entire chapter to exposing the inconsistencies of 
language and logic in Mauss’s work. Above all, Derrida is perturbed by Mauss’s thoughtless 
association of gift with an economic, social system based on carefully measured, culturally 
dictated give and take. Might I suggest that Derrida’s proposal, an ideal notion of gift which 
renders it synonymous with the impossible, is equally as unhelpful as Mauss’s dubious 
semantics. While Derrida’s extreme linguistic precision takes the concept of gift out of the 
human equation and experience, Mauss paints so widely and freely with his words that the idea 
of gift becomes largely ambiguous. What both men manage to do is make the notion of gift 
somewhat meaningless. 
Jean-Luc Marion, a postmodern philosopher and former student of Derrida, posits a 
variation which brings gift back into the realm of the possible. Marion questions the validity of 
attaching equal value to material and immaterial gains, thus quantifying the benefits of gift-
giving. He argues that rendering the act of giving into a simple transaction which can be shown 
to be part of an exchange economy, where one boon is traded for another, essentially annuls all 
altruism.32 Marion suggests that, “if the gift rests on gratuity, sufficient reason owes it to itself to 
exclude the gift from experience, and therefore from phenomenality: one must render invisible 
everything for which one cannot render reason – and first of all the gift.”33 Thus, he contends, if 
all altruism is negated because it stands outside reason, then God is negated as well. Marion 
points out that the idea of the impossible gift comes from trying to insert gift into a closed 
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system, an economy of give and take, where both sides of the algebraic equation have to add up; 
in order for this to happen, the giver as well as the recipient must give a reasonable account for 
their respective roles. Some of this reasoning is workable, Marion shows, such as when the rich 
give their surplus goods to a humanitarian agency which distributes items of real value to the 
poor. The reason of justice is evident in this scenario where some measure of economic 
equalization is achieved. However, insisting that the gift must be evaluated or approached from 
within the horizon of exchange and economy drastically reduces the possibilities for engagement 
with the idea of gift. Instead of beginning from an economic horizon, Marion suggests that one 
begin with the gift itself.34  
It is then possible to put forth several scenarios which fall outside exchange such as 
anonymous donations, an inheritance, and even gifts to enemies which might incur greater 
animosity instead of any desirable benefit. Marion suggests that, “a gift that is scorned and 
denied, even transformed into an affront, nonetheless remains perfectly and definitely given; this 
desolation even makes it appear with a more sovereign force. It is only to an enemy that I can 
make a gift without risk of finding it taken up in an exchange or trapped in reciprocity.”35 The 
ultimate gift which falls outside of exchange is the gift which is nothing apart from oneself: 
one’s time, attention, care, and even one’s life. Marion recognizes the paradox in this self-gift 
which has great value and no real value at the same time. “In giving this nothing, I give all that I 
have, because I am not giving something that I possess apart from myself, but rather that which I 
am.”36 Marion echoes the idea presented earlier in relation to the Maori concept of hau, which is 
that a true gift is one which reflects the desire to give oneself. Marion observes that any object 
given by a donor to a donee can be judged on a continuum of self-giving. Either the object 
signifies a denial of the gift of self (giving an object in lieu of the self) or it represents a promise 
of the gift of self (giving an object as a token of ongoing self-donation).  
The most obvious theological example of self-gift is the person of Jesus Christ who 
represented not only God’s love and mercy, but God himself.37 The gift of God demonstrated 
through self-sacrifice, that is, Christ’s death on the cross, effectuated humanity’s salvation. 
Another aspect of divine self-gift is that of self-revelation. Jesus said, “Whoever has seen me has 
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seen the Father.”38 A much earlier instance of divine self-revelation can be seen in the encounter 
between the shepherd Moses and God in Exodus 3. When Moses questions the voice speaking to 
him from a burning bush and asks for an identifying name, the response given is YHWH, a form 
of the verb “to be.” While there is much discussion regarding the exact nature of the mysterious 
tetragrammaton and what it says about God, an equally significant point to this story is that the 
Eternal One gives Moses a name which, in contrast to the more common identifier – the God of 
Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob - is entirely self-referential. This form of self-gift transcends the 
functional notion of God “for humanity” and reveals God “in himself.”   
In addition to the aspect of self-donation, this story illustrates another dimension of gift 
which Derrida alludes to when he positions gift outside the realm of possibility. I would like to 
suggest that one way to interpret the idealism which characterises Derrida’s position is to think 
of gift as unconditional and inexhaustible. The problem, according to Derrida, is that as soon as 
something is recognised as a gift, it begins the slippery slide into an economy of exchange and 
obligation between two parties, or at the very least, initiates an inward-facing loop of self-
awareness and egoism. What Derrida does not make allowance for is a being who is above self-
interest and capable of giving unconditionally. What is impossible for Derrida to imagine is 
possible with God because God resides outside the human economy. The conditions which 
Derrida places on gift-giving do not apply when one does not need to exercise forgetfulness in 
order to engage in genuine altruism or when one exists outside of time. Therefore, if we apply 
Derrida’s conditions for the ideal gift to God, the unconditioned One, it is possible to imagine the 
unconditional gift.  
Crucial to Derrida’s notion of gift as “the impossible” are two assumptions: 1) the 
motivation of the giver is never purely benevolent, and 2) the recipient necessarily incurs a form 
of indebtedness. Derrida is right in pointing out that giving the ideal gift is virtually impossible 
in human society, but I believe he is incorrect in assuming that it does not exist at all. As Belk 
observes, people have no trouble imagining the perfect gift, even if it is not part of their actual 
experience. Thus, if one were to identify the giver as the loving Creator God who gives 
generously and unconditionally, and recognise that all those on whom he bestows his 
benevolence would never be able to repay even a small part of this generoaity due to their 
inferior status and resources, perhaps we come a bit closer, as Marion suggests, to locating the 
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concept of gift not so much in the equation, but in the identification of the giver with the gift. If 
the giver is unconditioned, then the gift is unconditional, the gift being representative of the 
donor himself. If the nature of the giver is inexhaustible, then the gift is inexhaustible since the 
donor’s character is imbued in the gift. This identification of the gift with its originator takes the 
idea of gift out of the economy of exchange, and in the case of the Eternal One, out of time as 
well. The giver, in effect, defines the gift and gives it significance. The gift is nothing if it is not 
connected to the giver.  
A helpful metaphor here is Marion’s notion of fatherhood as pure givenness. A father, 
Marion observes, gives the gift of life without the possibility of any true reciprocity, because a 
father is “him to whom we [as children] can render nothing.”39 Marion concludes that this makes 
the title of Father a suitable name for God, making it possible to imagine an unconditioned and 
unreduced gift coming from a divine, unconditioned, and unreduced nature. To state it positively, 
the divine self exhibits excess, a generosity within its very being, thereby taking what is in the 
realm of impossible and making it possible.40 Marion writes: “To that which gains itself only in 
losing itself – namely, the gift, which gives itself in abandoning itself – nothing is impossible any 
longer. Not only does that which does not give itself lose itself, but nothing can ruin (perdre, 
lose) the gift, since it consists in the contradiction even of its possibility.”41 In essence, Marion 
takes the deconstructive work of Derrida concerning gift (the impossibility of gift) and, out of the 
rubble of the impossible, constructs an image of gift which unites the superfluous givenness of 
fatherhood with the impossibility of exchange, revealing its unconditional nature.42 This brings 
to mind the familial scenario Balthasar invokes in his theological trilogy, that of a child 
awakening to love through the smile of its mother. The child receives an awareness of its 
existence through the mother. The child receives its idea of love through the mother. The child 
receives an awakening to life outside itself through the mother. Before the child is capable of any 
reciprocity, she is receiving gift after gift from her mother. What began as the impossible gift 
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with Derrida becomes the possible impossibility in Marion’s reference to fatherhood and the 
unconditional gift in Balthasar’s mother/child scenario.   
Gift in Theatre 
Both Mauss and Derrida allude to the idea that the act of giving sets up a power dynamic. 
In the exchange economy, the giver is seen as the one who exerts power over the recipient. Both 
indicate that the act of bestowing a gift on someone means that the recipient is now in the 
donor’s debt, and thus the gift serves to reinforce the difference in social standing between the 
two or highlight the reliance of the donee on the donor. In some cases, giving a gift to someone 
can place the recipient in an indentured state, in effect, rendering the donee a servant of the giver. 
I contend that the presence of power dynamics in societal exchanges not only undermines and 
upends the idea of gift, but essentially distorts it beyond recognition, stripping it of its original 
intent. While Derrida recognizes this inequality in gift-giving and its related problems, the 
distinction, for the most part, seems lost on Mauss. At the heart of genuine gift we find not a play 
for power nor self-aggrandisement, but an unconditional generosity of the self, evidenced 
through vulnerability and humility. In order to demonstrate this, I turn to the practice of 
improvisational theatre. Here one can observe gift-giving and gift-receiving in a controlled and 
focused environment and the results are, for the most part, consistent and repeatable.   
It has already been mentioned that the first rule of improvisation is “Yes , and…” These 
two small words are weighted with meaning. The first word, Yes, indicates that the actor places 
herself in receiving mode; she chooses to accept instead of block whatever comes her way in a 
scene. Though this may seem like a sure pathway to chaos, saying Yes is not an exercise in 
randomness. This is due to the presence of the second word (and) which refers to the actor’s 
commitment to contribute to the ongoing story and remain faithful to its intent. To reiterate, 
undergirding the idea of openness and acceptance (Yes) is the actor’s awareness of the larger 
story and her role in it (and). In contrast, the practice of blocking, which is exhibited through 
tactics like contradicting another actor, refusing or ignoring information, redirecting the story, or 




Improvisational teacher Keith Johnstone observes that “you block when you want to stay 
in control.”43 Blocking is also an expression of fear: fear that things will go horribly wrong, fear 
that one will look foolish, or fear that one will get caught in an uncomfortable or dangerous 
situation.44 Because improvisation and control cannot co-exist, blocking (negation) will 
inevitably cause an improvised scene to fall apart. Improvisation is about risk, about learning to 
incorporate the unexpected, about facing fear head-on, and ultimately, about learning how to tell 
stories together.45 Because the actor can only understand the story by being part of it, 
improvisation becomes a journey of discovery for the players. Once an actor comprehends what 
the ongoing story is about, she will know how to move it forward and toward what end. If the 
actor does not grasp the basic narrative, the improvisation will be nothing more than a series of 
unrelated events strung together.  
Essential to good improvisational theatre is commitment not only to the ongoing story but 
to the community which is creating the story. Improvisation is never about getting a laugh or 
being clever, though practitioners are often susceptible to prioritising these two elements. Placing 
the emphasis on individual cleverness inevitably erodes the trust between actors and derails the 
story. Good actors know how to honour the story and serve their fellow players, in essence, 
making the other actors “look good” instead of drawing all the attention to themselves.46  
Let us return to Marion to connect improvisational theatre practice with the notion of gift. 
When Marion describes the demeanour of the beneficiary, he indicates that, “it is a matter of 
abandoning the posture of self-sufficiency and calm possession of oneself and one’s world.”47 
Marion positions humility - the ability to put away self-reliance - as a requisite mindset for 
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receiving and accepting a gift. A correlation could be made between this and Johnstone’s notion 
of giving up the need to control the action and, by implication, the direction of the story. Marion 
goes on to address the communal aspect common to both gift and improvisation: “Before 
accepting a gift – which would nevertheless seem easy, since it appears to be a matter of gain, 
pure and simple – it is necessary first to accept to accept, which implies recognizing that one no 
longer increases oneself by oneself, but rather by a dependence on that which one is not, more 
exactly on that which the ‘I’ in one is not.”48 Here Marion touches on both overarching 
commitments in improvisation: being a participant in a larger story and becoming part of a 
community of trust. The improvisational story is crafted by a group of players who give and 
receive freely, thus building a specific narrative which is unique to that community. In order for 
the story to be successful (clear, cohesive, and believable), it must not be driven or controlled by 
one person, but incorporate the voices of the various players in the group. The gifts which the 
actors give to each other (and ultimately to the audience) are their contributions to the story. 
Marion’s use of the word “abandon” hints at how significant trust and vulnerability are when 
receiving gifts.  
In theatrical improvisation, it becomes apparent that this vulnerability is not restricted to 
the beneficiary but can also be present in the donor. Anyone who has participated in an 
improvisation exercise knows the dread which can accompany offering a particular action or 
piece of dialogue to a group. There is a fear that one’s contribution will fall flat, or will be found 
uninteresting and nonsensical by their fellow actors, or in the worst case scenario, will be 
blocked. The vulnerability goes both ways in improvisation. In a sense, the other actors hold 
control over what an improviser offers to the story, for they have the power to either embrace it, 
include it, and build on it, or to ridicule it, ignore it, and refuse it. Fear can also be present due to 
the actor’s inability to re-do or re-work or re-think any action or word once it has been offered. 
Johnstone suggests that instead of ignoring fear or pushing it aside, actors should start by 
acknowledging it, especially the fear of failure. Johnstone makes a direct association between 
mistakes and learning; he encourages his students to learn how to fail by becoming comfortable, 
even happy, with mistakes.49 Similarly, Marc Rowland, a director at Montreal Improv, tells his 
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workshop participants that mistakes can be gifts and encourages players to embrace so-called 
errors and make them part of the story. Johnstone suggests that actors are “performing risky 
actions in search of a miracle, and you won’t get miracles if it’s all safe.”50  
We turn back to Marion for his thoughts on the topic of risk. Within the context of gift, 
Marion places the power as well as the risk within the gift itself. He anthropomorphises the gift, 
making it an active player in the equation of gift-giving: “It [gift] renders itself in that it 
abandons itself to its givee, to allow him the act of acceptance. It also renders itself to its giver, 
in that it puts itself at his disposal to allow the act of giving. Finally, it renders itself to itself in 
that it is perfectly accomplished in dissipating itself without return, as a pure abandoned gift, 
possible in all impossibility.”51 By stating that the gift abandons itself to the giver, the givee, and 
ultimately, to itself to be given as a gift, Marion indicates that the gift relinquishes all control. 
The gift, in its state of constant availability, runs the risk of not being given, of not being 
accepted, and of ceasing to exist as a gift, and this is what makes it a true gift.   
Marion posits that gifts are given, “without reserve or retreat, hence without condition or 
measure, hence without cause or reason.”52 While I recognise Marion’s description of gift as 
unconditional and inexhaustible, it is necessary to qualify his third descriptor (without cause or 
reason). In theory, I agree with Marion’s suggestion that gift operates from a “higher reason,” a 
reason intrinsic only to itself.53  However, he looks no further than the gift itself to find this 
“higher reason,” thus divorcing the gift from the giver. In effect, the gift is in limbo, completely 
cut off from the giver in order to be received with impartiality by the recipient. This makes the 
phrase “higher reason” somewhat meaningless due to its lack of sentient subject. Allow me to 
refer back to Marion’s example of God as Father to give substance to his inference that gift has a 
“higher reason” or larger purpose than itself. The gift is always and only possible because of the 
benevolence of the giver. If one connects these ideas to improvisational theatre, one could say 
that the constant presence of “Yes” means that the actors are able to give themselves 
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unconditionally to each other, and due to the possibilities of “and,” the story is relatively 
inexhaustible. The improvised story, though, must not be thought of as a separate entity, without 
cause or reason; it exists due to the actions of a generous, attentive community of improvisers. 
In terms of making links between gift and improvisational theatre, Marion’s gift-centric 
approach proves to be limited; it does not allow for the self-donation of the giver and the 
necessary elements of relationship and trust which I posit are non-negotiables in genuine gift. 
Marion’s approach also negates vulnerability since the giver and givee never interact with each 
other; they only make contact with the gift, not the other party. Similarly, beginning with gift 
instead of the involved parties seems to suggest that the story or drama is of no consequence. 
There is no narrative to follow because the gift is its own subject, its own phenomenon, its own 
story, so to speak. Gift becomes an end unto itself instead of a prop or vehicle which allows 
players to develop relationships and create a unique story. Though it seems that Marion has 
solved Derrida’s problem concerning the impossibility of genuine gift, he has created another 
problem: that of elevating gift to the role of inanimate subject and doing away with meaningful 
relationship and ultimately, the need for story. Every gift offered in improvisation, be it a word, a 
gesture, or a movement, conveys a fragment of meaning which must be discovered and 
developed by the other players. Gift, in improvisation, is not a self-contained and self-defined 
phenomenon. What is offered by one member of the community affects the direction of the 
group from that point forward.  
A genuine gift demands that both the giver and the recipient are open to each other, in 
other words, that they develop a community of trust. Wells explains it this way:  
Accepting…is a practice that builds community by acknowledging, encouraging, and 
accommodating the other. It recognizes the dependence of all parties concerned upon one 
another. It requires the sharing of space and implies a continuing conversation about how 
to go on doing so. It shares time and assumes only the kind of outcomes that can benefit 
the other. It is not a competition that is about winning and losing.54  
What Wells is describing here is the optimum paradigm for successful improvisational theatre. 
As actors abandon self-sufficiency, give up control of the story, and humbly embrace 
vulnerability, a strong community is formed.  
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Gift in Theology 
Many of the ideas presented in the previous section resonate with theological concepts, 
but there are some distinctions to be noted. In theology, gift originates in the divine giver, God. 
We find gift present in the prolific nature of the creation narrative in Genesis. John Milbank 
observes that, “God's original, creative donation is a kind of throwing away, or pointless excess. 
But not such that it is a gift to 'anyone' (who happens to be there, 'in the street'); rather, in order 
that there be an anyone at all, to receive.”55 In other words, God’s abundance and generous 
excess consists of much more than the gifts given; God’s benevolence is so comprehensive that it 
also brings into being recipients who are relationally capable of receiving and enjoying his 
gift(s).56 Similarly, divine generosity is at the core of the expansive covenantal promises made to 
Abraham and in the generous offering of forgiveness in stories such as Hosea’s marriage to an 
unfaithful prostitute and Jonah’s reluctant warning to the people of Nineveh. All of these divine 
acts of giving are intricately linked to the cultivation of loving relationships. The person of Jesus 
Christ stands as the supreme example of gift, a divine gesture of personal and costly beneficence 
without equal. In Christ we have the gift of God himself. Through this self-gift, God re-
establishes and renews the covenant with humanity and sets in motion a new expression of a 
community (έκκλησια) of trust and faith. 
Central to the divine demonstration of generosity are the ideas not only of trust and love 
but of mutuality. John Milbank notes: 
As against a logic which would associate a purity of love with unilateral action, it seems 
not insignificant that within romantic love an asymmetry of giving, where only one 
partner gives presents and favours, suggests not at all freedom and gratuitousness, but 
rather an obsessive admiration that subsists only at a wilfully melancholic distance, or 
still worse a purchase of sexual satisfaction, and in either case the slide of desire towards 
one-sided private possession. Giving here is most free where it is yet most bound, most 
mutual and most reciprocally demanded.57 
 
It is important to note that Milbank is not dismissing unilateral giving in favour of a gift 
economy and all the obligations which accompany it. He is pointing out that in the context of a 
loving relationship, giving to is always joined to giving back. This is quite distinct from the type 
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of exchange Mauss refers to in his sociological analysis of primitive societies, nor is it the 
tainted, self-interested gift which is so distasteful to Derrida.  
Gift-giving within a mutually loving relationship might be said to occupy ground 
somewhere between the ideal, unconditional gift and the relational gift of self, but perhaps it is 
more accurate to claim that it transcends both positions. The dynamic of mutual love 
paradoxically joins together concepts like willingness and obligation, freedom and restriction, 
and desire and denial. Contrary to the idea of exchange which seeks to maintain a careful 
equilibrium between two parties, loving mutuality thrives on excess - mutual, reciprocal excess. 
In referring to the difference between giving love (agape) and desiring love (eros), Milbank 
argues that though giving love is “above such play” as one finds in a human love relationship, 
theology must not make agape all about sacrifice and thereby extract the mutual desire and 
reciprocity evident in eros. A comprehensive, more holistic view of love is key to defining the 
theological concept of gift. My thesis here is that the self-giving sacrifice of Christ (agape) must 
always be joined with God’s loving, unconditional pursuit of humanity (eros) and the generous 
offer of mutuality, of co-labouring with God (philia).  
The gift of agape is exemplified in the kenosis (self-emptying) of Christ.58 The nature of 
agape is described in the familiar biblical passage found in 1 Corinthians 13: “Love is patient; 
love is kind; love is not envious or boastful or arrogant or rude. It does not insist on its own way; 
it is not irritable or resentful; it does not rejoice in wrongdoing, but rejoices in the truth. It bears 
all things, believes all things, hopes all things, endures all things. Love never ends.”59 Though 
these words are often recited at weddings, it is interesting to note that the actual text contains no 
mention of reciprocity; the self-giving character of agape appears to be in large part unilateral 
and independent of any response from the recipient. Because of its unconditional nature, agape is 
often identified as ideal love, love that gives its all even when the recipient is unworthy or 
incapable of a suitable response. In some sense, this manifestation of giving love is similar to 
Marion’s depiction of the self-defined gift, with at least one significant difference: in theology it 
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is not the gift which discloses itself but God who makes himself known through kenosis. In other 
words, God is the gift.  
It is worth quoting Balthasar at some length regarding the implications of God’s self-
emptying.  
For the Father strips himself, without remainder, of his Godhead and hands it over to the 
Son; he “imparts” to the Son all that is his. … The Father must not be thought to exist 
“prior” to this self-surrender that holds nothing back. This divine act that brings forth the 
Son, that is, the second way of participating in (and of being) the identical godhead, 
involves the positing of an absolute, infinite “distance” that can contain and embrace all 
the other distances that are possible within the world of finitude, including the distance of 
sin. Inherent in the Father’s love is an absolute renunciation: he will not be God for 
himself alone. He lets go of his divinity and, in this sense, manifests a (divine) God-
lessness (of love, of course). The latter must not be confused with the godlessness that is 
found within the world, although it undergirds it, renders it possible and goes beyond it. 
The Son’s answer to the gift of Godhead (of equal substance with the Father) can only be 
eternal thanksgiving (eucharistia) to the Father, the Source – a thanksgiving as selfless 
and unreserved as the Father’s original self-surrender.60 
  
There are a few important points to note in Balthasar’s description of God’s kenotic, giving love. 
The first is that kenosis is inherent in God’s triune nature and not a unique feature of the 
incarnation event. Loving, absolute self-donation, according to Balthasar, is a distinguishing 
characteristic of the divine nature, the three-in-one and one-in-three. The Nicene Creed describes 
the Son as “eternally begotten of the Father” and the Spirit as one who “proceeds from the Father 
and the Son.”61 Though Church fathers have long debated these words and their exact phrasing in 
order to bring precision to the doctrine of God, might I suggest that the robust mutuality, 
equality, and “give and take” which Balthasar describes in the Godhead are among the nuances 
often missed in a simple reading of the Creed. The incarnation reveals a God who is eternally, 
lovingly, generously kenotic. The incarnation was never a stop-gap measure, not a contingency 
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plan, and certainly not a necessity in order to re-establish God’s holiness.62 Kenosis is part of the 
divine essence because God is giving love (agape).63 Balthasar goes on:  
…the Father, in uttering and surrendering himself without reserve, does not lose himself. 
He does not extinguish himself by self-giving, just as he does not keep back anything of 
himself either. For, in this self-surrender, he is the whole divine essence. Here we see 
both God’s infinite power and his powerlessness; he cannot be God in any other way but 
in this “kenosis” within the Godhead itself. (Yet what omnipotence is revealed here! He 
brings forth a God who is of equal substance and therefore uncreated, even if, in this self-
surrender, he must go to the very extreme of self-lessness.)64 
 
By identifying kenosis and self-surrender at the very heart of the immanent Trinity,65 Balthasar 
provides us with a theological model for the concept of gift. The always-giving God is also the 
always-receiving God; the powerful God is also the self-limiting God.  
A further point which can be drawn from Balthasar’s depiction of the Godhead is that the 
intent of gift is always directed toward the other, inviting reciprocity. In loving, agapic, kenotic 
gift, true mutuality is possible. The “distance” which the three-in-one God creates within Godself 
makes possible human freedom and divine/human covenant. Another distinction (which was 
already alluded to above) is the inexhaustible nature of divine gift. God holds nothing back and 
yet God’s eternal self-giving never renders him any less than he is.66  
A second aspect of theological gift is found in the concept of eros (desiring love). The 
most explicit theological text which portrays the passionate pursuit of a lover for his/her beloved 
is the Song of Songs. Both bride and bridegroom give voice to their mutual desire and love; they 
call to each other, express their longing to be together, and share affectionate intimacies, 
                                                          
62 In the Middle Ages, the Dominicans and the Franciscans debated whether the Incarnation would have taken 
place had humanity not sinned. John Duns Scotus (Franciscan) believed that the incarnation was part of God’s 
intention from the beginning. Thomas Aquinas (Dominican) held that the appearance of Jesus Christ in history was 
a response to sin, necessary for atonement, though he allowed that the Incarnation could have been viewed as the 
consummation of God’s glory before sin entered the world. Both views were eventually accepted by the Church as 
having biblical support, and therefore within the realm of orthodoxy. See Thomas Aquinas, “The Fitness of the 
Incarnation,” Article III and “The Act of Faith,” Article VII, Summa Theologiae, trans. Fathers of the English 
Dominican Province (New York: Benziger Brothers, 1947). See also Pope Benedict XVI, “John Duns Scotus,” in Great 
Christian Thinkers: From the Early Church Through the Middle Ages (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2011), 301-5. 
63 1 John 4:8. 
64 Balthasar, TD4, 325. 
65 “This primal kenosis makes possible all other kenotic movements of God into the world; they are simply its 
consequences.” Balthasar, TD4, 331. 
66 “For since He Whom God has sent speaks the words of God [proclaims God’s own message], God does not give 
Him His Spirit sparingly or by measure, but boundless is the gift God makes of His Spirit! The Father loves the Son 
and has given (entrusted, committed) everything into His hand.” John 3:34-35. The Amplified Bible ©1987 by The 
Zondervan Corporation and The Lockman Foundation. 
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extolling each other’s admirable qualities: “Arise, my love, my fair one, and come away. O my 
dove, in the clefts of the rock, in the covert of the cliff, let me see your face, let me hear your 
voice; for your voice is sweet, and your face is lovely.”67  
In addition to passion, eros contains the notion of unrelenting pursuit. Though the actual 
Greek word (eros) is not found in the New Testament, the idea of sensual, desiring love can be 
found in several biblical stories. In the book of Hosea, a prophet marries a prostitute in response 
to a directive from God. Their relationship is to be a living representation of God’s faithfulness 
to Israel despite Israel’s unfaithfulness to God. It is a tale of desire, infidelity, tenderness, and 
redemption. Though Hosea’s wife, Gomer, breaks her marriage vows on many occasions, the 
continued faithfulness of Hosea eventually transforms their relationship from a master/servant 
dynamic, where one party dominates the other, to that of husband/wife where love is freely given 
and received. Hosea and Gomer’s marriage trajectory runs parallel to God’s ongoing pursuit of 
the nation of Israel despite its unfaithfulness to the bilateral covenant in which God declares, 
“You are my people,” and Israel responds with, “You are my God.”68 What eros brings to the 
theological concept of gift is the idea that the giver is not a disinterested party; the benefactor 
actively pursues a relationship with the object of his desire. What is at the fore here is not 
primarily the posture of self-surrender which we find in agape but an unrelenting, passionate 
commitment to mutual exclusivity and intimacy with the other. In effect, the gift being offered 
here is worth; the pursuer bestows on his beloved an immeasurable value due to her special and 
unique significance to him.  
A third dimension of theological gift is illustrated by the Greek word philia which, of the 
three words, carries the strongest sense of mutuality. Essentially, philia is the bond of friendship, 
the loyalty of brotherly love, and the companionship and camaraderie between equals. If agape is 
giving love and eros is desiring love, then philia is collaborating love. A form of the word philia 
is used to describe the love the Father has for the disciples and the love the disciples have for 
Jesus.69 Philia is also used to characterise true followers of Christ, those who have “love for the 
Lord,”70 and employed to describe the love Jesus had for Lazarus and his disciple John.71 The 
                                                          
67 Song of Solomon 2:13b-14. 
68 Hosea 2. The depiction of Christ and the Church as husband and wife in Ephesians 5 contains both desire and 
self-sacrifice. 
69 John 16:27. 
70 1 Corinthians 16:22. 
71 John 11:3, 36; John 2:20. 
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concept of mutuality or collaboration between divine and human can also be found in the idea of 
co-working (συνεργέω) when Paul writes that “we are fellow workmen (joint promoters, laborers 
together) with and for God.”72  
We find mutuality present in the covenant which YHWH establishes with Abram in 
Genesis. Whereas one might expect a supreme deity to issue unilateral edicts and directives, the 
establishment of a covenant where both parties have obligations exhibits a surprising amount of 
parity. Other examples of this divine desire for collaboration are found in stories where mere 
mortals are negotiating with Almighty God. I will reference but one example.73 Not long after 
God rescued the people of Israel from captivity in Egypt, they fashioned an idol, a golden calf to 
worship, thereby displacing YHWH as their object of desire. As a result of this betrayal, God’s 
anger was kindled and he declared his intent to destroy an unfaithful people. However, Moses 
pleaded with God to change his mind, to spare the Israelites and give them another chance. 
According to the account in Exodus, Moses prevailed and God turned away from his destructive 
plan.74 The weight given to Moses’s words in this exchange has proven problematic for some 
readers because it seems to bring into question the omniscience and omnipotence of God. 
However, if this is a God defined by self-sacrifice, a God who places significant value on 
humanity, a God who is committed to collaboration,75 this is very much in character. What we 
have in the concept of philia love is the gift of friendship. 
What I have sought to show in this chapter is that at the heart of every Yes is the notion 
of gift. Balthasar’s starting point of theology, beauty, is relevant here. In “A Résumé of My 
Thought,” he writes: “A being appears, it has an epiphany: in that it is beautiful and makes us 
marvel. In appearing it gives itself, it delivers itself to us: it is good. And in giving itself up, it 
speaks itself, it unveils itself: it is true.”76 Balthasar equates the self-revelation of God with 
benevolent and vulnerable self-donation. The gift and the giver cannot be separated; the gift is 
                                                          
72 1 Corinthians 3:9, The Amplified Bible. See also 2 Corinthians 6:1: “Labouring together [as God’s fellow workers] 
with Him then, we beg of you not to receive the grace of God in vain…” The Amplified Bible.  
73 Other stories include Abraham negotiating with God about how many righteous souls (from 50 down to 10) it 
would take to save Sodom and Gomorrah (Genesis 18:16-33) and the account of Moses being commissioned by 
YHWH to bring the Israelites out of Egypt. Here we find a lengthy dialogue between God and Moses in which 
Moses questions his ability to do the job and YHWH provides reassurances (concessions?) such as a miracle and a 
spokesperson to do the talking (Exodus 3-4).  
74 Exodus 32:1-14. 
75 “And the Lord spoke to Moses face to face, as a man speaks to his friend.” Exodus 33:11. 
76 Hans Urs von Balthasar, “A Résumé of My Thought,” trans. Kelly Hamilton, Communio 15.4 (Winter 1988), 472.  
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attractive and desirable precisely because the giver is attractive and desirable. We have seen how 
a genuine gift communicates not only the character but the intent of the giver; in a theological 
context, this translates to God’s desire to be close to humanity, to be not merely a benefactor 
(agape) but a lover (eros) and a friend (philia). A theological interpretation of gift also 
incorporates Mauss’s observation regarding the relational “stickiness” and mutuality inherent in 
giving and receiving, and draws on theatrical improvisation to provide a dynamic model of how 
giving and receiving function to establish a community of trust. Theology acknowledges, along 
with Derrida, that the ideal gift must be one untainted by egoism and self-interest and embraces 
Marion’s notion that gift (true givenness) is by nature unconditional and inexhaustible, 
specifically in the notion that God himself is gift in the person of Christ. A gift is the self-
expression of the giver, the mediating tool between two parties, and the covenant which binds 
people together. In the context of the three Yeses, a gift offered is the first Yes of invitation. A 
reciprocal, second Yes, acknowledges the receipt of the unconditional, un-retractable gift and 
responds in kind. This interaction between the two parties initiates a mutual relationship where 




The Second Yes - Response 
 
God seeks to enter the world anew. He knocks at Mary’s door. He needs human freedom. 
The only way he can redeem man, who was created free, is by means of a free 'yes' to his 
will. In creating freedom, he made himself in a certain sense dependent upon man. His 
power is tied to the unenforceable 'yes' of a human being. So Bernard [of Clairvaux] 
portrays heaven and earth as it were holding its breath at this moment of the question 
addressed to Mary. Will she say yes? She hesitates … will her humility hold her back? 
Just this once—Bernard tells her—do not be humble but daring! Give us your 'yes'! This 
is the crucial moment when, from her lips, from her heart, the answer comes: 'Let it be to 
me according to your word.' It is the moment of free, humble yet magnanimous obedience 
in which the loftiest choice of human freedom is made.1  
 
The first Yes is the invitation which God, the author, director, and primary actor, extends 
to humanity to participate in the grand drama which God has put into play. It is a true invitation, 
an offer to participate and collaborate, not a divine decree or coercive compulsion based on 
superior position or power. It is divine freedom making space for human freedom, and as such, 
this divine Yes requires a response. While one might think that a secondary, responsive Yes 
carries relatively little authority or weight in comparison to the first Yes, that the second Yes is 
mostly passive and compliant, nothing could be further from the truth.  
Yes as a response is much more than assent; it is the desire to align oneself with another, 
to enter their story, or better yet, to create a story together with another. The preceding chapter 
on gift was meant to lay the groundwork for the second Yes of response, clearly positioning it 
within the context of gift and not in the culture of exchange. Semiotician Genevieve Vaughan 
explains, with a good deal of precision, the difference between the two: 
In the logic of exchange, a good is given in order to receive its equivalent in return. There 
is an equation of value, quantification, and measurement. In gift giving, one gives to 
satisfy the need of another and the creativity of the receiver in using the gifts is as 
important as the creativity of the giver. The gift interaction is transitive and the product 
passes from one person to the other, creating a relation of inclusion between the giver and 
the receiver with regard to what is given. Gift giving implies the value of the other while 
the exchange transaction, which is made to satisfy one’s own need, is reflexive and 
implies the value only of oneself. Gift giving is qualitative rather than quantitative, other-
oriented rather than ego-oriented, inclusive rather than exclusive. … Its relation-creating 
                                                          
1 Pope Benedict is commenting on one of Bernard of Clairvaux’s Advent homilies. Joseph Ratzinger (Pope Benedict 




capacity creates community, while exchange is an adversarial interaction that creates 
atomistic individuals.2 
 
Vaughan’s description contains several points of intersection with the observations made in the 
previous chapter: 1) gift is focused on the recipient and not on the donor, 2) gift confers value on 
the recipient, 3) gift forges relationships, and 4) gift is oriented toward collaboration instead of 
competition. It is vital that any discussion of theology and drama maintain the distinction 
between gift and exchange, careful to avoid blurring the lines between them. If one confuses the 
two types of interaction, the tendency will be to see invitation and response as an expression of 
Newton’s third law of motion: for every action, there is an equal and opposite reaction. This 
would be a serious mistake. An exchange which happens between two persons through dramatic 
action should never be equated with self-balancing equilibrium. Doing so would negate all 
possibility of freedom, surrender, and generous, unnecessary, excessive largesse, all of which are 
present in dramatic theology.  
In exploring the idea of response, I will re-visit the importance of starting point, this time 
from the perspective of the second Yes. This will lead into a look at the implications and 
limitations of human experience as a source for dramatic theology with particular attention paid 
to selected writings by Friedrich Schleiermacher. The latter part of the chapter focuses on 
describing the connection between revelation and responsibility and acknowledging some of the 
limits of human responsiveness, especially in relation to divine initiative. But first, in keeping 
with a methodology which recognises that words on a page can only take one so far in describing 
dramatic action, I offer a brief illustration of the nature of the responsive Yes. 
The Second Yes in Action 
Keith Johnstone, a specialist in improvisation, writes: “Great improvisers ‘go with the 
flow’, accepting that they’re in the hands of God, or the Great Moose. Their attitude is the 
opposite of those ‘beginners’ for whom improvisation is very difficult and who find the demons 
on the stage just as threatening as those in life. When a great improviser is inspired, all limits 
seem to disappear.”3 As part of my research for this thesis, I participated in an improvisational 
theatre workshop with the intent of experiencing first-hand the dynamic of “going with the 
                                                          
2 Genevieve Vaughan, “Introduction,” in Women and the Gift Economy: A Radically Different Worldview is Possible, 
ed. Genevieve Vaughan (Toronto: Inanna Publications and Education, 2007), 2. 
3 Keith Johnstone, Impro for Storytellers (London, UK: Faber and Faber, 1999), 341. 
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flow,” of participating in the second Yes.4 Because I have done improvisation in the past and 
knew what to expect, I was surprised by how much anxiety I felt going into the workshop; those 
demons of which Johnstone speaks were very real. No doubt the prospect of fairly close 
interaction with a room full of strangers was the cause of some of the tightness in my chest, but 
my real fears had less to do with clumsy social interactions and more to do with the actual 
performance aspect of the workshop. I was afraid that I would freeze when it was my turn to 
deliver a line or action. I imagined that when every eye turned expectantly toward me, my mind 
would go blank, I would have nothing to offer, and the scene would be ruined due to my 
ineptitude. I was also afraid of being faced with a situation which might overstep my personal 
boundaries and values, making it impossible for me to contribute meaningfully to a scene. The 
last thing I wanted was to be awkwardly out of sync with the other participants in the workshop. 
Referring back to the first rule of improvisation (Yes, and…), it is clear that my first fear related 
to having no “and” to give and my second fear concerned the high cost of saying Yes. In the end, 
both fears were unrealised. The director of the workshop proved to be very good at his job, 
moving the group through a natural progression. We began with simple, nonthreatening circle 
exercises which involved giving and receiving, then moved to more complex versions of the 
same, then switched to one-on-one dialogues where we engaged in storytelling, and finally ended 
with everyone playing an impromptu scene with a fellow-actor in front of the whole group. Ten 
minutes into the workshop I noticed that my fears were no longer an issue because I felt safe 
with the group. We had all looked each other in the eye, we had all given and received from each 
other, and we had all graciously accepted each other’s mistakes.  
As the workshop went on, it became easier and easier to say Yes to whatever suggestion 
was thrown my way, and there was no hesitancy in trying out different words and actions to see 
how they would move a scene forward. Several times, when a scene was floundering, the 
director of the workshop stopped the players and had them try it again from a pivotal point in the 
action, offering a few helpful suggestions to keep the story’s momentum going. The simple 
exercise of saying Yes again and again over the period of an hour and a half had a profound 
effect. As I exited the workshop and stepped onto a busy downtown street, I was approached by 
a man asking for money. This is a common enough occurrence in the city of Montreal, and my 
usual response is to say a simple, “Sorry,” avoid eye contact, and keep moving. However, since I 
                                                          
4 The workshop I attended took place at Montreal Improv on September 27, 2014. 
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had been saying Yes for the last ninety minutes, I was much more open than usual. Instead of 
walking by, I stopped, looked the man in the eyes, and stuck out my hand. “Hi,” I said, “What’s 
your name?” The man hesitated, a bit taken aback by my forwardness, then shook my hand and 
told me his name. I asked him about his situation and the reason he was on the street looking for 
handouts. He told me a bit of his story and said his immediate need was for a shower and some 
clean clothes. In response, I referred him to a drop-in centre where he could get a meal and some 
clothes and then offered him a few dollars. As we parted, I wished him well and said I would 
pray for him. At this point, I realised how out of character the interaction had been for me. I 
remembered one of the comments made by the director of the workshop. He stated that one of 
the most enjoyable aspects of improvisation is witnessing those delightful moments when 
performers surprise themselves in that vulnerable, wide-open place of Yes, a moment like the 
one I had just experienced.  
The Starting Point before the Starting Point 
Before we answer the question of what particular role the second, responsive Yes plays in 
the divine drama, it is necessary to look again at the idea of starting point. For Balthasar, beauty 
is the access point for a person’s first encounter with divinity, the first hint that there is more to 
form (Gestalt) than that which meets the eye. This starting point says something about the 
Creator (for Balthasar, the emphasis is on goodness), but it also says a great deal about the nature 
of divine/human interaction. The interaction between a work of art and a human being is not an 
exchange between equals. The two are not, at their core, the same substance. An encounter with 
beauty is mysterious, subjective, elusive, convincing yet insubstantial, undeniable yet not 
provable. It is as if beauty comes to us from another realm, and this is exactly what Balthasar 
means to imply when he equates beauty with the glory of God. We catch only glimpses of glory, 
but these glimpses are enough to attract us, enthrall us, and cause us to pursue its source. 
Balthasar posits God as the originator of beauty and glory, or more accurately, recognises these 
qualities as part of the divine nature. As mentioned in a previous chapter, Balthasar presents a 
rather robust depiction of the sovereignty of God. However, positioning God not only as the 
primary actor but as the ultimate telos of all action leaves little room for human expression or 
input. Balthasar addresses this problem by situating human freedom within divine freedom; in 
other words, human freedom exists because divine freedom wills it to exist. The subject 
addressed in this section is not the starting point per se, as it was in chapter one, but a revisiting 
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of the topic from a temporal, human standpoint. In order to do this, we must put aside Balthasar’s 
occasional tendency to view history from a divine perspective and look more closely at the 
subjective reality of starting point. Perhaps a more accurate title for this section would be The 
Starting Point after the Starting Point, thereby acknowledging divine primacy both temporally 
and causally while noting that from the perspective of human experience, the first Yes is 
unintelligible until the responsive second Yes has been uttered. Essentially, the divine story has 
no meaning for humanity until a human being steps onto the stage and enters the story. Dorothy 
Sayers puts it bluntly: “To complain that man measures God by his own experience is a waste of 
time; man measures everything by his own experience; he has no other yardstick.”5 The second 
Yes, then, is the experiential, human starting point for divine/human interaction.  
One way to differentiate this dramatic starting point from other existential starting points 
is to place them side by side. For my purposes, I have chosen to compare the dramatic starting 
point of the second Yes with René Descartes’s cogito ergo sum (beginning with human thought) 
and Plato’s theory of forms (beginning with human imperfection). The contrast between the three 
starting points will serve to highlight an important distinction which sets dramatic theology apart, 
and that is its inference that human existence must be thought of as co-existence.  
Descartes, during a lengthy eight-year meditation on the nature of philosophy and the 
basis of knowledge, resolved to isolate truth by distancing it from that which we normally rely 
on: our senses, reason, and imagination. His exercise led him to the following conclusion:    
But now that I wanted to devote myself solely to the search for truth, I thought I needed 
to do the exact opposite – to reject as if it were absolutely false everything regarding 
which I could imagine the least doubt, so as to see whether this left me with anything 
entirely indubitable to believe. Thus, I chose to suppose that nothing was such as our 
senses led us to imagine, because our senses sometimes deceive us. Also, I rejected as 
unsound all the arguments I had previously taken as demonstrative proofs, because some 
men make mistakes in reasoning, even in the simplest questions in geometry, and commit 
logical fallacies; and I judged that I was as open to this as anyone else. Lastly, I decided 
to pretend that everything that had ever entered my mind was no more true than the 
illusions of my dreams, because all the mental states we are in while awake can also 
occur while we sleep and dream, without having any truth in them. But no sooner had I 
embarked on this project than I noticed that while I was trying in this way to think 
everything to be false it had to be the case that I, who was thinking this, was something. 
And observing that this truth I am thinking, therefore I exist was so firm and sure that 
                                                          
5 Dorothy L. Sayers, The Mind of the Maker (New York: Continuum, c1941, 2005), 24. 
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not even the most extravagant suppositions of the sceptics could shake it, I decided that I 
could accept it without scruple as the first principle of the philosophy I was seeking.6 
Of interest to our discussion regarding starting point is Descartes’s insistence on rejecting 
anything which might be susceptible to doubt. Instead of viewing doubt as a natural process in 
discovering truth (though his method clearly demonstrates it), Descartes seeks to eliminate it, 
determined to find truth in the via negativa, so to speak. The result is that his reliance rests solely 
on his own thought process and ability to reason; he does not eliminate reason, but only doubt in 
his reason. From what he concludes is a sure starting point - the ability to think - he then sets out 
to prove that God exists.7  
 Allow me to introduce the second conversation partner, Plato, before I draw some 
comparisons between the three different starting points. In “Phaedo,” Plato (through the 
character Socrates) deduces that though we cannot observe absolute qualities such as equality, 
goodness, beauty, uprightness, and holiness, we know they exist by direct contact, through our 
senses, with marred versions of them.8 “So before we began to see and hear and use our other 
senses we must somewhere have acquired the knowledge that there is such a thing as absolute 
equality. Otherwise we could never have realized, by using it as a standard for comparison, that 
all equal objects of sense are desirous of being like it, but are only imperfect copies.”9 Since 
knowledge of abstract absolutes cannot be explained through sensual experience, Plato links this 
knowledge to a form of recollection, intimating that the soul knew these things before birth and 
thus must be immortal. Plato’s starting point, human experience of the imprecise and imperfect, 
leads him to posit the presence of the absolute, the abstract, and the eternal.  
A brief comparison of all three views with regard to form, content, and trajectory will 
serve to highlight the distinguishing marks of the second Yes, the theodramatic Yes.  
                                                          
6 René Descartes, Discourse on the Method of Rightly Conducting One’s Reason and Seeking Truth in the Sciences, 
trans. Jonathan Bennett (©1637; 2007), Part 4, 15. Accessed February 15, 2016. 
http://www.earlymoderntexts.com/assets/pdfs/descartes1637.pdf. 
7 René Descartes, “Meditations on First Philosophy,” in The Philosophical Works of Descartes, trans. Elizabeth S. 
Haldane (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1911). Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 1996. Accessed 
February 15, 2016. 1996. http://selfpace.uconn.edu/class/percep/DescartesMeditations.pdf 
8 Plato, “Phaedo,” in The Last Days of Socrates, trans. Hugh Tredennick (Harmondsworth: Penguin Classics, c1954, 
1983), sections 73-77. 
9 Ibid., section 75b. 
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1) Form: In contrast to Plato’s segregation of true virtue (ideal form) from what can be 
observed in the material world (imperfect copies to these ideal patterns),10 Balthasar 
insists that form (outward physical appearance) and content (meaning) cannot be 
severed from each other, for it is the combination of the two which results in beauty 
or glory. Balthasar holds that in the incarnation of Jesus Christ, we see the ideal union 
of form and content; in fact, Christ becomes the definition of beauty, a beauty which 
encompasses the marred physical appearance of Christ on the cross. As a result of this 
association of beauty with the suffering Christ, Balthasar has no difficulty identifying 
goodness, truth, and glory in less than ideal forms.11 In a sense, both Descartes and 
Plato have a certain disdain for form, finding it necessary to isolate truth from the 
senses in order to render it pure and beyond doubt. Both philosophers believe that 
outward form has limited value in discerning truth and virtue. For Descartes, the 
senses show themselves to be unreliable indicators, so he discards them in his quest 
for what is true and certain. Plato observes that the senses only have access to what is 
damaged and defective, thereby presenting us with shadowy, imperfect versions of 
truth. As a result, Plato also dispenses with the senses rather quickly, relying instead 
on abstract imagination and what he deduces must be inherent recollection in order to 
define transcendent virtues in their purest form. In contrast, Balthasar looks to the 
incarnation of Christ as the archetype for how form and content must be intricately 
joined in order for truth to be revealed and made intelligible to humanity. Balthasar 
states that, “If beauty is conceived of transcendentally, then its definition must be 
derived from God himself. Furthermore, what we know to be most proper to God – 
his self-revelation in history and in the Incarnation – must now become for us the 
very apex and archetype of beauty in the world...”12 Instead of shunning experience in 
order to arrive at transcendental truth, Balthasar shows that God chooses human form 
                                                          
10 “If all these absolute realities, such as beauty and goodness, which we are always talking about, really exist, if it 
is to them, as we rediscover our own former knowledge of them, that we refer, as copies to their patterns, all the 
objects of our physical perception – if these realities exist, does it not follow that our souls must exist too even 
before our birth…” Ibid., section 76e. 
11 Balthasar believes that God’s beauty embraces death as well as life, fear as well as joy, what we call ugly and 
what we call beautiful. Hans Urs von Balthasar, The Glory of the Lord: A Theological Aesthetics, vol. 1, Seeing the 
Form, trans. Erasmo Leiva-Merikakis, eds. Joseph Fessio S.J. and John Riches (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1982), 
56. Hereafter referred to as GL1. 
12 Balthasar, GL1, 69. 
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to be the ultimate revelation of divine truth, thereby dignifying form, sensuality, and 
human experience. The point here is that the second Yes, the human, experiential 
Yes, leads one to the divine Yes without being negated by it. 
2) Content: Descartes locates truth, that which is without doubt (what one could call the 
ultimate content), in his mind, specifically in the action of thinking. As a result, 
divine content or all truth about God is also limited to what the mind can think about 
the divine. By placing reason in a foundational position, it becomes the measure for 
what can be known about God. For Plato, the content of truth is transcendent and 
abstract and therefore, unattainable and indescribable except through faint echoes 
from the past. The perfect truth remains essentially uncharted territory because the 
gap between present human experience and perfection cannot be completely 
traversed. Essentially, Plato’s content remains inaccessible and unknowable. 
According to Balthasar, the incarnation event, the joining of divine content with 
human form, renders ultimate truth and perfection not only accessible but immanent. 
Though humanity may not have the capacity to comprehend divine goodness in its 
glorious totality, through Christ, something of this totality can be experienced, not as 
a distant memory, as Plato would suppose, but as present reality. We find this idea of 
experiencing immanent divine presence in many instances in theology. I cite but two 
examples here: in the Psalmist’s invitation to his listeners: “O taste and see that the 
Lord is good,”13 and when we look at one of the names for the messiah, Immanuel, 
which means “God with us.”14 The appearance of God in human form reveals that 
divine content or truth is not distinct from the senses nor unintelligible to the senses, 
but available through the senses. One of the purposes of the second Yes is to reveal 
the first Yes, thereby making divine nature intelligible to humanity.15 
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14 Isaiah 7:14; Matthew 1:23. 
15 According to Aidan Nichols, Balthasar’s notion of clarity (radiance and brightness) differs from the Cartesian 
notion of clarity which references clear and distinct ideas. “The brightness of the beautiful is something that 
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3) Trajectory: By a process of elimination, Descartes finds himself left with his own 
thoughts as the only reliable evidence of his existence. In so doing, he sets himself on 
a trajectory of using reason and self-awareness to prove the existence of God.16 This 
leaves very little room for God to be more than a projection of human thought and 
virtually no place for divine mystery to transcend linear reasoning. Insisting that 
reason is the only reliable source for divine/human interaction results in much of 
human experience being rejected as useless data, discarded and abandoned because it 
is considered unreliable and misleading. Plato also advocates this denigration of 
human experience, positioning ultimate truth out of reach for mere, imperfect mortals. 
Another problem with Plato’s starting point is that it requires one to make deductions 
by moving from imperfection to perfection; this is a tricky commute. It is highly 
probable that remnants of imperfection will remain imbedded in any attempts to 
describe perfection because humanity remains situated within an imperfect context, 
and our perceptions of perfection will always be imperfect. In contrast, Balthasar’s 
approach is to take a common human scenario, that of a child becoming aware of 
motherly love, and show that limited human experience is integral to understanding 
the larger picture. The idea of awakening into the context of a loving relationship 
leaves room for divine mystery while at the same time valuing human experience, 
giving place to human reason, and establishing the importance of learning and 
process. Even an imperfect, immature, child can show love, exhibit goodness, and 
proclaim truth. For Balthasar, the human starting point is not reason nor an 
imaginative recollection of perfection, but the realisation that one is part of a 
nurturing, loving relationship. The second Yes is not an assertion of autonomy and 
self-will, nor a quest for perfection, nor a search for certainty. The second, responsive 
Yes is that which makes one a consenting partner in a mutual relationship. 
To reiterate, the second Yes consists of entering into the story which the divine Yes has 
set in motion. However, when seen from within human experience, the second Yes is its own 
                                                          
16 Interestingly, Fergus Kerr observes that Descartes’s reasoning apparently backfired. He references Eberhard 
Jüngel when he notes that “Descartes’ attempt to demonstrate the necessity of God’s existence by way of 
establishing the subject’s self-certainty has resulted in the ‘death of God’ crisis. Far from having yet to accept the 
turn to consciousness, theology has already been nearly ruined by it.” Fergus Kerr, Theology After Wittgenstein, 2nd 
ed. (London: SPCK, 1997), 8. 
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starting point; it is humanity’s debut. And what exactly is the nature of this debut? As Descartes 
and Plato so ably demonstrate, self-awareness, reason, and even human experience can lead one 
to pursue the transcendent. However, I contend that these alone are not enough to thrust a person 
onto the stage or make them aware of their role within the larger, divine drama. The horizon 
which opens up through the second Yes is a process. I refer back to my experience in the 
improvisation workshop to trace the progression.  
The first step in my journey toward Yes was self-awareness; I recognised internal anxiety 
which revolved around past experiences and unrealised fears. This anxiety resulted in a brief 
self-examination in which I evaluated whether or not my fears had any foundation. I concluded 
that although most of my anxiety was unfounded, there was indeed a possibility that I would find 
myself in a few uncomfortable situations during the course of the workshop. This left me with a 
decision: I could forgo the workshop, or I could proceed with caution, giving myself the option 
of leaving or declining certain exercises, or I could embrace the element of risk and say Yes to 
the whole experience, trusting that in the end it would contribute to my overall learning. I chose 
the third option. 
Having made the decision to say Yes in theory, my commitment was put to the test 
through the various improvisation exercises which required me to practice receiving from others 
and then giving back to them. Of interest here is the fact that in all the exercises, my role was 
never that of initiator; I was always responding either to another actor or to a directive given by 
the workshop leader. Though I was in a constant state of responsive, second Yes, the experience 
as a whole translated as initiative in my mind. I was constantly thinking, feeling, reasoning, 
making decisions, and trying to keep pace with what was going on around me. The intensity and 
speed of the workshop activities required me to be wholly attentive in every situation. Never, for 
one moment, did I think of myself as passive.  
The workshop experience guided me from self-awareness to deliberate action to 
functioning relationally. A sense of community developed quickly among the participants 
because every exercise demanded that we interact with each other, communicate with each other, 
and most importantly, trust each other. Anytime the group failed to deliver in these three areas, 
the momentum of the exercise inevitably faltered. Scenes in which actors were primarily self-
aware instead of community-oriented never completely succeeded, because a self-focused actor 
either locks others out of the action or disregards the contributions of fellow actors. Watching, 
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listening, and moving together proved essential to developing a successful, coherent story or 
scene. Saying Yes meant that I was willing to go where another person led, willing to build on 
their story idea, and willing to accept a role someone else assigned me. I discovered that it took 
diligence to constantly refuse the internal No; I had to fight off the desire to maintain control, to 
protect my sense of autonomy and self-determination. Practicing the responsive Yes gradually 
changed my disposition from anxiety-ridden to one characterised by openness and generosity. 
Instead of fear, I felt excitement and enjoyment. Instead of being paralysed by extreme self-
consciousness, I was able to enjoy the surprises which came out of collective efforts. Instead of 
evaluating my own performance, I rejoiced in the successes of the whole group. 
The final element of the second Yes became evident only after I left the safe, controlled 
environment of the improvisation workshop and encountered a stranger on the street. Because of 
my experience of living in a state of Yes, I was no longer fearful or preoccupied with self-
protection. The practice of repeatedly acting out the responsive Yes placed me in a position of 
openness, and the experience of listening to and engaging with the stories of others became my 
new norm. Seeing how I could contribute to the story became my immediate task in the 
workshop, and I began to feel at home in this fluid role. The question was, what would happen to 
the responsive Yes after I left the confines of the rehearsal space and the workshop’s temporary 
community of trust? Would it translate into the real world, into an encounter with a complete 
stranger, some might even say, a threatening stranger? Indeed it did, much to my surprise.  
To summarise, my practical investigation into the second Yes led me through the 
following stages: 1) self-awareness, 2) commitment to decisive action, 3) participation in a 
community and shared story, and finally, 4) engagement with the world outside the community 
of trust. What my on-the-ground research did not reveal in any substantial way was how the 
second Yes makes the divine nature (the first Yes) intelligible. In order to address this topic, we 
turn back to theology and the work of a German philosopher and theologian who sought to 
straddle the worlds of modern thought and religion. 
Theology From Below: Schleiermacher 
Friedrich Daniel Ernst Schleiermacher (1768-1834) is often referred to as the father of 
modern theology. Because he lived during the period of history when the medieval worldview 
was giving way to what we now identify as modernity, his writings reveal the tension of his time: 
increasingly, reason was no longer seen as being informed by faith but became the basis for 
84 
 
critiquing faith. Practically speaking, theology lost its influential role as Queen of the Sciences. 
In contrast to Anselm’s “faith seeking understanding,” modern thought asked if faith was 
reasonable at all. As Descartes demonstrates in his writings, the starting point of modern 
theology and philosophy is, to a great extent, not belief but doubt. One of Schleiermacher’s early 
works, On Religion: Speeches to Its Cultured Despisers (1799), addresses the increasing divide 
between philosophy and religion. Interestingly, his attempt to defend religion by using a more 
modern approach was interpreted by the church as a “too-strong challenge to received Christian 
teaching.”17  
Schleiermacher’s later work, The Christian Faith (1821-22, second edition 1830-31), was 
an attempt to engage more with orthodox Christian thought and for this reason is the work most 
often cited by theologians. However, in discussing how the second Yes leads to a revelation of 
the first, divine Yes, I will primarily refer to ideas found in Schleiermacher’s early work, On 
Religion, because it deals more directly with the topic at hand. In the second speech, “The Nature 
of Religion,” Schleiermacher states that, “every activity of the spirit is only to be understood, in 
so far as a man can study it in himself.”18 Here, it seems, we are clearly able to identify the 
second Yes leading to a discovery of the first Yes, but is this what he argues? In a footnote, 
Schleiermacher clarifies that he does not believe religion holds the highest knowledge (he does 
not distinguish Christianity from other religions here, suggesting that all forms of religion are 
similar in kind) but that religion’s form is always determined by something outside of itself. In 
essence, he makes a distinction between outward form and true nature, stating that the two are 
never the same.19 His writing contains strong hints of Plato’s theory of forms, indicating that 
pure religion can never be experienced. As a consequence, despite his stated effort to unite piety 
with knowledge, he finds himself caught in an ongoing dualism. He states: “You can only obtain 
what is original by producing it, as it were, by a second, an artificial creation in yourselves, and 
even then it is but for the moment of its production.”20 Assuming that true religion can never be 
                                                          
17 Jack Forstman, foreward to On Religion: Speeches to its Cultured Despisers by Friedrich Schleiermacher, trans. 
John Oman (London: K. Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., Ltd.; Grand Rapids: Christian Classics Ethereal Library, 1983), 
6.  
18 Friedrich Schleiermacher, On Religion: Speeches to its Cultured Despisers by Friedrich Schleiermacher, trans. John 
Oman (London: K. Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., Ltd.; Grand Rapids: Christian Classics Ethereal Library, 1983), 25. 
19 Ibid., footnote, 29. 
20 Ibid., 30. 
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known, he invites the listener to deduce its existence from a feeling, a sensation, or a glimpse of 
the infinite and good, similar to Plato’s recollection of perfection.  
To Schleiermacher, all religion is the “endeavour to break through from a lower region to 
a higher.”21 Whereas the medieval world relied, to a great extent, on Church authority and 
modern thinkers relied on science and reason, Schleiermacher appeals to another source: self-
consciousness or feeling. He later refers to this as “religious affections” in The Christian Faith: 
“The common element in all religious affections, and thus the essence of piety, is this: the 
consciousness of our absolute dependence, i.e. the feeling of dependence on God.”22 
Schleiermacher’s desire to unify all religious affection and feeling, combined with his contention 
that true religion is beyond human experience, makes his argument altogether too vague. 
Whereas Balthasar’s reference to the incarnation of Christ is historical and particular, 
Schleiermacher’s description of the connection between human and divine is so indeterminate 
that it could apply to almost any experience at all. He writes: “To a pious mind religion makes 
everything holy, even unholiness and commonness, whether he comprehends it or does not 
comprehend it, whether it is embraced in his system of thought, or lies outside, whether it agrees 
with his peculiar mode of acting or disagrees. Religion is the natural and sworn foe of all narrow-
mindedness, and of all onesidedness.”23 This lack of clarity, especially regarding the nature of 
the religious element opened up in the exploration of self-consciousness, causes Schleiermacher 
to fall short of describing genuine divine/human encounter. Because he is overly committed to 
human experience, human feeling, and human consciousness as his starting point, he is unable to 
stretch beyond its confines to reach any intelligible understanding of the divine. As a result, all 
religious affection remains solidly tethered to human consciousness and never reaches beyond it 
to the object of its affection, the subject of religion itself, God.  
To be fair, a broader reading of Schleiermacher’s works, especially concerning the 
incarnation, reveals a bit more nuance than I am presenting here. In defending Schleiermacher 
against accusations of speculative theology, James Gordon argues that Schleiermacher believed 
that, “the general God-consciousness of humanity finds its end – its fulfillment – in Christ’s own 
God-consciousness, which ‘in Him was absolutely clear and determined each moment’ such that 
                                                          
21 Ibid., 30-31. 
22 Friedrich Schleiermacher, The Christian Faith, trans. D. M. Baillie (Edinburgh: W. F. Henderson, 1922), 6. 
23 Schleiermacher, On Religion, 50. 
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it is proper to attribute ‘a real existence of God in Him.’”24 The substantive divine presence in 
the person of Jesus, according to Schleiermacher, the “real existence” so to speak, is 
communicated into Christian self-consciousness of God through the grace of redemption through 
Christ. Despite occasional Christocentric statements such as these, several theologians see 
Schleiermacher’s overall starting point as problematic. Bruce McCormack contends that 
Schleiermacher’s writings never concretely establish Christ as the starting point and concludes 
that Schleiermacher fails “to operate in a consistently christocentric fashion.”25 Thomas Curran 
finds Schleiermacher’s treatment of the Trinity incoherent, arguing that in his writings, “All talk 
of God ‘as He is in Himself’, as He might exist apart from our relation to Him, is banished.”26 
Similarly, Barth critiques Schleiermacher for making the subject of theology not God in Godself 
but God only as God appears to humanity.27  
We find evidence of this cautious ambiguity concerning the nature of God in 
Schleiermacher’s word choices. For much of “The Nature of Religion” he uses the term “World-
Spirit” to reference the divine.28 It appears that this is an attempt to make the discussion of 
religion palatable to his cultured readers by leaning more toward the inclusivity associated with 
modern sensibilities and less toward the traditional and particular identification of the divine as 
the God of Israel, the God revealed in Jesus Christ.29 Another problematic word choice, at least 
                                                          
24 James Gordon, “A ‘Glaring Misunderstanding’? Schleiermacher, Barth and the Nature of Speculative Theology,” 
International Journal of Systematic Theology 16.3 (July 2014), 320-21. 
25 Bruce McCormack, “Not a Possible God but the God Who Is: Observations on Friedrich Schleiermacher’s 
Doctrine of God,” in The Reality of Faith in Theology: Studies on Karl Barth, Princeton–Kampen Consultation 2005, 
eds. Bruce McCormack, Gerrit Neven (Bern, Switzerland: Peter Lang, 2007), 115.  
26 Thomas Curran, Doctrine and Speculation in Schleiermacher’s Glaubenslehre (Berlin, Germany: Walter De 
Gruyter, 1994), 302. 
27 Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics: The Doctrine of the Word of God, vol. 1.1, trans. G.W. Bomiley (Edinburgh: T & T 
Clark, 1975), 353. 
28 In a footnote, Schleiermacher makes his case for the term: “It should hardly be necessary to justify the use of the 
expression World-Spirit where I wish to indicate the object of pious adoration in a way that would include all 
different forms and stages of religion. In particular, I do not believe it can be said with justice that, by this choice of 
expression, I have sacrificed the interests of the most perfect form of religion to the inferior. On the contrary, I 
believe, not only that it is a perfectly Christian name for the Highest Being, but that the expression could only have 
arisen on Monotheistic soil, and is as free from Jewish Particularism as from the incompleteness of the 
Mohammedan Monotheism which I have attempted to specify in the “Glaubenslehre,” § 8, 4. No one will confuse 
it with World-Soul. It neither expresses reciprocal action between the World and the Highest Being, nor any kind of 
independence of the World from Him. I believe therefore that Christian authors are justified in using the term, 
even though it has not directly proceeded from the special standpoint of Christianity.” Schleiermacher, On 
Religion, 56. 
29 In The Christian Faith, Schleiermacher does recognise the unique person of Jesus of Nazareth through whom 
redemption is accomplished, however the emphasis remains on “the consciousness of redemption” instead of the 
person of Christ. Schleiermacher, The Christian Faith, 8. 
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from an orthodox theological standpoint, is found in his comments on the nature of miracles and 
the relationship between religion and other sciences. He remarks on what he calls the “childish 
operations of the metaphysicians and moralists in religion,” stating that their misunderstanding 
of revelation discredits religion by causing it to “[trespass] on the universal validity of scientific 
and physical conclusions.”30 He promises his audience that he is not a party to this confusion 
concerning the nature of religion, adding that true religion “leaves your physics untouched, and 
please God, also your psychology.”31 The word which stands out here is “untouched,” a rather 
strong choice considering his goal in these published talks is to reconcile the two worlds of 
modernity and religion. By using the descriptor, “untouched,” he implies that religion does not 
intrude on scientific principles and makes no claims which require rigorous dialogue between the 
two disciplines. It is perhaps no surprise, then, that his definition of miracle steers clear of any 
physical or historical expression. Instead, it is lodged in human consciousness. A miracle is a 
sign, a wonder, Schleiermacher suggests, purely a “mental condition of the observer.”32 After 
having emphatically separated the worlds of science and religion, he then attempts to soften the 
distinction by redefining miracle as a non-particular event: “Every event, even the most natural 
and usual, becomes a miracle, as soon as the religious view of it can be the dominant. To me all 
is miracle. In your sense the inexplicable and strange alone is miracle, in mine it is no miracle. 
The more religious you are, the more miracle would you see everywhere.”33 As always, the truth 
of the matter, according to Schleiermacher, is to be found in the state of mind.  
Schleiermacher locates the starting point of religion in self-awareness. According to him, 
what is not revealed to human consciousness, what human consciousness cannot think or feel or 
comprehend, is not part of religion or, for that matter, part of life. Likewise, inspiration, 
prophecy, and the operation of grace are all resituated to be expressions and experiences of 
human consciousness; true religion originates in the heart and true belief is defined as knowing 
that one has these things. Faith is not in some outside person or source, Schleiermacher insists, 
for this would be a second-hand action instead of an intrinsic virtue. The introspective nature of 
Schleiermacher’s ideas is reinforced when he goes on to dismiss any outside authority on the 
matter of religious authenticity. “You are right in despising the wretched echoes who derive their 
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relation entirely from another, or depend on a dead writing, swearing by it and proving out of 
it.”34 For Schleiermacher, the starting point and the final authority in religion are the same. “You 
must belong to yourselves. Indeed, this is an indispensable condition of having any part of 
religion.”35 When Schleiermacher searches for true religion, he begins in conscious awareness of 
the self and its affections. While this is similar to the starting point of human experience and 
thought which Descartes, Plato, and Balthasar all utilise in their contemplation of the nature of 
the divine, Schleiermacher never succeeds in leaving self-awareness to arrive at an awareness of 
God. God is always intricately tied to what the self feels and thinks and knows, and therefore, 
human experience remains mired in the slough of self-consciousness and self-dependence. 
Unfortunately, Schleiermacher’s attempt to defend religion to modern thinkers never opens up to 
a genuine encounter with the divine. For him, the second Yes remains reliant on its own voice 
and as a result, has nowhere to go but back into itself. What is meant to be a dynamic 
conversation between divine and human (religion) is reduced to variations or echoes of self-
consciousness; in other words, what Schleiermacher leaves us with is a monologue.   
I must point out that Schleiermacher’s starting point is not the real problem here. It is his 
refusal to move past his starting point, self-awareness, which prevents him from ever fully 
engaging in any meaningful discussion on the nature of God. By limiting his understanding of 
religion to human consciousness, he shuts out any perception of a transcendent being. The 
dramatic, second Yes is meant to open one up to the existence of the first, divine Yes and to 
initiate human involvement in the divine drama. In effect, the second Yes is a relinquishing of 
control, self-centredness, and self-direction.36 If there is no willingness to move beyond human 
consciousness as the first and last word in religious experience, there is no possibility for true 
encounter between divine and human simply because there is no real differentiation; the divine is 
always interpreted as part of self-awareness, not as a being apart from the self. However, 
Schleiermacher insists that he has not excluded God from religion: “Seeing then that I have 
presented nothing but just this immediate and original existence of God in us through feeling, 
how can anyone say that I have depicted a religion without God? Is not God the highest, the only 
unity? Is it not God alone before whom and in whom all particular things disappear? And if you 
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36 The analysis of my experience in theatrical improvisation revealed this same principle, that is, the necessity of 
moving beyond self-awareness to encounter with the other.  
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see the world as a Whole, a Universe, can you do it otherwise than in God?”37 Indeed, there are 
glimpses of God as Creator in this passage, but a few pages later he concludes with a statement 
reiterating his reliance on human consciousness: “Yet the true nature of religion is neither this 
idea nor any other, but immediate consciousness of the Deity as He is found in ourselves and in 
the world.”38 
This rather selective engagement with Schleiermacher is meant to illustrate the danger in 
positioning the second Yes as the anchor for the first Yes; thinking along these lines makes for a 
very limited, human-centric portrayal of the divine. When human self-awareness becomes 
essentially equated with awareness of God, one is left with no way to escape a closed system 
which begins and ends with human experience. While I have acknowledged that experientially 
the second Yes functions as the human starting point, I have tried to make clear that it is meant to 
be a stepping stone to acknowledging and accepting the divine first Yes. The first Yes is revealed 
through an expression of generosity, a gift. This in turn requires the responsive, dramatic second 
Yes to accept what is offered from the divine Other and, by doing so, step into a larger story, a 
story beyond human experience or consciousness. In Schleiermacher’s view, there is no 
movement from self-awareness to dramatic action; in fact, his closed loop of self-awareness 
never moves one past the first stage of improvisational practise identified in the previous section. 
For Schleiermacher, every religious aspect bounces back to self-consciousness and brings us 
only the ghost of an encounter with the divine.  
Revelation and Human Response-ability 
Up to this point, the second Yes has, in large part, been defined negatively, distinguishing 
it from what it is not. It is time for a more constructive approach and for that, we turn again to 
Balthasar. At the heart of the second Yes is its ability to usher the actor into a new world, a world 
heretofore unknown to the subject, a world which is unfamiliar territory in many ways, yet 
ultimately recognisable as the place where human longing is meant to lead. Balthasar states that, 
“It is not man’s love for God that has set before itself an image of God so as to be able by this 
means to love God better: the image offers itself as something that could not have been invented 
by man – an image that can be read and understood and, therefore, believed only as an invention 
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of God’s love.”39 The world that opens up in the second Yes is not one birthed out of human 
imagination, but out of divine love. What is revealed to humanity is a love beyond anything 
experienced in this world. As we have seen, Schleiermacher’s refusal to move beyond a human 
starting point results in his inability to articulate divine love and as a result, he neglects the 
overall divine story; the human subject remains tethered to imperfect and incomplete human 
experience instead of moving toward a loving and transcendent relationship with God. 
Awareness of the greater story, it is apparent, cannot come through human self-consciousness 
alone; it must come from outside, from revelation.   
God’s free revelation of himself in Jesus Christ is an invitation into the realm of an 
absolute and divine freedom, in which alone human freedom can be fully realized. Nor is 
this just an invitation, but through God’s becoming man in Jesus Christ, which is an 
example to all of true fulfillment, there is a breakthrough and entry into the sphere of 
precisely that kind of freedom which is so feverishly sought after by modern man but 
which, without the revelation of God, he can never otherwise find.40 
In this short passage from Balthasar, we identify the first Yes of divine invitation (God reveals 
himself to humanity), the aspect of gift (this revelation is freely given), the dynamic nature of the 
second, responsive Yes (it catapults humanity into freedom and fulfillment), and of special 
interest to our purpose here, the necessity of revelation in order to make possible any meaningful 
movement toward the divine.  
Revelation (αποκάλυψις) means an uncovering or unveiling, and it is used in the New 
Testament to refer to God being revealed through the person of Jesus Christ, the Word (λόγος) of 
God. Implementation of the Greek word λόγος as a name for God incarnate is important not only 
because of its philosophical implications as a divine animating principle of the universe, but 
because it is a communicative reference. It implies that there are two parties in dialogue with one 
another, and that one of them, the speaking party, the one associated with the living λόγος, is the 
one who is revealing himself. When Jesus refers to himself as the truth (αληθεια), this is another 
indication that communication or revelation is resident in the divine nature. Balthasar positions 
truth in a communicative, animated framework when he defines it as a “transcendental property 
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of Being, truth which is no abstraction, [but] rather the living bond between God and the 
world.”41  
German theologian Karl Barth, a contemporary of Balthasar, adds another dimension to 
the idea of revelation by linking it to reconciliation, thereby placing merciful, loving relationship 
at the heart of God’s communication:  
To the extent that God’s revelation as such accomplishes what only God can accomplish, 
namely, restoration of the fellowship of man with God which we had disrupted and 
indeed destroyed; to the extent that God in the fact of His revelation treats His enemies as 
His friends; to the extent that in the fact of revelation God’s enemies already are actually 
his friends, revelation is itself reconciliation.42  
 
The motivation and end goal of revelation, according to Barth, is the reconciliation of humanity 
to God. Revelation is not just an unveiling of who God is, not just data about the nature of God, 
not just divine self-expression, but self-disclosure meant to draw two parties together in 
friendship. In essence, it is self-gift motivated by love, self-gift seeking to awaken reciprocal 
love. We must be careful not to miss Barth’s reference to the broken, disrupted communion 
between God and humanity, for it contextualises the importance of revelation as reconciling 
agent. This idea of broken communication is similar to what Balthasar calls the great abyss. 
However, Balthasar refers not only to a severed relationship, but also to the inherent difference 
between divine and human natures. Both of these factors make meaningful communication and 
relationship difficult. Revelation is necessary because it can accomplish what the second Yes 
cannot; it can reveal the divine lover to the beloved. Human self-consciousness is not capable of 
this task because revelation concerning the divine must originate in the source. Revelation and 
reconciliation can be received only as an offer (gift) from the divine initiator. 
The importance of revelation and, in particular, God as self-revealing and self-disclosing, 
is closely tied to Balthasar’s first word in theology, beauty. Balthasar observes that there are two 
moments to be noted in the interaction between a person and a work of art (beauty). The first, the 
act of beholding, does not intimately engage the beholder with the object of adoration. The 
second, being enraptured, is not a passive stance (despite the passive case of the verb), but rather, 
the act of giving oneself to beauty. This happens when the beholder surrenders to the radiance of 
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beauty’s splendour and allows it to effect transformation.43 While the one gazing at beauty is a 
distant or objective observer (first moment), the one who is enraptured has entered into 
communication with beauty by partaking of its gift, a gift freely offered to all who desire to 
receive it. For Balthasar, beauty, goodness, and truth are all found in God because they are 
revelations of divine Being. God’s self-giving revelation, like any gift, invites a response, an 
encounter, and a movement, not toward the gift or the work of art, but toward the giver and the 
artist. Balthasar notes: “For the source is not a thing, nor an abstract truth nor a work of art, but 
God himself, eternally involved in Christ crucified for my sake and for the sake of the whole 
world.  I myself cannot, in the face of this, stand by as a mere spectator. I am involved, though 
involved only insofar as I involve myself.”44 Revelation, then, is not only that which comes from 
the divine, but that which builds a bridge between divine and human. It is important, as Balthasar 
is careful to explain, not to reduce revelation or λόγος to an abstract, static philosophical or 
religious concept. Revelation is a “living bond” embodied in the God-man, Christ.45 Revelation, 
as we have seen, is closely linked to beauty, relationship, and identification with the person of 
Christ. A further dimension of revelation implied in all these elements is action. Because divine 
revelation is rooted in the action of God, human understanding of that revelation is likewise 
accessed through human action, through responsive acts. “For God’s revelation is not an object 
to be looked at; it is his action in and upon the world, and the world can only respond, and hence, 
‘understand’, through action on its part.”46 
The idea of reciprocal action is not without its challenges. If only God can reveal God, 
and only God can reconcile the other to God, the potency of the second Yes is brought into 
question. It seems obvious that humanity does indeed have the ability to respond, but does this 
response carry any real weight or authority in comparison to the divine Yes? Does the second 
Yes add anything to the first Yes? Is it possible for there to be a real contribution on the part of 
humanity to the divine drama, a substantive, dramatic “and” to follow the second Yes? Some of 
these questions will be addressed in the next chapter which deals with collaboration, but the short 
answer to all of the above is yes. Balthasar, commenting on the thought of Barth, uses an 
                                                          
43 Balthasar, GL1, 10. 
44 Balthasar, Engagement with God, 46. 
45 Balthasar, GL1, 153. 
46 Hans Urs von Balthasar, Theo-Drama: Theological Dramatic Theory, vol. 1, Prologomena, trans. Graham Harrison 
(San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1988), 15. Hereafter referred to as TD1. 
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illustration to describe the connection between revelation and faith, or divine initiative and 
human response.  
In Christ, the moment of revelation and the moment of faith are fused together, and in 
their interchange in him, we discover in the truest sense the infinite fulfillment of both in 
all their implications. We could describe this thought as a kind of hourglass, where the 
two contiguous vessels (God and creature) meet only at the narrow passage through the 
center: where they both encounter each other in Jesus Christ. … And just as the sand 
flows only from top to bottom, so too God’s revelation is one-sided, flowing from his 
gracious decision alone. But of course the sand flows down into the other chamber so that 
the sand there can really increase. In other words, there is countermovement in the other 
chamber, but only because of the first movement, the initiative of the first chamber.47 
This is a helpful image in some ways, but it has its limitations, one of them being its unilateral 
nature. Though the sand in the bottom of the hourglass is said to increase, to have 
countermovement, it is nevertheless entirely passive, having no ability to interact with the top 
half. In order to better reflect human freedom, Hans Boersma takes Balthasar’s analogy of the 
hourglass one step further. “Revelation was primary, was supernatural in character, and did come 
from above. At the same time, the gift of supernatural revelation through Christ made it 
legitimate to turn the hourglass upside down, so that nature, too, made its genuine contribution, 
in and through Christ.”48 This inversion is what is at the core of the second Yes, and what makes 
it a compelling, powerful response to divine initiative.  
Both Balthasar and Barth are cautious never to allow human freedom to exert substantive 
power over divine freedom; both desire to preserve the sanctity of divine sovereignty. However, 
both the biblical witness and recorded history point to a scandalous amount of human freedom 
within divine sovereignty, so much so that in both cases we find anguished pleas for God to 
intervene and stop the horrors wrought by human hands. How do we reconcile a strong 
commitment to divine sovereignty with the reality of devastating and destructive human action? 
The answer lies in how we view revelation. Ben Quash states that, “The Spirit makes history a 
medium of revelation and not just an interval, or gap, between revelation and its recipients.”49 
Quash is not quibbling over Barth’s and Balthasar’s commitment to view history as a showcase 
for divine redemption, but noting that history also serves another purpose: it reveals who God is, 
                                                          
47 Hans Urs von Balthasar, The Theology of Karl Barth, trans. Edward T. Oakes (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1992), 
197-98.  
48 Hans Boersma, Nouvelle Thèologie and Sacramental Ontology: A Return to Mystery (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2009), 5. 
49 Ben Quash, Theology and the Drama of History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 212.  
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not just through the person of Christ, but through human action. This may be troubling to some 
theologians because, though the overall arc of the divine drama in biblical accounts undoubtedly 
positions God as beginning and end, alpha and omega, there is much in the intervening acts 
which appears to be a clear departure from the divine author’s intent. To a great extent, the 
human actors seem to have derailed the divine narrative. Predictably, Balthasar always points the 
reader back to the source, insisting that humanity’s story is only found within God’s story: 
“Again to be led by faith means to remain in perpetual contact with the source and to have no 
desire to seek one’s own adventure. The greatest adventure after all is God’s redeeming action 
for the world in his Son, and if we follow the Son’s course we shall not run the risk of losing 
ourselves on the slippery paths of self-inverted love.”50 I find little fault in positing a continuous 
turn to Christ as the focal point of all theology, however, it does serve to render the second Yes, 
perhaps without meaning to, as somewhat redundant, a barely heard affirmation to what God has 
already determined from the very beginning. In other words, Balthasar’s Christo-centricity could 
be interpreted as diminishing the responsive, yet revelatory role of creation and humanity. This, I 
believe, would be a misrepresentation of the divine drama. 
If freedom and self-determination are divine gifts granted to humanity, they cannot be 
token gifts; they must have real creative power. Free agents cannot be pawns in a divine game 
nor actors with no ability to act. This would make the concept of human responsibility 
meaningless. The ability to respond to divine invitation must be a true, voluntary response, not 
an automatic, involuntary reflex which involves no volition. Beginning with the assumption that 
there is such a thing as genuine human freedom, a gracious gift granted by divine benevolence, 
we now consider why a robust human response is necessary. I have already made reference to 
the stages of the second Yes, moving a person through self-awareness, decisive action, 
participation in community, and engagement with the other. The question here goes beyond what 
the second Yes looks like to its importance in the divine drama; human response is vital to the 
divine drama because it is the means for transformation.  
The answer can be found by once again referring to the dynamics of theatrical 
improvisation. Because the second Yes implies that the respondent is a willing participant, freely 
surrendering her own agenda to the community of trust and her personal adventure to the larger 
story, there is no imposition of one will over another. Change is not forced but embraced, and as 
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a result, there is not merely external compliance but an internal shifting of priorities and guiding 
principles. The ability of one actor to make a genuine response to another (freedom) gives rise to 
several transformative dynamics. The first has already been mentioned, and that is a revelation of 
the existence and benevolence of the other which opens up a whole new world to the actor. The 
second is an awareness of the power which genuine, free, creative response carries. This 
realisation can either result in gratitude and wonder, leading to humble restraint and responsible 
action, or to a hunger for more power which manifests itself in aggression and self-assertion over 
the other. In the first scenario, the respondent becomes a functional member of a relational 
community; in the second, the respondent seeks to take control of the community. There is 
another possible scenario which technically takes one into the realm of No. One of the 
expressions of this negation is when the actor recoils from the demands of being a contributor 
and isolates themselves from interaction (community) as much as possible. In all these scenarios, 
it is important to remember that once the first Yes has been offered, it cannot be rescinded. A 
response is required and in fact, cannot be withheld; even a refusal to respond is a response, 
affecting the relationship between the two parties.  
Translating the transformative element of the second Yes into theological language, we 
first affirm that the responsive Yes is meant to awaken humanity to the divine Yes. A positive 
response, a second Yes which willingly enters into the relationship initiated by God, is birthed in 
gratitude and worship and accompanied by cooperative action, often called obedience. 
Transformation is characterised by self-focused human purpose opening up to and joining itself 
to divine purpose. Ongoing change is cultivated through growing intimacy between divine and 
human, made possible through revelation and the indwelling Spirit of God. Barth speaks of it this 
way:  
The Spirit of God is God in His freedom to be present to the creature, and therefore to 
create this relation, and therefore to be in the life of the creature. And God’s Spirit, the 
Holy Spirit, especially in revelation, is God Himself to the extent that He can not only 
come to man but also be in man, and thus open up man and make him capable and ready 
for Himself, and thus achieve His revelation in him.51 
  
Barth brings many of the elements of dramatic theology together in this brief quote: the first Yes 
(being present to the creature through revelation), self-gift (making humanity ready for Himself), 
transformation (opening up humanity), and intimacy (being present in humanity).  
                                                          
51 Barth, Church Dogmatics, 450.  
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Before moving on to the next section, let me offer a brief comment on the self-assertive 
response. Self-assertion is when the wilful respondent (as opposed to the surrendering 
respondent) seeks to splice the divine giver from the divine gift, grabbing hold of human 
freedom but refusing divine purpose, thereby setting herself up in competition to the divine. This 
partial Yes refuses to relinquish self-interested action, and this proves detrimental to the 
community and eventually, to the self. In theological terms, it is the way of death and not life 
because it isolates the respondent from the source of life, the Creator. Nevertheless, 
transformation is evident even in the self-determined respondent, but it has nothing to do with 
embracing virtues such as love, justice, and mercy which are the building blocks of community. 
Instead, the respondent chooses attitudes and actions which solidify the distance between herself 
and the other (both divine and human), seeking to displace or destroy any who would threaten 
her ability to control her own destiny. The first biblical example of self-assertion is found in 
Genesis when we read of the wilful responses of Adam and Eve and their choice to part ways 
with divine purpose.52 It is interesting to note that both types of Yes (surrender and self-
assertion) are costly, though in different ways. The Yes of surrender to divine purpose forfeits 
self-interest and self-determination whereas the Yes of self-will walks away from all expressions 
of cooperation which are found in genuine friendship, flourishing community, and joyful 
participation in the divine drama. 
The Limitations of Human Action 
The remarkable power of the second Yes, both constructive and destructive, is evident to 
any student of theology or history. When considering the gift of human freedom and its source in 
divine freedom, one cannot help but brush up against theodicy. I feel no need to defend the 
authority and power of Almighty God in the face of evil deeds which humans inflict on each 
other and on creation; I know that God, if he is indeed Almighty, needs no help from me on this. 
However, freedom, like any virtue, is done a great disservice if only viewed from the positive, 
permissive angle without acknowledging the counterbalancing aspect of restraint. My subject 
here is not pure theodicy (how can a good God allow evil?) but focused on the limitations of 
human freedom, an issue which is closely related to theodicy but views it from the ground-up, so 
to speak. I contend, first of all, that it is not necessary to diminish the role of humanity in order to 
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heighten the sovereignty and determination of God. In fact, positioning humanity in a restrictive 
role or placing too much attention on the effects of sin leads to an impoverished view of God, 
suggesting there is a limit to divine goodness and wisdom. Second, if the human will is truly 
free, then self-determination must be factored in alongside divine determination. Where there is 
freedom for human depravity, there must also be freedom for human goodness.  
In order to address the matter of human limitation, I suggest that we look through two 
lenses in the hope that by combining them, we might gain some measure of depth and dimension 
on the topic. The first is what could be called the best case scenario. This relies heavily on the 
inherent goodness of humanity and the belief that the link between Creator and creature is the 
starting point for positive self-determination and conscientious morality. The second, the worst 
case scenario, posits that humanity is damaged at the core, therefore the natural inclination is to 
turn and return to the baser things, much like a stone tossed in the air always returns to the 
ground. These two scenarios are evident in the heated debates between Pelagius (c. 350-418), 
whose suggestion of a sinless life made possible through grace was condemned by the church, 
and Augustine (354-430) who prevailed with his doctrine of inherited original sin. My purpose 
here is not to revisit this age-old debate in any depth, but to cite it as a way of illustrating 
different approaches to human determination and limitation. In addition, this debate reiterates the 
impact which starting point has on theological development.  
For Pelagius, the starting point is the doctrine that human beings are created in the image 
of the Creator and inherently good.53 For Augustine, the starting point is the depravity of 
humanity through the inheritance of a sinful nature and the resultant great gulf between God and 
creation. Augustine’s belief that (after Adam and Eve sinned) we are all born into sin and carry 
the curse of condemnation, as well as the compulsion to participate in sin, means that he views 
the human will as severely hampered.54 As a result of this impotence on the part of humanity, the 
                                                          
53 Details gleaned from Robert F. Evans, Pelagius: Inquiries and Reappraisals (New York: The Seabury Press, 1968) 
and Geoffrey O. Riada, “Pelagius: To Demetrias.” Accessed February 15, 2016. 
http://www.libraryoftheology.com/writings/pelagianism/PelagiusToDemetrias.pdf 
54 William E. Phipps summarises Augustine’s view regarding original sin: “Adam's disobedience to the divine will 
resulted in his genitals becoming disobedient to his own will. ‘Lust’ (concupiscentia) was involved in this latter 
mutiny and Adam was to spread that ‘disease’ congenitally to his offspring. From the first couple in human history 
onward, a ‘depraved nature’ has been transmitted in the semen so that infants are sinful ‘by contagion and not by 
decision.’ Humans can no more choose to sin or not to sin than they can choose their parents or their 
pigmentation.” William E. Phipps, “The Heresiarch: Pelagius or Augustine?” Anglican Theological Review LXII.2 
(April 1, 1980), 126. He references Augustine’s works: Marriage and Concupiscence 1.7-9, Unfinished Work Against 
Julian 4.98, Against Julian 5.14. 
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saving grace of God and the salvific death of Christ are significantly heightened both in 
importance and potency. In contrast, the best case scenario (Pelagius) posits that the gift of 
human free will originates with a good and benevolent Creator. Therefore, the divine will which 
produces the human will also enables humanity to live a moral life. Pelagius makes clear that it is 
necessary to draw on both “the good of nature and the good of grace,” referencing the work of 
the Creator as well as the Redeemer.55 Pelagius has been, and still is, accused of promoting 
wilful self-determination instead of utter reliance on the grace of God, thereby rendering void the 
saving work of Christ on the cross. Though Pelagius made clear that he recognised the necessity 
of divine grace, his message of sinlessness which was meant as a call to authentic Christian 
living was perceived as a threat to orthodoxy and a divisive factor in the church.56 Instead of 
emphasising the great schism between a good God and depraved humanity, Pelagius presents a 
picture more indicative of attunement between the Creator and the creature. He writes: “We are 
procreated also without virtue or vice and before the activity of our own personal will there is 
nothing in man but what God has formed in him.”57 For Pelagius, the nature of humanity is 
rooted in Genesis 1 and the good Creator and not primarily in Genesis 3 which presents the 
fallen creation.  
It is important to note that both Augustine and Pelagius hold that grace is essential to 
salvation and the Christian life. For Augustine, grace enables one to overcome the downward 
pull of inherent sin, the “Adamic mutation” as it were, and through the grace of redemption, 
human nature is remade.58 Grace, for Pelagius, is also the necessary element for salvation, but 
the focus is not so much on freedom from inherent sin, but empowerment for obedience and 
good works. He writes: “That a man possesses this possibility of willing and effecting any good 
work, comes from God alone.”59 Perhaps one could align Pelagius’s view with the theological 
idea of common grace, the generous, divine presence which underlies every expression of 
goodness in creation. Special grace, the action of God on behalf of sinners to reconcile them to 
himself, appears to speak more to Augustine’s concerns regarding humanity’s depraved nature. 
                                                          
55 “The Letter to Demetrias,” in B. R. Rees, The Letters of Pelagius and his Followers (Woodbridge: Boydell, 1991), 
9.1. Accessed February 15, 2016. http://epistolae.ccnmtl.columbia.edu/letter/1296.html. 
56 Evans, Pelagius: Inquiries and Reappraisals; Riada, “Pelagius: To Demitrias.” 
57 Pelagius as cited in Phipps, “The Heresiarch: Pelagius or Augustine?” 128.  
58 Phipps, “The Heresiarch: Pelagius or Augustine?” 130. 
59 Pelagius as cited in Alan P.F. Sell, “Augustine Versus Pelagius: A Cautionary Tale of Perennial Importance,” Calvin 
Theological Journal (November 1977), 123. 
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It is easy to see how this debate causes lines to be drawn concerning free will and divine 
sovereignty. For those who do not wish to call God’s determinism into question, the idea of 
inherent human goodness leading to moral sinlessness seems at the very least impossible and at 
most, heretical. However, for those who hold God’s goodness in high regard and seek to live in 
that goodness, the belief that humanity is inherently good speaks not of self-determination but of 
the irrepressible goodness of God. If we refer to the best case scenario, human limitation is 
identified in acts of sinful self-sabotage, acts which turn one away from the goodness of God 
which is ever present in generous measure both in human nature and in the saving work of 
Christ. Human limitation, in the worst case scenario, is seen in the devastating effects which sin 
has on the world, thereby limiting free will, especially in its capacity to choose good over evil. 
The worst case scenario acknowledges the power of the grace of God, the work of Christ, and the 
ongoing indwelling of the Spirit to reconcile us to God, but denies that these can empower us to 
live without sin, at least in this present life. From the viewpoint of the best case scenario, there is 
no such restriction: the possibility for goodness is unlimited. As we can see, both perspectives 
put forth elevated views of divine holiness and goodness, however, the best case scenario also 
suggests a robust view of human freedom.  
History shows us both scenarios: people who seem to have every advantage end up 
bringing devastation on the world, and people who are up against great odds choose to respond 
with lovingkindness and generosity. Augustine explains the first by pointing to the infection of 
sin present in all humanity. Pelagius says that the latter were able to find the good of nature and 
join it with the good of grace in order to live moral lives. This brings us back to the importance 
of starting point. Since Pelagius begins with goodness, we can conclude that he expects to follow 
a trajectory toward more goodness. Since Augustine starts with the assumption of human 
depravity, he expects continued depravity. When mapping out the divine drama, we must be 
careful not to use the starting point of our limited perspective, in other words, the second Yes, to 
define roles, interpret motivations, and delineate the story arc. Wherever we find ourselves on 
the inherent good/inherent evil spectrum, we can agree that there is inexplicable goodness as 
well as incomprehensible evil present in humanity. This is the freedom which characterises the 
second Yes and it must be given full voice. However, we must always remain mindful of the 
limitations of human action and experience. To use a musical analogy, the second Yes is a 
harmony, perhaps a counterpoint melody at times, but it has no existence or meaning apart from 
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the dominant leitmotif. Nonetheless, when the two voices come together, the first Yes and the 




The Third Yes – Collaboration and Synergos 
 
Audience and actors are not complementary and self-sufficient halves; both of them 
remain open, expecting some third thing that is to come about in and through both 
players and the audience. The limitations of both of them open on to an unlimited 
horizon.1 
 
Balthasar shows us that the mystery of being is revealed, that is, made immediately 
apparent, in and through the mediation of the encounter of particular beings in their 
simultaneous unity and difference.2 
 
Thus far, I have argued for the primacy and potency of the divine Yes, as well as its 
ability to release and empower the second Yes. The context of gift has been invoked in order to 
ensure that loving interaction instead of domination remains at the forefront of the divine drama. 
On the subject of human freedom, I have attempted to describe a robust capacity for self-
determined action while acknowledging that humanity is essentially cast in a responsive role. We 
now move on to the crux of dramatic theology: the nature of the interaction between divine and 
human actors as they share the stage.  
When we talk about the concept of gift, it is easy to recognise the two roles of giver and 
receiver, but in the idea of collaboration, the lines between the initiator and the responder are less 
distinct. Though collaboration (co-labouring) involves mutual exchange, it should not be 
categorised as a function within the exchange economy. In other words, collaboration does not 
situate us back in Mauss’s primitive model of total services, equating societal obligations with 
cultural mores enacted through pre-scripted gifts and reciprocations. Instead, collaboration 
moves the parties forward into new roles. No longer can we clearly identify the one who acts and 
the one who is acted upon, because in collaboration both parties are on relatively equal footing, 
sharing a common goal and task.  
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In the English language, the idea of collaboration is associated with two or more people 
working on a project together.3 Since the common usage of the word carries no indication of the 
loving commitment and trust which I believe is vital to the third Yes, I have chosen to introduce 
another word, synergos, into the discussion to augment the notion of collaboration. Synergos is a 
Greek word used several times in the New Testament4 in different forms; it is translated as 
“fellow workers,” “fellow helpers,” “labourers together,” “working together,” “co-labourers,” 
and “co-workers.” The word is used to refer both to the Lord working with his disciples (Mark 
16:20; 2 Corinthians 6:1) and the followers of Jesus working together (1 Corinthians 3:9; 
Romans 16:3, 9, 21). However, within these biblical contexts, we find many indicators that the 
co-labourers are much more than work colleagues. Paul writes: “Greet Prisca and Aquila, who 
work with me in Christ Jesus, and who risked their necks for my life” (Romans 16:3-4a). In a 
letter to the Colossians, we read: “These are the only ones of the circumcision [Jews] among my 
co-workers for the kingdom of God, and they have been a comfort to me” (Colossians 4:11). 
Paul refers to a fellow worker, Epaphroditus, in the following way: “my brother and co-worker 
and fellow soldier, your messenger and minister to my need” (Philippians 2:25) and calls 
Timothy a “brother and co-worker for God” (1 Thessalonians 3:2). The idea of synergos or 
collaboration in the New Testament is further contextualised by proximity to words like “loyal 
companion,”5 “truth,”6 “good news,”7 “grace,”8 “joy,”9 and the actions of supporting, 10 
strengthening, and encouraging.11 As well, the “co-workers” in the New Testament are exhorted 
to rejoice together and to serve each other.12 
In addition to the biblical context of a tightly knit group of believers devoted not only to a 
common purpose but to each other, I would like to incorporate the meaning of an English 
                                                          
3 “Collaboration,” Cambridge English Dictionary. Accessed at dictionary.cambridge.org. Interestingly, the word can 
also be used in a negative sense to refer to someone who cooperates with an enemy to bring about the demise of 
their country. 
4 Some occurrences of various forms of synergos can be found in Mark 16:20; 1 Corinthians 3:9; 1 Corinthians 
16:16; 2 Corinthians 1:24; 2 Corinthians 6:1; Romans 8:28; Romans 16:3, 9, 21; Colossians 4:11; Philippians 2:25; 
Philippians 4:3; 1 Thessalonians 3:2; Philemon 1:24; and 3 John 1:8. 
5 Philippians 4:3. 
6 Ibid. 
7 Mark 16:20. 
8 1 Corinthians 3:9. 
9 2 Corinthians 1:24. 
10 3 John 1:8. 
11 1 Thessalonians 3:2. 
12 1 Corinthians 16:16; Philippians 4:4. 
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derivative, synergy, into the idea of synergos. Synergy, which refers to “a mutually advantageous 
conjunction,”13 reinforces the notion of interrelation which we find in collaboration, but also 
adds the idea of something new being created when two or more participants join together “to 
produce a combined effect greater than the sum of their separate effects.”14 Synergy implies that 
when two parties come together, they are, essentially, more than two. This echoes the spiritual 
dynamic found in Jesus’s promise to his disciples that, “where two or three are gathered in my 
name, I am there among them.”15 My purpose in referencing the expansive biblical concept of 
synergos (working together), both in divine/human and human/human configurations, and 
incorporating the idea of synergy, is to infuse the notion of collaboration with a sense of 
intimacy and commitment which goes beyond that found in the word’s common usage. In order 
to reflect this broader definition, I will use the terms collaboration and synergos somewhat 
interchangeably to refer to the concept of two or more parties coming together in a loving, 
trusting relationship in order to craft a story. 
It must be acknowledged that navigating the ground of divine and human collaboration is 
complex, even precarious, because any robust theology concerning the character and nature of 
God exposes the vast distance between the two subjects. One relatively recent approach, 
relational theology, seeks to bring the divine and human subjects together by invoking a 
reciprocal framework. Relational theology affirms two key concepts which speak to both aspects 
of the divine/human relationship. Theologian Thomas Oord articulates the first idea this way: 
“God affects creatures in various ways. Instead of being aloof and detached, God is active and 
involved in relationship with others. God relates to us, and that makes an essential difference.”16 
Here the emphasis is on the dynamic action of God upon creation which reveals God’s 
immanence to the creature. The second point gives considerable weight to the creaturely side of 
the relationship, highlighting the effect creation can have on God. Oord continues: “Creatures 
affect God in various ways. While God’s nature is unchanging, creatures influence the loving 
and living Creator of the universe. We relate to God, and creation makes a difference to God.”17  
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Even though Oord is careful to affirm God’s nature as immutable, he nevertheless opens up a 
rather large spectrum of questions regarding God’s omniscience and omnipotence, and more 
specifically, God’s foreknowledge and foreordination of events. Nevertheless, relational 
theology brings some very important elements to the discussion which are generally missing 
from divine determinism.  
New Testament scholar Scot McKnight affirms a relational theology approach, stating 
that it “rightly affirms God’s vulnerability and the partial openness of the future.”18 McKnight 
deliberately distinguishes his theological position from one which allows for a changing deity 
(process theology) by proposing what he calls a “non-process, narrative-based, relational view of 
God’s sovereignty.”19 Relational theology suggests that a defense of genuine divine/human 
collaboration does not diminish God’s ability to intervene in human affairs; however, because 
God is sovereign over all things, he is sovereign even over his own sovereignty.20 By choosing to 
enter into relationship and be intimately involved with humanity, God chooses to be affected by 
his creation. Relational theology posits that the acts of God toward his creatures are based in 
overflowing love, not a need to maintain control. Theologian Roger Olson defines divine 
determinism as a view in which, “all events are traceable back to God who controls history down 
to every detail according to a blueprint.”21 According to Olson, this results in a God who takes 
no risks and essentially micromanages historical events and individual lives to ensure that 
nothing occurs which is contrary to divine will. Human freedom, it seems obvious, can never 
find full expression in this view. However, relational sovereignty (Olson’s term) shifts the focus 
from control to what Barry Callen identifies as “interactivity or mutuality.” Callen goes on to 
emphasise that the “interaction of the wills of Creator and creature are real.”22 In summary, 
                                                          
18 Scot McKnight, “Relational Theology: Roger Olson,” Jesus Creed: Exploring the Significance of Jesus and the 
Orthodox Faith for the 21st Century, April 17, 2013. Accessed February 15, 2016. 
http://www.patheos.com/blogs/jesuscreed/2013/04/17/relational-theology-roger-olson/.  
19 Ibid.  
20 “To say that God can’t be vulnerable, can’t limit himself, can’t restrain his power to make room for other 
powers, is, ironically, to deny God’s sovereignty.” Ibid. 
21 Roger Olson, “A Relational View of God’s Sovereignty,” talk given at Missio Alliance, Alexandria, Virginia, April, 
2013. Accessed February 15, 2016. http://www.patheos.com/blogs/rogereolson/2013/04/a-non-calivinist-
relational-view-of-gods-sovereignty/. 
22 Barry L. Callen, “John Wesley and Relational Theology,” in Relational Theology: A Contemporary Introduction, 
eds. Brint Montgomery, Thomas Jay Oord, Karen Winslow (San Diego: Point Loma Press; Eugene, OR: Wipf & Stock 
Publishers, 2012), 7. 
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relational theology, according to its proponents, is a way to view God not as a divine being 
obsessed with power or authority, but characterised by openness and vulnerability.23  
Though I am not advocating relational theology per se nor agreeing to all its propositions, 
the portrayal of a relational God is foundational to the idea of the third Yes. In order to flesh out 
the concept of divine/human collaboration or synergos, we look first at the biblical concept of 
covenant and note how the Israelite covenants, unique in Ancient Near Eastern literature, show 
God leaning toward collaboration instead of control. The second part of the chapter will be 
devoted to a discussion of the incarnation, divinity and humanity united in the person of Jesus 
Christ, and the concept of plerosis (fullness) as an expression of synergos. Next, we turn back 
again to improvisation, this time both in theatre practice and in music, to explore the dynamics of 
synergos through creative interactivity and mutuality. Finally, I engage with a number of 
philosophers, particularly Jean-Luc Nancy and his concept of “being-with,” as a way of 
understanding divine/human interaction. Viewing the third Yes from four different angles is not 
an attempt to fence it in or define its parameters once and for all. Instead, each image or scenario 
is meant to open up another aspect of the dynamic, dramatic interaction between divine and 
human actors. Ideally, the four approaches will provide a good deal of clarity concerning the 
nature of the third Yes while, at the same time, allowing for the breathing room characteristic of 
genuine dramatic encounter. This chapter is pivotal in that it moves us past unilateral divine 
action, past human response-ability and experience, and launches us into collaborative 
interactivity (synergos) which is at the core of dramatic theology.   
 
                                                          
23 Of interest here is the thought of theologian John D. Caputo on divine vulnerability. In his book, The Weakness of 
God, Caputo suggests that God’s weakness (demonstrated in part through Christ’s kenosis) is not merely restraint, 
but God’s very essence. He equates traditional views of God with power structures, God (and theology) being the 
one at the top of the heap, so to speak. By positing what he calls a weak theology, a theology which reveals the 
action of God through indirect and often confusing means instead of through definitive creeds and theological 
enforcement, Caputo shows us a God who, though uncontainable, appears to us in ways which have nothing to do 
with power and thereby resemble uncertainty. Instead of a theology of causation, he posits a theology of call, what 
he terms an “unconditional claim” and what I believe is very close to what I have labelled invitation (the first Yes). 
For Caputo, the idea of weakness opens up the whole concept of God in a way which a strong theology of God 
cannot, because its focus is not on God having everything turn out the way God wants it to, but on the call to 
unconditioned compassion, justice, and love. John D. Caputo, The Weakness of God: A theology of the event 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2006). See also Ian Leask, ed., “From Radical Hermeneutics to The 




Covenant: Faithfulness and Vulnerability 
The idea of synergos within the divine drama should come as no surprise since dynamic, 
mutually collaborative movement is at the heart of the triune God (perichoresis). Therefore, one 
could argue that there is evidence of divine/human collaboration throughout the entire biblical 
witness, from the creation stories to the description of the eschaton. I have chosen to highlight 
but one example of divine/human collaboration in this section: the Israelite covenants, 
specifically the Abrahamic and Mosaic agreements. In the examples of covenant found in the 
Hebrew Bible, we find a God who asks human beings to trust him, and rather surprisingly, a God 
who places a great deal of trust in humanity as well. As a result, the posture of the divine initiator 
is not one of maintaining control or exerting domination, but of fostering mutuality and 
collaboration. In covenant we see a God who would freely bind himself to human beings in an 
agreement and thereby, choose to be affected by them and their actions. This, as we shall see, 
was unique for its time. Covenants in the Ancient Near Eastern cultures were basically of two 
types, promissory and obligatory.24 A promissory covenant was unconditional, meaning that one 
party made promises to another party without any demands made on the latter. In contrast, an 
obligatory covenant implicated some aspect of mutuality, indicating responsibilities on both 
sides. Some ancient covenants were between unequal parties, such as a suzerainty agreement 
(obligatory) in which a monarch promised protection and certain benefits to a lesser ruler in 
exchange for their fealty. Another example of a covenant between disparate parties was a land 
grant (promissory) by which a wealthy landowner or ruler bestowed a parcel of land in a gesture 
of gratitude to a loyal subject. This was similar to a patron covenant (promissory) in which a 
superior party made an oath to take responsibility for the well-being of an inferior party. An 
example of a parity contract between two equal parties (obligatory) would have been a mutually 
beneficial trade agreement.25  
                                                          
24 M. Weinfeld, “The Covenant of Grant in the Old Testament and in the Ancient Near East,” Journal of the 
American Oriental Society 90.2 (April – June 1970), 184. George E. Mendenhall uses slightly different categories, 
suzerainty treaties and parity treaties, to distinguish the differences in ANE agreements. Mendenhall defines the 
suzerainty treaty as a bond of mutual support requiring an oath only from the inferior party. The superior party 
was bound to commands given by his own superior, the king. In contrast, the parity treaty contained identical 
oaths for both parties. George E. Mendenhall, “Covenant Forms in Israelite Tradition,” The Biblical Archaeologist 
XVII (September 1, 1954), 55-56. See also Delbert R. Hillers, Covenant: The History of a Biblical Idea (Baltimore: The 
Johns Hopkins Press, 1969), especially chapter 3.  




René Lopez observes that the covenants the God of Israel (YHWH) makes with his 
people follow the Ancient Near Eastern pattern for the most part, but there are some notable 
differences. I will point out a few of Lopez’s observations which are especially pertinent to the 
topic at hand. 1) The covenant names YHWH as an active party. ANE contracts were never 
between a deity and humans; at most, they called on the gods to be witnesses. 2) The punishment 
for a violation of the covenant is not total annihilation, as in most ANE agreements, but 
proportionate to the crime. Further, if Israel were to break the covenant, it would not be 
considered void; instead, there is a promise of restoration after a period of discipline. 3) Contrary 
to ANE tradition, the blessings are listed before the curses.26 While Lopez, in agreement with 
many Hebrew scholars, concludes that the fulfilment of the promises made in the Israelite 
covenants are contingent on God alone, thereby making them covenants between two unequal 
parties, I believe that the exceptions show how far the biblical covenants lean toward mutuality, 
especially in contrast to the covenants of the time. 27 The primary indicator of mutuality is the 
fact that God inserts himself into the covenant with Israel. Instead of acting as an objective 
witness or a divine judge, YHWH is the benevolent ruler offering to enter into a reciprocal 
relationship. The inclusion of merciful discipline and a promise of restoration should the lesser 
party violate the conditions indicate that the objective of the agreement is not domination but an 
ongoing, mutually beneficial bond. Similarly, the matter of reversing the order of curses and 
blessings reveals the overall good will of the dominant party toward the inferior party, 
comparable to a patron treaty. In contrast to ANE tradition, the tone evident in every part of the 
Israelite covenants is not that of an overbearing monarch seeking to subjugate his subjects, but 
the divine king inviting Israel to sit at the royal table.  
All things considered, there is an unusual amount of give and take in the ancient biblical 
covenants, showcasing a more equivocal relationship than that generally found in ANE 
agreements. Instead of threatening annihilation upon violation of the covenant, mercy is offered 
                                                          
26 Details gleaned from Lopez, “Israelite Covenants in the Light of Ancient Near East Covenants, Part 1” and René 
Lopez, “Israelite Covenants in the Light of Ancient Near East Covenants, Part 2,” CTS Journal 10 (Spring 2004), 72-
106. 
27 Mendenhall points out, “the relative absence of the do ut des type of religion in which man and deity are 
business contractors in which each agrees to confer a benefit upon the other – the sort of concept which is the 
foundation of legally binding contracts today,” in the Israelite covenants. I believe this in no way diminishes my 
point about mutuality because he specifically notes the “business” nature of these obligatory contracts while I 
refer to covenants based in loving relationship. Mendenhall, “Covenant Forms in Israelite Tradition,” 51.  
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upon repentance. Instead of breaking off the contract when one party fails to hold up its end of 
the agreement, provision is made for restoration. Instead of many gods acting as witnesses, 
YHWH, the one God, enters into an exclusive relationship with humanity. Also included in 
Lopez’s list of distinctives is the special allowance given for the oppressed and downtrodden. 
Offering compassion toward those who have nothing of value to contribute might be interpreted 
as reinforcing the unilateral nature of the covenant (promissory), but I believe it speaks not so 
much about superiority or even about patronisation as it does of a God who identifies with the 
poor, the outcast, and the overlooked. The lovingkindness written into the Israelite covenant is 
not impersonal benevolence, nor a litany of benefits cited for the purpose of demanding 
obedience, but YHWH revealing himself as a compassionate, relational God, one who is mindful 
of the least and the lowliest. One cannot make a case for absolute parity between divine and 
human parties in the Israelite covenants, but comparatively speaking, they are strikingly 
benevolent and interpersonal agreements which cast the two parties as relative collaborators, and 
according to Psalm 25:14, even as friends.28  
In general, theologians believe the Israelite covenants take the ANE suzerainty agreement 
as their model, but there are some significant contrasts between the two. The traditional 
suzerainty treaty, meant to secure mutual support, nevertheless left few, if any, options open to 
the lesser party. Mendenhall notes: 
[The] vassal is exchanging future obedience to specific commands for past benefits 
which he received without any real right. Since, to receive a gift without becoming 
obligated is a prerogative only of the emperor, the actual positon of relative strength – 
that is, the inability of the vassal to defend himself from overwhelmingly superior power 
is a fact which deprives him of any ground which would enable him to escape obligation 
to an overlord who has granted him a boon – frequently of kingship itself.29  
The Israelite covenants reveal an inversion of the traditional roles of the suzerainty agreement. 
Instead of the vassal being the powerless, vulnerable party, we find a people to whom the divine 
sovereign offers a surprising amount of freedom, and by implication, some measure of power. 
Essentially, this puts YHWH in a vulnerable position, a situation which the ANE treaties sought 
to eliminate. The suzerainty covenants were drawn up primarily to protect the interests of the 
king or suzerain, not the vassals. In contrast, the Abrahamic covenant initially requires nothing 
                                                          
28 “The friendship of the LORD is for those who fear him, and he makes his covenant known to them.” Psalm 25:14. 
29 Mendenhall, “Covenant Forms in Israelite Tradition,” 58. 
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from the lesser party, consisting only of divine promises of blessing.30 Later on, circumcision is 
implemented as a sign of the everlasting bond between YHWH and Abraham’s descendants.31 
The promises of YHWH contained in the Abrahamic covenant are numerous; their reiteration to 
subsequent generations testifies to the ongoing commitment of YHWH to the nation of Israel. 
What seems significant in this covenant are the two key points found in relational theology: 
God’s faithfulness and God’s vulnerability.  
As mentioned previously, the typical ANE suzerainty agreement placed the vassal or 
lesser party in a vulnerable position, demanding obedience and loyalty to the monarch. In the 
Israelite covenant, we find the reverse. Instead of requiring it, YHWH is the one who promises 
faithfulness, affirming that his words and blessings are true and everlasting. YHWH is also the 
one who places himself in the position of vulnerability, putting his promised faithfulness in 
jeopardy by trusting Abram to be the willing and cooperative means whereby great blessing will 
come to all the nations of the world.32 A recurring motif of the Hebrew Bible, “You will be my 
people and I will be your God,”33 contains two parallel phrases, reading more like a parity 
agreement than a treaty between two unequal parties. It should be noted that the Mosaic covenant 
which appears in the book of Exodus, hundreds of years after the initial Abrahamic covenant was 
instated, contains a significant number of obligations which are commonly referred to as the 
Decalogue or Ten Commandments. This seems to be a progression in the relationship between 
YHWH and his people; God has proven his ongoing interest in their salvation, well-being, and 
longevity (declared in the Abrahamic covenant), and now the second, obligatory part of the 
treaty is presented. While the list tends to read as demands, especially when taken out of context, 
the words should be interpreted more as directives meant to orient former slaves to a new way of 
life within a benevolent theocracy. In essence, the Decalogue asks the people of Israel to emulate 
the nature of their covenantal God.  
The first four directives (some argue that the fifth should also be included in this 
grouping) have to do with reciprocal faithfulness: the God who has brought Israel out of slavery 
now asks for their faithful loyalty and worship. It is important to note that in the Israelite 
covenants, YHWH never asks for anything before he has proved himself willing and able to give 
                                                          
30 Genesis 15. 
31 Genesis 17. 
32 Genesis 12, 17. 
33 Exodus 6:7; Leviticus 26:12; Jeremiah 30:22. 
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the same in generous measure. The last six directives concern moral and communal 
responsibilities, giving the newly freed slaves a model for just and equitable relationships with 
each other. Since the people of Israel had been in a position of vulnerability for hundreds of 
years, these communal laws were to ensure that they did not use their newfound freedom to take 
advantage of others. In other words, the laws were meant to prevent Israel from self-destructive 
and inequitable behaviour. The Mosaic covenant, then, was given to direct people toward living 
in peace with God and others, concepts which would have been relatively unfamiliar for the 
Israelites at that point in their history.  
The idea of covenant is important to the third Yes because it embodies the idea of divine 
and human collaboration, especially through the unique and unusual position in which YHWH 
places himself by entering into covenant with human beings. To my knowledge, there is no 
comparison for this type of divine benevolence and vulnerability in the Ancient Near Eastern 
religions. When YHWH commits himself to blessing Abram and his descendants, and reiterates 
the promise after repeated breaches in trust on the part of the people of Israel, he puts his divine 
reputation at stake. This is evident in Exodus 32 when the impatient dissension of the newly 
freed Israelites causes them to break one of stipulations in the Mosaic covenant immediately 
after it is given. They ask the priest, Aaron, to fashion an idol of gold so they can worship it as if 
it were YHWH. This is a violation of the exclusivity clause in the Mosaic covenant. YHWH’s 
response is to threaten annihilation of the people which, according to an ANE covenant, would 
have been a legitimate response. However, Moses appeals to YHWH’s commitment to 
vulnerability, to be affected by his people, thereby hoping that YHWH would differentiate 
himself from all other gods of the time. Moses says to God: “Why should the Egyptians say, ‘It 
was with evil intent that he brought them out to kill them in the mountains, and to consume them 
from the face of the earth’? Turn from your fierce wrath; change your mind and do not bring 
disaster on your people.”34 Moses adds a second appeal, this time to YHWH’s faithfulness, citing 
his promises to do well by Israel. “Remember Abraham, Isaac, and Israel, your servants, how 
you swore to them by your own self, saying to them, ‘I will multiply your descendants like the 
stars of heaven, and all this land that I have promised I will give to your descendants, and they 
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shall inherit it forever.”35 In other words, Moses is speaking YHWH’s covenant back to him, 
calling on him to demonstrate faithfulness and vulnerability even when Israel failed to do so.  
The outcome is revealed in the next sentence of the text: “the LORD changed his mind 
about the disaster that he planned to bring on his people.”36 Moses’s success in getting YHWH to 
reconsider the destruction of an unfaithful and ungrateful people can seem problematic if one is 
trying to defend the character of an unchanging, omnipotent God. However, when we read the 
text within the context of covenant, the focus is not the unchanging nature of YHWH, but what 
kind of covenant YHWH makes with human beings. The dramatic negotiation scene in this story 
illustrates that YHWH, in contrast to the rulers of the time, has not made a unilateral version of a 
suzerainty covenant which is meant to serve primarily his own interests. The Abrahamic 
covenant was YHWH’s promise of benevolent faithfulness. The Mosaic covenant was a 
reiteration of that faithfulness, this time with the added dimension of mutuality, expressed 
through directives meant to foster human fidelity. Because YHWH had proven himself faithful, 
he asked for faithfulness in return. Unfortunately, it was not readily reciprocated, but what is 
truly remarkable is that a direct violation of the directives did not result in voiding the covenant. 
Instead, we see YHWH taking on a posture of vulnerability, allowing himself to be affected by a 
human being. When Moses urges YHWH not to forsake the covenant, not to let the Egyptians 
equate YHWH’s justice with malice, and not to walk away from his promises, it is a contrast in 
covenants. The ANE suzerain would have crushed insubordination. YHWH chooses to 
demonstrate faithfulness even when his subjects are unfaithful. The covenant YHWH made with 
Israel is a covenant which reveals a desire for divine/human collaboration, a feature unique 
among ANE agreements.   
Earlier I stated that evidence for collaboration between YHWH and humanity could be 
found before the Israelite covenants, in the biblical creation accounts. Miroslav Volf, in talking 
about work and its relation to faith, makes a case for the presence of mutuality (synergos) in 
creation: 
It starts with the statement that there was no vegetation on earth after God created it. Two 
reasons are given for this: first, God had not yet let rain fall on the ground, and second, 
human beings were not around to till it. Only when human beings come onto the scene 
and start working can God’s work of creation be complete. God creates, God preserves, 
God’s blessing is enacted, God transforms the world in anticipation of the world to come 
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– and in all that, God makes us God’s own coworkers. We work with God, and God 
works through us.37 
Volf recognises the restraint God exercises in choosing to work with human beings instead of 
coercing or forcing them into submission. As Volf states, “fundamentally, God is not a 
demander; God is a giver.”38 The Israelite covenants are first of all generous offers of blessings 
(Abrahamic), then invitations to mutual faithfulness and joined purposes (Mosaic), and finally, 
though there is not space to develop it here, promises for the establishment of God’s kingdom 
through human participation (Davidic). All of these covenants point to the ultimate collaboration 
of God and humanity, the joining of the two natures in one person, Jesus Christ.  
The Collaboration of Incarnation 
The person of Christ is present in every theodramatic Yes: first as God’s Yes (God’s self-
revelation through the gift of his divine Son), then in the responsive Yes of humanity (through 
Jesus’s humble submission to the Father’s divine will), and finally in the third, collaborative Yes 
(demonstrating divine/human cooperation and synergos at its fullest). Though we are focusing on 
the person of Jesus in this section, it is important to remember that the idea of divine/human 
synergos, and for that matter, all of dramatic theology, must be viewed through a Trinitarian 
lens. We must always remain mindful that the divine invitation to collaborate is rooted in the 
loving interconnection and cooperation already present within the Godhead. Balthasar is careful 
to do this, framing Theo-Drama within a Trinitarian context by assigning the roles of author, 
actor, and director to the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, thereby situating all divine/human 
interaction within the spacious mutuality of the Godhead. As stated in an earlier chapter, 
dramatic theology is not primarily about a tryst between God and humanity, but about a 
communal, relational God who invites humanity to engage in the ongoing divine drama, to 
participate in the circle dance of the perichoresis.  
In the same vein, Stephen E. Fowl observes how adopting a Christological analogy in 
scriptural interpretation (the Bible as having two natures, divine and human) can lead to 
employing methods which place emphasis on historical and cultural contexts in order to unearth 
divine meaning. The problem, Fowl concludes, is that using human means to access divine truth 
                                                          
37 Miroslav Volf, A Public Faith: How Followers of Christ Should Serve the Common Good (Grand Rapids: Brazos 
Press, 2011), 35. 
38 Volf, A Public Faith, 26. 
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will never prove successful. Citing John Webster, he insists that “all doctrines about scripture 
must begin with and depend upon doctrines about the triune God.”39 This recalibration toward a 
Trinitarian framework informs how we view revelation, which then becomes “directly dependent 
upon God’s triune being and … is inseparable from God’s freely willed desire for loving 
communion with humans.”40 Fowl’s warning on the subject of scriptural interpretation has 
implications for how we talk about the incarnation. Christ, the living λόγος of God, the 
revelation of God in human form, must always be joined to the triune God because the relational, 
communal nature of the Godhead informs God’s communicative activity toward humanity and 
undergirds God’s commitment to the same. Similarly, Gerard Loughlin emphasises the primacy 
of Trinitarian context as key to interpreting the biblical texts as well as understanding the 
incarnation. He writes: 
God is his own interpreter, but his interpretation is incarnate, concrete and human. The 
mystery of God’s self-interpretation, God’s reading of his own story, is that in being 
given over to human contingency, that contingency is taken up into the mystery of God’s 
triune life. When Scripture as inspired writing is understood in this way its all too human 
production is expected rather than surprising.41   
 
With this in mind, we now turn our attention to divine/human collaboration in the incarnation. 
In chapter two on the topic of gift, I briefly addressed the notion of kenosis, the self-
emptying of God which makes space for humanity to encounter the Godhead, or in Balthasar’s 
terms, God making room on the stage for human involvement and action. Instead of revisiting 
that concept, I will approach the incarnation through the lens of plerosis (fullness). This is not a 
negation of or counterbalance to divine vulnerability described in the previous section on 
covenant, but a recognition that without plerosis, there can be no kenosis. The joining of divine 
and human natures in the person of Christ should not be viewed as somehow bringing God down 
to human level, but as an overflow of divine generosity, an expression of synergos. Kevin 
Vanhoozer states that, “Jesus’ appearance in history was neither a surprise nor a contingency 
measure but the result of a joyful collaboration conceived in eternity between the Father and the 
                                                          
39 Stephen E. Fowl, “Scripture,” in The Oxford Handbook of Systematic Theology, eds. John Webster, Kathryn 
Tanner, Iain Torrance (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 348. 
40 Ibid. 
41 Gerard Loughlin, Telling God’s Story: Bible, Church, and Narrative Theology (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1996), 119.  
114 
 
son.”42 The incarnation, then, is to be viewed as an extension of the fullness of the Godhead, a 
fullness which encompasses all of humanity, not in a pantheistic way, but in a demonstration of 
God’s animating presence in creation (panentheism, if you will).43  
In situating the locus of beauty and splendour in the person of Jesus Christ, Balthasar 
recognises that both kenosis and plerosis are part of God’s self-revelation to humanity. To take 
either one out of the mix impoverishes our idea of God and reveals a decided lack of Trinitarian 
sensibility, something which Balthasar is careful to avoid. John Webster observes:  
Von Balthasar's theology of the incarnation leads to a particular manner of approaching 
the doctrine of God. Because Jesus 'fleshes out' or 'bodies forth' the nature of God, his 
history furnishes the key to the inner relationships of the Trinity. The drama of the 
incarnation, that is, plays out before the eyes of the world the loving unity between Father 
and Son in the bond of the Spirit. Thus it is truly the incarnation which lies at the root of 
Christian belief about the differentiated character of God. The life of God is neither flat 
nor relation less: rather, it is fully societal, bearing within itself both the pain of 
separation and the mutuality of love.44 
What is described here is a God who is able to exhibit distinction without disintegrating into 
disunity, a God capable of embracing humility, suffering, and even death without inducing a 
deficiency in divine glory, love, and life. Because of this both/and nature of incarnation, 
Balthasar insists that the person of Jesus not be viewed as existing in perpetual tension, paradox, 
or dialectic.45 The apparent contradictions in Jesus’s utterances, especially concerning the 
kingdom of God (is it at hand or is it to come?) cause Balthasar to conclude that Jesus lives 
“’proleptically’ in both directions.”46 In other words, Christ embraces both a divine 
understanding of things to come (plerosis) as well as a limited human reality (kenosis). The 
Council of Chalcedon in 451 articulated it in these words: “We confess one and the same our 
Lord Jesus Christ, and we all teach harmoniously [that he is] the same perfect in Godhead, the 
                                                          
42 Kevin J. Vanhoozer, Remythologizing Theology: Divine Action, Passion and Authorship (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2010), 259. 
43 “For in him [Christ] the whole fullness of deity dwells bodily, and you have come to fullness in him, who is the 
head of every ruler and authority.” Colossians 2:9-10. 
44 John Webster, “Hans Urs von Balthasar: The Pascal Mystery,” Evangel (October 1983), 7. 
45 “God’s incarnation does not occur ‘through tension, dialectic, paradox, and contradiction.  It is not God, but 
rather the errors of our manner of thinking about God that are to be blamed if we conceive of the Incarnation in 
such a way.” Hans Urs von Balthasar, The Glory of the Lord: A Theological Aesthetics, vol. 1, Seeing the Form, trans. 
Erasmo Leiva-Merikakis, eds. Joseph Fessio S.J. and John Riches (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1982), 55. Hereafter 
referred to as GL1. 
46 Hans Urs von Balthasar, Theo-Drama: Theological Dramatic Theory, vol. 3, Dramatis Personae: Persons in Christ, 
trans. Graham Harrison (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1992), 92. Hereafter referred to as TD3. 
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same perfect in manhood, truly God and truly man, the same of a reasonable soul and body; 
consubstantial with the Father in Godhead, and the same consubstantial with us in manhood, like 
us in all things except sin.”47 Balthasar puts it this way: “Jesus’ whole life and work exhibit both 
things simultaneously: he looks ahead to the reality that will come without fail, and he possesses 
the peace of the man who unhurriedly performs his tasks each day that is granted to him.”48 In 
Christ, we find what Balthasar calls the “unique presence” of God with the world which includes 
both knowledge and ignorance, both power and weakness, both freedom and constraint, and both 
authority and submission.49 Christ’s two natures, divine and human, are not to be viewed as 
existing in competition with each other or isolated from one another, but joined in a unity which 
demonstrates the collaborative, communal oneness of the Trinity.  
We see an illustration of this cooperative unity between divine and human when we place 
two related proclamations of Jesus side by side. While Jesus is in the temple, teaching, he says, 
“I am the light of the world.”50 In another context where Jesus is speaking to crowds on a 
hillside, he declares to them: “You are the light of the world.”51 The link between the two can be 
found in the gospel of John: “He [the Word] was the true light that enlightens everyone coming 
into the world.”52 As humans, we are first receptive as we accept the light of God, then active as 
we become light-bearers with Christ. The apparent paradox of the incarnation is that the Son of 
God, being light, also fully embraces humanity’s role in receiving light from God. This only 
becomes problematic when one tries to view overabundance (plerosis) and self-emptying 
(kenosis) as two separate postures. In the context of light, the self-emptying of God through the 
Son should not be interpreted as a snuffing out of the light, but a receptive stance which aligns 
the person of Christ with all humanity, acknowledging the source of light and life as God. The 
incarnation could be viewed as God, in covenant with Godself, showing faithfulness as the 
Father and vulnerability as the Son, or in terms of light, being the giver of light and glory as well 
                                                          
47 Edward Rochie Hardy, ed., Christology of the Later Fathers (London: SCM Press, 1954), 373.  
48 Balthasar, TD3, 92. 
49 Ibid., 97. 
50 John 8:12. 
51 Matthew 5:13. 
52 John 1:9. See footnote. 
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as the recipient of glory.53 Scottish theologian Peter Taylor Forsyth describes the mutuality in 
this way:  
God and man meet in humanity, not as two entities or natures which coexist, but as two 
movements in mutual interplay, mutual struggle and reciprocal communion. On the one 
hand we have an initiative, creative, productive action, clear and sure, on the part of the 
eternal and absolute God; on the other we have the seeking, receptive, appropriate action 
of groping, erring, growing man. God finds a man who did not find Him, man finds a 
God who did find Him.54 
 
The movement of each toward the other is key to understanding the plerosis of the incarnation. 
Not only is God moving toward humanity through Christ, but Christ is moving, in humanity, 
toward God. It is interesting to note the capital letter in Forsyth’s last “Him” which suggests that 
God finds himself. Whether this is a typographical error or part of Forsyth’s emphasis on the 
interplay and connection of divine and human natures is unclear, but if intentional, it would 
reinforce his point that the two natures in Christ cannot be neatly spliced. Such a rending would 
essentially void God’s solidarity with humanity.  
Forsyth sees the abundance of God as the factor which not only makes Christ’s suffering, 
death, and resurrection possible, but causes the light of the divine nature to spill over into 
humanity, even to the point of descending into hell.55 The two movements, divine descent and 
human ascent, are Forsyth’s way of explaining how divine plerosis, the self-fulfilment of God, is 
displayed through kenotic action on the part of Christ. “We have [ascent and descent] in the 
unity of one historic person, to show that, however inadequate earthly personality is to heavenly, 
they are not incompatible, and they are capable of the supreme mutual act of love and grace.”56 
For Forsyth, the emphasis on fullness is vital because it repositions Christ from a person 
characterised by limitation and weakness to one who is carrying out the overabundant action of 
God, moving toward humanity in order that mutual love and cooperation may increase. Forsyth 
continues: “In the person of Christ we have the crisis and sacrament of divine and human love. 
Do not let us speak here of impossible contradictions of logic. Let us rather remember here again 
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that the reconciliation of such rational antinomies as God’s sovereignty and man’s freedom only 
takes place in the unity of one active person which has equal need of both for full personal 
effect.”57 The choice of imagery here is noteworthy. Overflowing fullness is the constant state of 
the Godhead. As a result, God is described not as being, but as always moving, unchanging yet 
always active. Because activity is central to God’s character (and by implication, to dramatic 
theology), the flow of love, light, life, and truth through the person of Jesus Christ is not an 
exercise in self-emptying as much as it is a reflection of the fullness of the inexhaustible 
Trinitarian Godhead. Therefore, uniting divinity and humanity is not a theological conundrum to 
be solved by reason, but a dynamic relationship to be observed and experienced through the 
person of Christ.  
Balthasar also links the ideas of abundance and self-emptying, making a direct 
connection between the vulnerability present in divine covenant and the work of Christ as a 
demonstration of God’s transforming love. 
If, however, these [sin and death] are the consequences of the risk which God has taken 
in entrusting his creatures with genuine freedom (freedom ultimately to deny and to 
destroy themselves), then ultimately God could only take such a risk if he himself threw 
himself into the balance, assumed the risk himself, and of himself opened up a way where 
there were no ways. It is here that the biblical message interposes and proclaims, “God 
with us”, God on our side! It proclaims not only “covenant”, which assures us of God’s 
faithfulness, even in spite of our breaches of that covenant and in spite of his just 
judgments (“If we are faithless, he remains faithful – for he cannot deny himself”, 2 Tim 
2:13 RSV), but a coming over to our side in order to open up a way for us from within 
our helplessness and hopelessness - yet without in any way overplaying that situation 
with his omnipotence; without, that is, impugning our freedom in any manner. A way 
which leads through death into life. Dying freely and obediently, he turns death, the sign 
of our guilt, into a monument of love.58 
Both Forsyth and Balthasar insist that loving collaboration or synergos is not understood 
theoretically or reasonably but through action, specifically the act of God becoming human in the 
historical person of Jesus Christ. This act demonstrates how the plerosis of the Godhead makes 
possible the kenosis of Christ by embracing the total experience of humanity while at the same 
time embodying the fullness of the Godhead. The dynamic category of movement instead of the 
more static notion of being is what allows us to more fully comprehend the mutuality and 
interactivity of the incarnation.  
                                                          
57 Ibid. 
58 Hans Urs von Balthasar, Elucidations, trans. S.P.C.K. (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1998), 55-56. 
118 
 
If we refer back to the tetragrammaton (YHWH), it is interesting to note that the 
revelation of God’s name to Moses invokes a form of the verb to be. However, we must also note 
that subsequent to this interaction between God and Moses, the character of YHWH continues to 
be revealed through the stories found in Israel’s history, through action and movement. The 
context of human history is where YHWH is made present, is embodied, is made incarnate to 
Israel and the world. The person of Christ builds on and fulfills the revelation of YHWH in the 
Hebrew Bible by making YHWH known to humanity in a unique, singular way. Balthasar 
highlights the plerosis of God revealed in the action of Christ, specifically his death on the cross: 
“He [Christ] does not thereby cease to be himself; indeed he shows precisely through this what 
he is in himself, what he is and what he can do. God can be dead without ceasing to be eternal 
life and he can, acting in this manner, prove finally that he is life and love and the goodness and 
grace which pours itself out in selfless self-giving.”59 Here again, we find the emphasis on action 
and movement as the means by which divine plerosis engenders divine/human interaction and 
collaboration.  
In contemplating the unity of divine and human in the person of Christ, the aspect of 
overabundance and fullness (plerosis), especially for Forsyth and Balthasar, can seem to 
overshadow the humanity of Christ. I do not believe this is the intent of these theologians nor 
anyone who espouses what could be identified as a high Christology. The fullness of God is not 
meant to obliterate the weak and sin-affected nature of humanity, but to permeate it. The divine 
abundance evident in history, especially in the person of Christ, becomes the means by which 
humanity can be reconciled to the triune God and become a participant in loving, collaborative 
synergos through generous, energising grace. 
Collaboration in Improvisation 
 The discussion of collaboration and synergos thus far has been focused in large part on 
divine faithfulness, divine vulnerability, and divine abundance. The purpose of this has been to 
show that collaboration is essential to the societal, triune God; therefore, any invitation from this 
God is an invitation into collaboration and mutuality. We now turn our attention from describing 
the parties involved in collaboration to describing the nature of synergos itself. We will do this 
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by looking at improvisational practices, both in dramatic and musical settings, which illustrate 
the shared giving and receiving of those united in purpose and action.  
In his book, Theology as Improvisation, Nathan Crawford draws on the practice of 
musical improvisation to find ways to talk about God and God’s interaction with humanity. He 
states: “My belief is that both theology and improvisation begins [sic] with the desire to be 
attuned to the other and open to said other, exploring the possibilities for interaction with the 
other, always keeping open the ways in which the other comes.”60 Musical improvisation does 
not happen in a vacuum, Crawford notes. It is always bound to tradition and must begin with 
learning the tools of that tradition, including the classic forms. Once these have been mastered, 
the musician has the skills necessary for “reorienting and transforming the tradition.”61 When 
Crawford makes the leap from musical tradition to theological tradition, he is careful not to fence 
himself in, choosing to be broad enough in his definition of Christianity to include not only the 
scriptures, but writings which would be classified as orthodox, heterodox, or even heretical.62 
His open posture toward tradition, believing that it is rather fluid and dynamic, reveals his 
commitment to the open-ended nature of improvisation. According to Crawford, of utmost 
importance in musical improvisation are the qualities of listening, hospitality, being open to the 
other, attunement to tradition, attunement to other players, attunement to the audience, and 
finally, the ability to engage in deconstruction and innovation.63  
I should mention that Crawford offers a rather substantial critique of dramatic 
framework, in particular Vanhoozer’s use of Theo-Drama for reimagining theology.64 
Essentially, Crawford is not rejecting theatre categories as such, but expressing disappointment 
at Vanhoozer’s inability to let God be formless. Vanhoozer, in Crawford’s estimation, is overly 
committed to producing a theological script which leaves him with a constricted idea of God, a 
God who is bound to revelation through the Bible alone, and a God who can only be experienced 
through the lens of covenant.65 I will not comment specifically on Vanhoozer’s view of 
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covenant, but will say that Crawford seems overly committed to openness, so much so that one 
might consider him an open theist. He seems to view the biblical notion of covenant as primarily 
restrictive instead of acknowledging the mutuality evident in its protective limitations and 
bilateral promises. Whatever the case, for Crawford, theology is all about getting past the script 
(and in his case, covenant would be part of a narrow script) to innovation. He does not have any 
problem per se with theatrical models of theology, but has found a very suitable analogy in 
music, especially the idea of attunement with its auditory overtones.  
Crawford’s idea of attunement, though not perfect, is particularly helpful in identifying 
the elements found in collaboration. Common to both musical and theatrical forms of 
improvisation are the ideas of innovation and participation. In fact, according to Crawford, 
participation is a key access point when it comes to revelation. He contends that, “Participation is 
the connection with God that makes knowledge of God possible.”66 It is important to note that 
Crawford is not speaking about a rather passive (or weak sense) of participation, such as the 
divine attunement all creation participates in by being created by God.67 His definition of 
attunement draws on Jewish theologian Michael Fishbane’s thought. This includes the notion of 
understanding the self in relation to the world and its inherent rhythms, interacting with a sacred 
text to become aware of its pace (in theology, this would refer to the biblical text), and “being 
ready to hear and do whatever the moment demands – with a heart and mind cultivated by a 
tradition of value and a life of thoughtfulness.”68 It is apparent that both Fishbane and Crawford 
are purposefully vague concerning theological traditions and terms, and this is to be expected in 
a treatise on openness. Since I am not looking to them for theological precision but for insight 
into collaboration, I will forgo any analysis of their views. The idea of attunement presented by 
Crawford has much to offer as we unpack the notion of synergos present in the third Yes, 
especially the state of “being aware” and the call to act informed by tradition or the ongoing 
narrative. I would, however, replace Fishbane’s reference to the “need of the moment,” which 
situates attunement in the context of rhythm and time, with the idea of collaborative action 
situated within embodied dramatic encounter. I believe this lack of incarnational action is the 
                                                          
66 Ibid., 8. 
67 Ibid. 
68 Michael Fishbane, Sacred Attunement: A Jewish Theology (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 
2008), 175. Cited in Crawford, Theology as Improvisation, 29. 
121 
 
main weakness of musical improvisation as a theological model. However, as stated above, it is 
helpful in giving us language with which to describe what we might call collaborative technique. 
“Being aware” is more than listening.69 While listening is a necessary posture and attitude 
when playing music in order to recognise the rhythm, melodic key, and overall arc and 
movement of a piece, there is an added dimension in “being aware” which involves not only an 
openness to the complexity of sounds, but an openness to the other (awareness of the 
community), a recognition of the context (the subtext, text, and ongoing narrative being formed), 
and a readiness to insert oneself into the action (saying Yes). In other words, “being aware” is 
what a theatrical improviser is practicing when she builds an impromptu scene with other actors. 
“Being aware” means that the improviser has begun to identify the storyline of the current 
scenario, has latched onto a starting point of sorts, and has caught a glimpse of where the drama 
might lead. “Being aware” is not solely situated in the auditory realm but includes all of the 
senses as well as an awareness of the self in relation to the larger world and its particular context. 
Because neither music nor drama are static (and neither is the world), the act of “being aware” is 
ongoing.  
A listener who is attentive to the ongoing leitmotif (to switch back to the music analogy) 
will, at some point, begin humming the tune, or playing along with the melody; in doing so, they 
become part of the music. When this transition occurs, when one changes from being a passive 
spectator to an active participant, the third Yes is enacted. No longer is one simply responding to 
an invitation or replying to a question, but, as illustrated by the musical example, one is 
contributing to the melodic narrative, adding a unique voice in counterpoint or harmony (or even 
dissonance) to the other voices, and as a result, changing the sound. To use Crawford’s language, 
because one is attuned to the language of music and has learned the dialogue of the musical 
tradition, one is able to enter into the song with an appropriate contribution. The idea of 
ensemble work, both in music and in drama, is key to the idea of collaboration. Whereas 
invitation and response (and gift, for that matter) can be viewed as having a fairly linear, bi-
directional dynamic (such as a tennis match which involves constant back and forth between two 
players, each one waiting to see what the other will do before they respond), ensemble work 
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requires a slightly different set of interactions. Instead of competing with the other, there must be 
a shared ethos and purpose. Though different players in a dramatic exercise will have different 
ideas of where the story is going or how to structure the narrative, each member of the ensemble 
must ensure that they are contributing to the collective story and not trying to control it. Working 
as an ensemble means that every voice must be heard and every player must have a part, and the 
action can never be valued over “being aware.” If action or movement takes priority over 
communal awareness, the loud, confident voices become dominant while the timid, more passive 
voices are relegated to the background. When this happens, it is no longer an ensemble and 
synergos has been abandoned.  
This is why the idea of divine vulnerability is central to the third Yes. In essence, it is 
divine attentiveness, restraint, and patience which ensures that the divine story, though 
originating in the heart and mind of God, is a true collaboration and not a monologue. Theatre 
dialogue, for the most part, is much like a tennis match: there is a lot of back and forth between 
different characters with very little overlap. This is as it should be, because several voices all 
speaking at the same time would be chaotic.70 For that reason, music is a better analogy to 
illustrate the harmony of synergos and collaboration in which many voices can be heard at the 
same time, each one distinct to the discerning ear, each one a different timbre and tone, perhaps 
even in a slightly different rhythm, but all together forming one melodic song. In orchestral 
music, each part played individually makes little sense, but when all the players join together in 
one ensemble, each note sounded in the right tone and key and precisely at the right time, the 
result is a complex yet unified masterpiece. In contrast to classical orchestral pieces which have 
set scores, improvisational music begins with only a skeleton score or a rudimentary pattern or 
structure; the challenging task of the musicians is to flesh out the song by first “being aware” and 
then acting collaboratively in every measure, thereby creating a coherent and intelligible piece of 
music. When done right, the resulting work is as much a masterpiece as the classical, scripted 
score, perhaps more so because of the added elements of spontaneity and originality.    
The idea of harmony is also useful in thinking about the person of Jesus Christ. We must 
not picture the divine and human natures as being involved in a tennis match or tug of war or in a 
back and forth dialogue. The two natures are united in harmony; they sing one song between 
them; they collaborate in telling one story. Admittedly, this is an incongruence, using the 
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pronoun “they” to describe the person of Jesus Christ. It is also an indication of how inadequate 
words are to describe true collaboration, and why models such as drama or music are necessary 
to help us understand dynamic action. Three are one in the Trinity. Two natures are one in Jesus 
Christ. Many parts become one body in the universal church. Collaboration, synergos, and the 
third Yes are all ways of describing a joining together of many voices, not in unison, not as an 
unruly crowd, not in chaotic cacophony, not as echoes of each other, but as individuals joining 
together to create something greater than the sum of their parts. The concept of synergy might 
seem inappropriate when one of the parties is Almighty God, but it speaks directly to the 
overabundance, the “more than” nature of God, the plerosis of the Godhead. In no way does it 
indicate that something can be or needs to be added to the divine nature. Instead, it seeks to 
express how overabundance characterises all that God does, including loving collaboration with 
humanity. 
One final observation should be made concerning the relationship between improvisation, 
training, and tradition. The improvisational musician immerses herself in a musical environment, 
listening, playing, practicing, and learning the different forms. Over time, many improvisational 
musicians develop an “intuitive intelligence” for music, a cognitive sense of where the song 
needs to go. Due to their constant exposure to music, at a deep, subconscious level, they know 
what is appropriate to play at the right time. Crawford states that, “This immersion results in a 
musician who is so entrenched in the music that he stop [sic] playing the music and the music 
begins to play him.”71 Though it is still improvisation, the accomplished musician will tell you 
that they do not select what notes to play from an endless array of options; what they play is in 
response to how, in their minds, the song goes. Observe an ensemble of intuitive, improvisational 
musicians and you will be able to detect them following the unwritten song together, all sensing 
what needs to happen next in the musical narrative and playing their instruments accordingly. 
There is little communication necessary between them because they are all attuned to what I 
have heard some musicians call “the spirit of the music.” This type of collaboration is not simply 
a result of being attentive to the other musicians, nor simply the result of years of training in the 
standard jazz forms. The spirit of the song, the narrative of the notes, the overall arc of the music, 
whatever you wish to call it, is something greater than the musicians themselves, and it guides 
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them in harmony and common purpose to create a song new and unique, yet, at the same time, 
familiar to them all. 
Using improvisational language and metaphors, I have described the third Yes in terms of 
“being aware,” harmony, and synergy. In essence, the third Yes is what happens when 
participants together become immersed in the music or the drama to such an extent that the story 
becomes part of who they are as a community. We must, however, be careful not to equate God 
with story, for God as author is always greater than the divine narrative. As well, the theological 
concept of a societal, triune God dictates that relationality (and not story or even purpose) must 
remain at the forefront of collaboration and synergos. That being said, the Israelite covenants and 
the incarnation of Jesus Christ reveal a divine author who chooses to immerse himself in the 
story, becoming an actor, an initiator (first Yes) as well as a responder (second Yes). It is a 
vulnerable position, to be sure, but it is also an expression of divine fullness permeating all of 
creation.  
The Collaboration of “We” 
From a musical and theatrical improvisation framework (the paradigm of movement and 
action), we move to a philosophical one (the paradigm of being) to give us additional language to 
describe the nature of collaboration. In particular, I will be looking briefly at the works of Paul 
Ricoeur, Martin Buber, and Jean-Luc Nancy. These three voices speak about the 
interconnectedness of humanity as key to self-understanding, human relations, and ethical action. 
However, I propose that their insights on the innate relationality of humanity also have profound 
implications for how we view divine/human interaction and collaboration. I will outline each 
author’s contribution to the subject in brief before adding my own thoughts on the collaboration 
or synergos of “we.”  
Ricoeur insists that the first personal pronoun, “I,” commonly used to communicate a 
sense of self, cannot be uttered without implying the complementary “you,” indicating that 
reflexivity is imperative to an “integrated theory of the self.”72 In speech acts, therefore, through 
the introduction of an implied second party, we already see the beginning of a sense of belonging 
to each other, a “we.” Similarly, Ricoeur observes that the actions of an individual person are so 
linked to the actions of others that studying a human subject in isolation is impossible.73 For 
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example, the beginning and the ending of our lives can only be recounted by others due to the 
fact that we are not aware of our own emergence into life nor can we fully take in our final exit. 
Ricoeur’s solution to this difficulty is to embrace the complexity of narrative and suggest that we 
are not the authors of our lives: we are merely co-authors. As a result, the self is obliged to 
relinquish, or at the very least, share its role as subject. Ricoeur’s indirect method, understanding 
the self through the other, is based in part on the idea that engaging with stories is one of the first 
ways we make sense of life and develop a sense of “we” or belonging.  
Ricoeur’s notion of the self evolves to include the field of ethics. The responsible self 
must recede into the background because the “ethical primacy of the other than the self [is] over 
the self.”74 A model Ricoeur uses to develop his concept of the ethical aim is that of friendship 
which incorporates reciprocity, intimacy, and benevolent spontaneity.75 While equality between 
the self and the other is established as a prime value of the ethical aim (friendship) and the 
autonomy of the self is still upheld, personal freedom now comes into tension with self-
legislation because the other’s well-being must always be taken into consideration. Ricoeur 
suggests that a misappropriation of freedom (self-assertion without consideration for the other) 
results in perversion and brings evil into society.76 In effect, Ricoeur is identifying the discovery 
of the self with the rediscovery of freedom as a societal order instead of identifying it with the 
right to individual choice.77 This concept of “we” bears some resemblance to the African idea of 
ubuntu which Desmond Tutu translates as, “A person is a person through other persons.”78 Tutu 
contrasts this African interpretation of being human to Descartes’s cogito (I think therefore I am) 
by restating ubuntu as, “I am because I belong.”79  
 One can find the theme of belonging running through the works of all three philosophers 
mentioned above, however it is perhaps most indirect in Martin Buber’s book, I and Thou. 
Buber’s emphasis on the difference between I-It interactions (treating another as an object) and I-
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Thou interactions (treating another as a subject) can be interpreted as an attempt to draw clear 
distinctions between two parties. Even though Buber’s language tends toward a certain amount 
of bifurcation, Gregor Smith notes that positioning two parties as equal but separate is never 
Buber’s intent; instead, it is about a meeting of the two.   
For faith is a meeting: it is not a trust in the world of It, of creeds or other forms, which 
are objects, and have their life in the past; nor is it, on the other hand, a reliance on the 
‘wholly other’ God; but it is the meeting with the eternal thou Who is both the Other and 
the Present One. If we stress God’s distance from men by asserting His Otherness alone, 
and do not realise at the same time the truth of His Presence in the relation of the Thou to 
the I, we are bound in the end to reduce the idea of Transcendence itself to a subhuman 
situation, and to take refuge in a paradox, which is not the ultimate paradox, of the 
impassability of the gulf between God and men.80 
 
While Ricoeur’s emphasis is more obviously on belonging, Buber chooses to use the term 
meeting to convey similar concepts. In distinctly poetic language, he speaks of the human 
tendency to place people, belief, and even God in the category of It, reducing all of these to 
objects of one’s seeking, desiring, acting, etc. As object, It is bound and defined by the subject 
and even by the verb, while Thou (as subject) has no bounds.81  
Buber integrates the ideas of invitation and response, of action and receptivity, in the 
meeting of I and Thou. Instead of Ricoeur’s “summoned self,” we have the I being chosen as 
well as choosing. “The Thou meets me. But I step into direct relation with it. Hence the relation 
means being chosen and choosing, suffering and action in one.”82 Here Buber is using the term, 
“suffering,” as the passive stance of someone who is acted upon. In the meeting of I and Thou, 
both invitation and response are present. In theodramatic language, we would say that the first 
Yes meets the second Yes and together, a third Yes, a relational Yes which is more than the sum 
of the first two, is the result. In trying to describe this meeting, Buber treads the fine line between 
unity and distinctiveness which we find in Trinitarian theology, suggesting that this same sort of 
interconnectivity is possible in the encounter between divine and human. He writes: “In the 
relation with God unconditional exclusiveness and unconditional inclusiveness are one. He who 
enters on the absolute relation is concerned with nothing isolated any more, neither things nor 
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beings, neither earth nor heaven; but everything is gathered up in the relation.”83 For Buber, 
unity and diversity are not opposites; neither are inclusivity and exclusivity. This paradox of 
partnership is the mystery contained in the third Yes. It is the space occupied by “we,” a space 
which is plural yet unified, where voices come together not in unison but in complex harmonies, 
where actions exhibit collaboration, intimacy, and trust. Buber also touches on the vulnerability 
of both I and Thou when he states that, “You need God, in order to be – and God needs you, for 
the very meaning of your life.”84 By these words Buber is not making a theological claim about 
the incompleteness or neediness of God, but acknowledging the generous space which God 
makes for humanity to have a meaningful encounter with the divine community of “we,” the 
Trinity. 
 French philosopher Jean-Luc Nancy explores some of this same territory, the idea that we 
are inescapably related to the divine and to each other, in his book, Being Singular Plural. He 
posits that “’we’ is always inevitably ‘us all,’ where no one of us can be ‘all’ and each one of us 
is, in turn (where all our turns are simultaneous as well as successive, in every sense), the other 
origin of the same world.”85 By “other origin” Nancy is referring to what he calls the multiplicity 
of origin, in other words, how our origin is always linked to the other, and the origin of the other 
is always linked to us.86 In this way, origin is outside us as well as inside us and must be seen 
from several vantage points, hence its multiplicity. This idea bears some resemblance to 
Ricoeur’s indirect self-knowledge which can only be found through the other. Nancy describes 
this “we” in terms of being-together or being-with, a plural singularity, a direct opposite to 
alienation.87 Nancy seeks to blur the lines between how we relate to or access ourselves and how 
we relate to or access others, suggesting that by nature both the individual and the world are 
plural, therefore always sharing space, time, presence, and even origin. Nancy critiques 
theological models of creation which separate Creator from creation, thereby rendering a God so 
transcendent, so wholly Other, that the divine occupies a sphere totally separate from the 
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world.88 This has significant implications for one’s view of God. Though I would not join Nancy 
in stating that there is no Other as such (and therefore no exact differentiation between divine 
and human),89 and his position regarding inescapable relationality seems to undermine the idea 
of a freely offered Yes, his thoughts on the nature of creation are particularly insightful for 
dramatic theology. He writes:  
One can understand how the creation, as it appears in any Jewish-Christian-Islamic 
theologico-mystic configuration, testifies less (and certainly never exclusively) to a 
productive power of God than to his goodness and glory. In relation to such power, then, 
creatures are only effects, while the love and glory of God are deposited right at [à même] 
the level of what is created; that is, creatures are the very brilliance [éclat] of God’s 
coming to presence.90   
 
The point I would like to highlight is Nancy’s emphasis on creation as the brilliant presence of 
God’s glory and goodness (a demonstration of plerosis) instead of a display of dominance and 
power. Creation, according to Nancy, speaks of the inclusivity of God, and I would extend this to 
refer to the divine invitation for humanity to be a partaker in goodness and glory. Nancy seeks to 
divert us away from ways of thinking (theologically and philosophically) which tend toward 
closed, controlled systems and redirect us toward paradigms which feature dynamic, relational 
interactions and all the uncertainties which accompany such connectedness. The element of 
“we,” of inclusion, is what Nancy finds in the creation story. It is also what we find at the heart 
of the Israelite covenants, what we find in the unique person of Jesus Christ, what we find in 
improvisation, and what is at the heart of the third Yes.  
As stated at the beginning of this chapter, collaboration is too weak a word for what I am 
trying to describe in the third Yes. The variety of pronouns used by Ricoeur, Buber, and Nancy 
reveals the paucity of single words to convey the idea of loving interconnectivity. It appears that 
a pairing of ideas is necessary to flesh out the concept of collaboration and connection, whether 
it is oneself and another, I and Thou, or the joining of two contradictory words, singular and 
plural. To this I have added my own joining: collaboration and synergos. I find the plenitude of 
terms entirely appropriate because it causes us to incorporate multiple concepts, definitions, and 
analogies instead of trying to reduce the third Yes to a singular, simple idea. In this chapter I 
used the model of covenant to illustrate the presence of mutuality, faithfulness, and vulnerability 
                                                          
88 Ibid., 15. This is similar to the ideas in Smith’s notes on Buber. See page 126. 
89 Ibid., 19. 
90 Ibid., 16-17. 
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in collaboration. The incarnation was invoked to show how the abundance of plerosis 
encompasses both distinction and unity, allowing two disparate parties to move toward each 
other into synergos. Improvisation provided structure and language to envision this movement 
toward the other as ensemble work. Philosophy helped us articulate collaboration as the state of 
being in which we are inextricably connected to the other, so much so that we identify as “we” 
instead of “I.”  
The third Yes implicates categories of being and action. The third Yes is multiplicity, 
complexity, and differentiation, but it is also unity, inclusion, and mutual encounter. Buber 
writes: “Between you and it there is a mutual giving: you say Thou to it and give yourself to it, it 
says Thou to you and gives itself to you.”91 When reading this sentence, one cannot help but 
notice how out of place and awkward the pronoun it is in the context of expounding on the nature 
of equanimity between an I and a Thou. The third Yes is a dramatic Yes for a reason: words 
cannot adequately express what transpires when there is genuine, intimate, loving encounter 
between persons. More than words, the third Yes is intentional action and genuine reaction, 
making room for continuity and predictability along with tension and surprise, and fostering the 
development of relationship while revealing the narrative arc. The third Yes is dynamic, mutual 
movement which brings with it risk and uncertainty as well as the means for dissonance to 
become harmony. The third Yes is meant to be the culmination of the divine invitation extended 
to humanity, an invitation to participate in the goodness and glory of God, first glimpsed in the 
creation story and ever after on display throughout history. The Third Yes is that moment when 
the listener becomes a musician, the spectator becomes a participant, and the story becomes 
richer because another actor joins the ensemble. Dramatic theology is not just another framework 
on which to hang theological ideas; it is a schema through which the story of God, the divine 
drama, is enacted. To this end, I now turn my attention from explaining the elements of dramatic 
theology to engaging with two dramatic texts: the first is the biblical drama of Job and the 
second is a theatrical play by Luigi Pirandello.
                                                          




A Biblical Example - The Book of Job  
 
 Stories tell us where we are from and where we are going and, thus, who we are.1 
 
More than just a literary sub-category or a theological approach, narrative is how we 
make sense of the world. Alasdair MacIntyre makes this point in relation to ethics or morality: “I 
can only answer the question, ‘What am I to do?’ if I can answer the prior question, ‘Of what 
story or stories do I find myself a part?’”2 This resonates with the general observation made in 
the last chapter that a skilled improviser (both musical and theatrical) is always being guided by 
an awareness of how the song or the story goes. The narratives we tell each other, that we are 
immersed in within the contexts of our culture and community, become the lenses through which 
we decipher not only what to do but who we are and, within a theological context, who God, the 
divine actor, is. This is why the stories contained within the biblical witness (much of the canon 
is some form of narrative) are key to understanding divine/human interaction, not because they 
serve up moral imperatives or tell us what to believe, but because they show us the divine/human 
relationship in action.3  
In moving away from primarily focusing on the theory of the three Yeses to engaging 
with examples of dramatic interaction (within a theological context in this chapter and within a 
theatrical context in the next chapter), it is necessary to adjust our method somewhat to be more 
reflective of a dramatic framework. Analysing a narrative requires a different approach from 
identifying with the characters in that narrative: the first takes an objective stance while the latter 
requires a certain “entering in” or direct encounter with the story. The importance of this aspect 
of “entering in” must not be underplayed, for doing so would undermine the very backbone of 
dramatic theology: the incarnational event of God entering into human experience in the person 
of Jesus Christ. 
                                                          
1 Andrew G. Walker and Robin A. Parry, Deep Church Rising: The Third Schism and the Recovery of Christian 
Orthodoxy (Eugene, OR: Cascade Books, 2014), 119. 
2 Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory, 2nd ed. (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 
1984), 216. 
3 Viewing the biblical witness as narrative is sometimes viewed as a weakening of its authority. However, N. T. 
Wright recognises that narrative is an extremely formative force because it shapes worldview. See N.T. Wright, 




The text I have selected to serve as a theological case study is perhaps not an obvious 
choice, but I believe it meets the criteria for robust engagement with theological dramatic theory 
on several fronts. First, this biblical text resembles a theatre piece in several ways: there is an 
epic conflict between good and evil, and extended monologues as well as some heated discourses 
are bookended by a classic prologue and epilogue. Second, it incorporates several viewpoints: 
we begin with a narrator setting the stage, then we are given access to a divine or otherworldly 
point of view, after which we enter the action as seen from the main character’s perspective, then 
several secondary characters offer their assessment of events, and finally, we have a direct 
discourse between God and Job. Third, as one of the earliest biblical texts, it most likely served 
as a folktale which framed Israel’s perception of God and divine/human interaction. Finally, Job 
has historically been a challenging text to interpret, in large part because its poetic language and 
dramatic structure do not lend themselves easily to neat systematic theological summaries. I 
contend that the insights to be gained from the tale of Job are found in looking at the characters’ 
interactions and relationships, not in analysing the words in isolation. In essence, the structure of 
the text (drama) could be said to supply the content (theology). For these reasons, the story of 
Job seems particularly well-suited to demonstrate dramatic theology.  
In looking at the book of Job, my primary goal is not to analyse the structure, though 
there will be mention of that, nor to dissect the theological nuances, though I will certainly 
observe a few, nor to answer the question of why God allows suffering, though I cannot help but 
offer some thoughts on a matter which takes up a fair bit of space in the text. Important as all 
those tasks may be, it is not the focus in this chapter. Using the lens of a theodramatic approach, 
the question to be answered is this: are invitation, response, and collaboration recognisable in 
one self-contained biblical narrative? To answer this query, I first delve into the dramatic nature 
of the story of Job, both narratively and structurally, and provide a brief overview of the story. 
Following that, I address the question at the heart of this chapter: can the elements of theological 
dramatic theory be found in the biblical text? In other words, is there evidence of the three 
Yeses, as well as the underlying aspect of gift, within the dramatic narrative of Job? Finally, I 
identify the theme of glory which I see coming to the forefront in the story of Job.  
Job as dramatic script 
The book of Job begins with a prologue which introduces the title character as blameless 
and upright, fearing God and turning away from evil. We are told that Job has seven sons and 
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three daughters as well as impressive numbers of sheep, camels, oxen, donkeys, and servants, 
making him “the greatest of all the people in the east.”4 The scene then shifts from Job in the 
land of Uz to a gathering of heavenly beings, among them the Lord (YHWH) and the adversary 
(literally hasattan).5 The Lord asks if the adversary has noticed the blameless, upright, God-
fearing man Job, and the adversary obviously has, for he is quick to offer his opinion that Job 
only fears and serves God because God protects and blesses him. The adversary hypothesises 
that Job would curse God if his good fortune changed. The Lord insists that Job is not as fickle as 
the adversary supposes and gives hasattan leave to have his way with Job’s fortune. In short 
order, Job loses his children, livestock, and servants in various tragedies. Job is devastated, but 
his response reaffirms the Lord’s confidence in him: “Naked I came from my mother’s womb, 
and naked I return there; the Lord gave, and the Lord has taken away; blessed be the name of the 
Lord.”6 The scene returns to another meeting of heavenly beings, and when the Lord once again 
asks the adversary to consider his faithful servant, Job, hasattan responds that Job’s faithfulness 
is obviously related to his good health. The Lord once again grants the adversary liberty to afflict 
Job, this time physically. When Job develops sores which cover his whole body, his wife urges 
him to curse God and die. Job refuses to do so and instead, replies, “Shall we receive the good at 
the hand of God, and not receive the bad?”7 
After this, three of Job’s friends, Eliphaz, Beldad, and Zophar, appear on the scene to 
comfort him. After the four men sit in silence for a week, Job cries out in lament, cursing the day 
he was born. Then one by one the friends speak, each offering extended discourses which argue 
that the terrible disasters which have befallen Job are because of some great sin he has 
committed against God. In turn, Job justifies himself against all their accusations, insisting that 
he has done nothing to deserve this endless suffering. Job’s prayer of lament, “Why do you hide 
your face, and count me as your enemy?” reveals the depth of his pain and his sense of 
abandonment by God. 8 When Job’s comforters accuse him of pride, insisting that he has brought 
                                                          
4 Job 1:3. 
5 Hebrew scholar August Konkel notes that the word hasattan is not used as a proper name for the devil in this 
text, nor can it be equated with the Satan we find in the New Testament. The adversary here refers to a tempter 
who participates “in terms of a specific test that God allows or initiates.” See August H. Konkel, Job, Cornerstone 
Biblical Commentary, vol. 6 (Carol Stream, IL: Tyndale House Publishers, 2006), 33. 
6 Job 1:21. 
7 Job 2:10. 
8 Job 13:24. 
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these troubles on himself, Job bitterly answers them, “…miserable comforters are you all. Have 
windy words no limit? Or what provokes you that you keep on talking?”9 These lengthy 
dialogues in which Job’s three friends insist on his guilt before God, and Job, maintaining his 
integrity, cries out for vindication, take up a good portion of the book (chapters 4-27).  
Chapter 28, a poem on the topic of wisdom, serves as an interlude. After this, Job once 
again defends himself, and then a fourth advisor, the young Elihu, speaks (chapters 29-37). After 
Elihu expresses anger at Job’s three friends because they have provided no answers, he proceeds 
to rebuke Job for justifying himself instead of God, reminding the destitute man that God is 
incapable of perverting justice, and Job is wrong to adopt a posture of self-righteousness. Elihu 
says: “The Almighty – we cannot find him; he is great in power and justice, and abundant 
righteousness he will not violate. Therefore mortals fear him; he does not regard any who are 
wise in their own conceit.”10 After Elihu’s speech, the Lord himself speaks to Job out of the 
whirlwind. The Almighty responds to Job’s questions by posing his own queries to the 
impoverished man. In effect, God changes the subject from injustice to the glory of creation. The 
Lord asks, “Where were you when I laid the foundations of the earth? … When the morning stars 
sang together and all the heavenly beings shouted for joy?”11 Job has no answers to the litany of 
questions God asks concerning the grandeur and complexity of creation (chapters 38-41), other 
than to confess, “Therefore I have uttered what I did not understand, things too wonderful for 
me, which I did not know. … I had heard of you by the hearing of the ear, but now my eye sees 
you; therefore I despise myself, and repent in dust and ashes.”12   
The epilogue finishes the dramatic story by going back to the action: the Lord rebukes 
Job’s three friends for their bad advice and wrongful representation of the Almighty and 
commands them to offer sacrifices while Job prays on their behalf. The Lord also restores all 
Job’s fortunes which include friends, sheep, camels, oxen, donkeys, and seven more sons and 
three more daughters; in fact, it is said that, “The Lord blessed the latter days of Job more than 
his beginning.”13 The text ends with these words: “And Job died, old and full of days.”14  
                                                          
9 Job 16:2-3. 
10 Job 37:23. 
11 Job 38:4, 7. 
12 Job 42:3-6. 
13 Job 42:12. 
14 Job 42:17. 
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As stated earlier, my purpose here is not to conduct a thorough analysis of the 
composition of the book, its reliance on existing folklore, or how it arrived at its present form. 
This is not an exegetical but a dramatic endeavour. However, a few comments on structure are in 
order. Jewish philosopher, Horace M. Kallen, believes that the text of Job was originally written 
as a poetic dramatic tragedy emulating the work of the Greek writer, Euripides (480-406 BCE), 
and that it was subsequently redacted into a more narrative version when it was added to the 
biblical canon.15 Kallen gives several reasons for his claim: 1) the inclusion of a prologue which 
prepares the spectator/reader for the drama to come, 2) the difference in tone between the 
prologue and the body of the play, 3) the heterodox nature of the sentiments put forth by the 
protagonists, especially from the final messenger, 4) the epiphany which redeems an intolerable 
situation, and 5) the appearance of the deus ex machina16 to conclude the action in the epilogue. 
Kallen even finds evidence of a Greek chorus, what he calls three “interpolations,” woven into 
the dialogue between the characters, but bearing marked differences from the surrounding 
dialogue either in their stanzic form or in theme and content.17 When comparing the book of Job 
to the writings of Euripides, it is important to note that each writer reflects a commitment to the 
orthodoxy of his context: in Greek tragedy we find a reinforcement of Greek sensibilities and in 
Job, this distinctive is adapted to reflect the traditions of the poet’s Jewish, monotheistic context. 
Though not all biblical scholars accept Kallen’s rather bold assessment of the connections 
between Greek dramatic tragedy and the story of Job, most concede that the poetic text contains 
many dramatic elements.  
Due to these dramatic elements in the book of Job and the timeless questions it raises 
concerning the nature of human suffering, several modern playwrights have drawn inspiration 
from the story. I will mention four modern treatments of the tale, two of which are relatively 
faithful to the original in their adaptation of the plot and two which depart rather significantly 
from the text, especially in their premises. Johann Wolfgang von Goethe’s Faust (1828-29) is 
what Kallen refers to as “a sort of Job in reverse” because Faust’s testing involves “desires and 
                                                          
15 Horace M. Kallen, The Book of Job as a Greek Tragedy (New York: Hill and Wang, 1959), 7. 
16 Literally, “God from the machine,” this Latin term refers to a dramatic device which uses a contrived event or 
plot development to miraculously resolve a hopeless situation. See Bruce McConachie, “Case Study: Classical 
Greek theatre: Looking at Oedipus,” in Theatre Histories: An Introduction, 2nd ed., ed. Gary Jay Williams (New York: 
Routledge, 2010), 91-92.  
17 Kallen, The Book of Job as a Greek Tragedy, 26-38. 
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aspirations” instead of “losses and sufferings.”18 Another plot reversal is that the title character is 
granted power over his destiny instead of being powerless to change his circumstances. Similar 
to the book of Job, the play begins with a conversation between Mephistopheles (the devil) and 
God in heaven, each one wagering that they can influence the title character; God seeks to bring 
the unhappy scholar, Faust, to a “clearer dawning”19 and Mephistopheles wants to “lead him 
gently on the road I set.”20 Faust, who has found knowledge and study to make him none the 
wiser, is determined to find the true essence of life, so he takes up Mephistopheles’s offer of 
magic powers and, in exchange, squanders away his soul and moral integrity, believing this 
transaction will set him on the road to ultimate happiness. Despite the protagonist’s poor choices 
and destructive behaviour, he is nevertheless ultimately granted entrance to heaven due to the 
gratuitous grace of God.21 In the end, the devil loses Faust’s soul as well as the bet he made with 
God. Though each travel by a different route, both Job and Faust end up destitute and must rely 
on divine help to rescue them.22  
The poet Robert Frost penned a short, satirical comedy which purports to be the 43rd 
chapter of Job, in other words, an addition or afterword to the biblical text’s 42 chapters. In 
Frost’s A Masque of Reason (1945), the character of God appears to Job and his wife many years 
after the denouement in chapter 42, and they converse on several topics. It is clear that the play is 
mostly a critique of modernity’s over-reliance on reason and not a theologically robust attempt to 
bring closure to the story of Job. Nevertheless, when Frost’s script gathers all the interested 
parties (God, Job, the devil) for a group picture, suggesting that the characters are willing to put 
their differences behind them, it seems to hint at some form of universal restoration.  
Despite its comedic tone, or perhaps because of it, Frost is able to land some solid 
punches on heavyweight topics such as the patriarchal nature of religion and the changing view 
of evil. Frost’s God is portrayed as very human, in the end admitting that the devil provoked 
(tempted) him to show off and he succumbed. By incorporating a certain amount of weakness 
                                                          
18 Ibid., xi. 
19 Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, Faust, line 309. Accessed February 15, 2016. 
http://www.iowagrandmaster.org/Books%20in%20pdf/Faust.pdf.  
20 Ibid., line 314. 
21 Here Goethe’s version differs from earlier tellings of the German folktale, such as Christopher Marlowe’s The 
Tragical History of Doctor Faustus (1604, 1616), which invariably end with the devil carrying the title character off 
to hell.  
22 Goethe’s Faust and the book of Job are both what we might call canonized or widely accepted versions of tales 
which exist in various forms in folklore.   
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into the divine character (God thanks Job for being God’s emancipator),23 Frost manages to 
portray God as a collaborator with Job and with the devil. While this ultimately fails as a 
sustainable theological proposition, I believe that Frost is bringing some needed correction to the 
common depiction of God as the power character and Job as the helpless victim, overstated as 
Frost’s version may be. The gist of the divine/human relationship presented in The Masque of 
Reason is evident in the following interchange:  
JOB:  I am much impressed 
With what You say we have established. 
Between us, You and I. 
GOD:  I make you see? 
It would be too bad if Columbus-like 
You failed to see the worth of your achievement. 
JOB:  You call it mine. 
GOD:  We groped it out together. 
Any originality it showed 
I give you credit for. My forte is truth, 
Or metaphysics, long the world’s reproach 
For standing still in one place true forever; 
While science goes self-superseding on.24 
The important point here is Frost’s suggestion that God relied on Job to make what he calls the 
“great demonstration” a success. Without Job, there would have been no wager, no struggle 
between God and Satan, and no affirmation of God’s faithfulness. In essence, God put his 
reputation on the line by trusting that Job would not turn away from him and would not curse 
him. Frost’s portrayal of the divine/human relationship bears some resemblance to relational 
theology, especially the aspect of divine vulnerability. Frost believes that the relationship is 
meant to work both ways, in other words, God affects Job, but Job is also meant to have an effect 
                                                          
23 God says: “I had to prosper good and punish evil. You changed all that. You set me free to reign. You are the 
Emancipator of your God. And as such I promote you to a saint.” Robert Frost, A Masque of Reason (1945), lines 
80-83. Accessed February 15, 2016. http://thevalueofsparrows.com/2014/06/21/saturday-reading-a-masque-of-
reason-by-robert-frost-2/.  
24 Ibid., lines 196-208. 
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on God. What Frost is obviously missing in his afterword is any sense of justice and mercy 
demonstrated through divine action, specifically, atonement.  
Archibald MacLeish’s play, J.B.: A Play in Verse (1958), takes its story directly from the 
prologue of Job and sets the whole production in a circus tent.25 Two vendors, Zuss (God) and 
Nickles (the devil), overhear a wealthy banker attributing his success to his faithfulness to God. 
The two vendors make a wager and the title character subsequently loses his children and his 
wealth. After disaster has struck, three Comforters seek to give him advice, and Nickles and Zuss 
get in on the action, the first urging J.B. to take his own life, and the latter promising a 
restoration of his former wealth and happiness if he obeys God. In a departure from the biblical 
text, J.B. rejects both offers and instead, finds comfort in making a new life with his wife. In 
essence, he trades faith in God for faith in himself, becoming a modern, self-reliant man.  
Finally, I was privileged to view the premiere of a new dramatic interpretation of Job, 
The Book of Bob by Arthur Holden, at Montreal’s Centaur Theatre in the winter of 2014. Holden 
has given us an updated story; the title character is a middle-aged professor whose life unravels 
through a series of unfortunate events, and God is represented by ten different characters, all 
played by a young woman. Aside from the familiar premise in which good things go horribly 
wrong, the play does not remain true to Job’s dilemma, in large part because Holden’s Bob is an 
avowed atheist. In the end, it is not a test of fidelity to God (such as we find in Job), nor a tale 
about choosing sides (Faust’s dilemma), nor about becoming one’s own person (the choice made 
by the businessman J.B.). Holden’s story ends with the title character humbly making peace with 
his imperfections. 
All four of these theatrical pieces draw their premise (and for the most part, their major 
plot points) from the story of Job, and yet, each author has modified the story in what could be 
interpreted as an attempt to make it more palatable. In all cases, the title character is rewritten to 
be more empowered and not as passive as Job is often perceived to be, and God is trimmed down 
to be a gentler, kinder, less powerful version of himself, more human, so to speak. The ending is 
invariably altered from the uncomfortably neat reversal of fortune found in the epilogue of Job to 
a conclusion which reflects more realistic sensibilities and a view of justice in keeping with the 
values of each author’s time.  
                                                          
25 Archibald MacLeish, J.B.: A Play in Verse (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1958).  
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For Goethe, Faust’s wrong turn at the beginning of the play (selling his soul to the devil) 
can only be reversed by the mercifulness of God, and God does not disappoint. It has been 
suggested that Goethe’s version of this ancient tale speaks to the rise of industrialism in the 
nineteenth century and its ultimate cost to the human soul. Of the four plays, Frost’s poem has 
the weakest characterization of God, inverting the power dynamic by making Job the one who 
helps the divine one to find himself. Parts of the text read almost like a therapy session in which 
God finds closure for the unfortunate wager made with the devil. At the end of MacLeish’s play, 
J.B. disentangles himself from religion altogether in order to live simply with his wife, a nod to 
the values of modernity. The most recent of these plays, Holden’s The Book of Bob, recasts God 
as a shape-shifter of sorts, appearing through various people in Bob’s life, yet avoiding detection 
due to Bob’s avowed atheism. The undoing of the pompous professor has fatalistic overtones and 
whether Bob acknowledges God or not is, in the end, largely irrelevant. Bob’s flaw is that he is 
blind to his deficiencies, and the small tragedies he suffers help him to be more honest with 
himself. As a result, he begins to take some responsibility for his actions instead of blaming 
others. According to reviewer Rachel Levine, Bob is a more accessible character than the ancient 
Job: 
Bob suffers just enough frustrations to be uncomfortable, but never really descends into 
despair. He is threatened largely by uncertainty and his own personality. Unlike the 
superhuman patience of Job, Bob is very real and his sufferings are very real. Each little 
obstacle thrown in his path is a familiar first-world problem. In consequence, Bob’s 
biggest threats are self-created and he bears full responsibility. If he suffers potential 
doom, it comes from his own response to the situation. Bob is far easier to relate to than 
Job ever was.26 
 
While one of the measures of a good piece of theatre is how well the audience relates to the 
characters, it is not the only metric. Levine’s assessment seems to be a bit short-sighted in this 
regard. We may indeed recognise ourselves on the stage, but if the play serves merely as a mirror 
of our own lives, it does not reveal anything new, only what we already know or at least suspect.  
Like Holden’s play, the book of Job gives its readers a dose of readily recognisable 
scenarios in the lamenting, anguished speeches of Job, the simplistic platitudes of the three 
Friends, and finally, the young Elihu’s call to repentance from self-righteousness. However, what 
the biblical text also does, and which all the adaptations try to downplay, is insist that all human 
                                                          
26 Rachel Levine, “Pushed to the Minimum. The Book of Bob.” Montreal Rampage, February 13, 2014. Accessed 
February 15, 2016. http://montrealrampage.com/pushed-to-the-minimum-the-book-of-bob/.  
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wisdom is inadequate and God does not have to answer to any of us. To a modern reader, the 
questions God asks Job in chapters 38-41 come across as condescending, bombastic, even 
sarcastic, and leave one with the uncomfortable sense that this God is a rogue deity, 
uncompassionate and prone to go off-topic. What kind of God would refuse to give comfort to a 
virtuous, suffering soul? The effusive, poetic descriptions of the cosmos, the heavens, and an 
array of creatures reflecting the sovereignty of God might be fitting in a hymn of praise, a psalm 
perhaps, but as the climax to a lengthy and painful discussion on the topic of theological justice, 
they seem in bad taste, like kicking a good man when he is down by reminding him who is really 
in charge.  
This is why readers of Job have often found its conclusion unsatisfying, and 
understandably so. The fact that there is no justification offered for Job’s suffering, that theodicy 
is not the subject of God’s speech, is indeed troubling, unless we understand it as a dramatic 
device meant to tell us something about the relationship between God and Job. What I would like 
to argue is that through a theodramatc approach to the book of Job, we are able to see the 
presence of divine invitation instead of divine imposition, we can identify human responsiveness 
instead of human powerlessness, and we find that divine/human collaboration is evident from the 
very beginning of the story of God and his faithful servant, Job.  
The Presence of Yes in Job 
In Robert Frost’s poetic addition to the book of Job, we find this interesting exchange: 
JOB: I am flattered proud 
 To have been in on anything with You, 
 ‘Twas a great demonstration if You say so. 
 Though incidentally I sometimes wonder 
 Why it had to be at my expense. 
GOD: It had to be at somebody’s expense. 
 Society can never think things out; 
 It has to see them acted out by actors, 
 Devoted actors at a sacrifice –  
 The ablest actors I can lay my hands on.27 
                                                          
27 Frost, The Masque of Reason, lines 233-242. 
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By identifying Job as an actor in a play meant to make a point to society (the tale is often 
interpreted in this way), Frost tries to soften the blow that Job appears to have been used by God, 
and without his express permission. In short, Frost seems to suggest that the only way to justify 
the idea that Job has been a pawn in a cosmic chess game is to recast God as someone who has 
good intentions but may not always employ the most equitable means to achieve the desired end. 
However, I would question the assumption that the point of Job’s story is to teach the reader a 
moral lesson or that it is a parable on the theme of unjust human suffering or theodicy as so 
many theologians suggest.  
Scholars have come to different conclusions regarding the main point of the book of Job. 
Konkel concludes that what Job and his readers receive is “better than a logical solution to the 
question of theodicy.”28 He believes the story has to do with hope: hope for transformation, hope 
that “the Creator of all creatures is also their redeemer and that their trust in him will be 
rewarded.”29 J.H. Walton believes that the book of Job is a guide which tells us “how to think 
about God in the face of suffering.”30 Walton views the story as a courtroom drama where not 
Job, but God is on trial.31 When it is shown that humans lack sufficient information to adequately 
judge God’s justice, the charges against God must be dismissed. In the end, Job is satisfied not 
with understanding his suffering, but in knowing God better.32 Stephen Cook, in his reading of 
Job as a theatrical work, concludes that the book of Job is a polemic against a retributive 
worldview found in Deuteronomistic historical texts. He writes: “It analysed the prevailing 
philosophies about providence and concluded that in the raw honesty of confronting the Divine 
about the apparent injustices and unfairness of the relationship, by articulating despair, anger, 
disappointment and frustration, one may speak well of God.”33 His point is similar to Walton’s in 
that it places the emphasis on cultivating a proper response to God instead of being able to 
understand the ways of God.  
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In my view, Hebrew scholar Robert Alter presents one of the most perceptive 
interpretations of the complex drama of Job. He shows how the theophany (chapters 38-41) is a 
direct response to Job’s initial complaint in chapter 3, a “brilliantly pointed reversal, in structure, 
image, and theme.”34 According to Alter, God answers Job not with direct replies to his queries, 
but by reframing his assumptions and redirecting his focus:  
Job’s first poem is a powerful, evocative, authentic expression of man’s essential, 
virtually ineluctable egotism: the anguished speaker has seen, so he feels, all too much, 
and he wants now to see nothing at all, to be enveloped in the blackness of the 
womb/tomb, enclosed by dark doors that will remain shut forever. In direct contrast to all 
this withdrawal inward and turning out of lights, God’s poem is a demonstration of the 
energizing power of panoramic vision. Instead of the death wish, it affirms from line to 
line the splendor and vastness of life, beginning with a cluster of arresting images of the 
world’s creation and going on to God’s sustaining of the world in the forces of nature and 
in the variety of the animal kingdom.35  
 
With careful and attentive text analysis, Alter deftly manages to avoid two pitfalls common to 
interpreters of Job: 1) focusing on justifying God’s sovereignty in light of the high cost to 
humanity, and 2) making the text a lesson on how to endure suffering without asking too many 
questions. I would like to take Alter’s observations concerning God’s interactions with Job and 
push them a little further by placing them within a theodramatic context. The insights we find by 
“entering into” the drama come not from an external viewpoint which seeks to make sense of the 
overall story, but from the limited perspective of characters within a story. Because God is one of 
the main characters, this “entering into” or limitation of perspective might, at first glance, appear 
to be an impossible hurdle to overcome. However, if we approach this as a theatrical exercise, 
what actors might call “getting inside a character’s head” when they are preparing for a role, it 
becomes possible to immerse oneself in the story with a view to discovering what the characters 
see instead of trying to make sense of the whole. This limiting of perspective also makes it easier 
to identify nuances in the characters’ dialogues and actions which tend to be overlooked when 
viewing the drama from a critical distance.  
1. The First Yes: Divine Invitation  
The first Yes is the divine Yes, so we will be viewing the story of Job from the 
perspective of the character of God. I should make clear that we are not relying on what other 
                                                          




characters tell us about God nor are we interested in the actions of any other actors unless they 
are in direct interaction with God. When it comes to the first Yes, we are solely interested in 
what happens when God is on stage, in what he actually says and does in the drama, especially in 
the prologue. After Job is introduced, we have a scene where the heavenly beings gather to 
present themselves to YHWH, and the first words spoken here, the words which set the direction 
for what is to follow, come from YHWH. He inquires of the adversary, “Where have you come 
from?”36 This is not a question meant to gather information, but more of a conversation starter 
with a particular goal in mind; it is a question meant to introduce the subject matter which God 
means to pursue. When the adversary indicates that he has been going to and fro on the earth, 
God further directs the conversation: “Have you considered my servant Job? There is no one like 
him on the earth, a blameless and upright man who fears God and turns away from evil.”37 There 
are several key factors here which reveal God’s motivation: 1) God starts a conversation with the 
adversary, 2) God draws the adversary’s attention to Job, his faithful servant, and 3) God speaks 
very highly of Job, extoling his accomplishments. If we think of this exchange in terms of a 
sports analogy where two rival coaches are having a conversation, the strategy becomes clear. 
Why would a coach provoke an opponent by bragging about his star player? It could only mean 
one thing: the coach is issuing a challenge, confident that he has a winner on his hands. The 
adversary responds to God’s leading statements by attempting to undermine and downplay the 
strength of Job, suggesting that the man is untried. To use a boxing analogy, the adversary 
implies that Job’s perfect record is due to the fact that he has only sparred with teammates, he 
has not engaged in a real fight against a legitimate opponent.38 YHWH does not come to Job’s 
defense because the adversary is right, Job is untested, but more importantly, YHWH has 
accomplished what he set out to do: the adversary takes the bait and offers to arrange 
circumstances which will test Job’s abilities. YHWH does not hesitate to give the adversary 
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permission to “touch all that he [Job] has,” with the caveat that Job himself is not to be harmed. 
This response makes it quite clear that from the beginning of the scene YHWH is initiating a 
testing of Job. It also shows us that YHWH is never in doubt about the outcome: he believes Job 
will come through still blameless and upright, still fearing God, and still turning away from evil.  
The sports analogy helps us see that YHWH’s actions are not malicious, nor is this a 
wager based on a whim or for the thrill of the game. YHWH is well-pleased, even proud of Job, 
and recognises his potential. It would appear that YHWH has a genuine fondness for Job, for he 
does not desire to put him directly in harm’s way. Job is precious to YHWH, it seems clear, but 
Job is untested; his fidelity has been forged within the safety of a friendly environment. In 
YHWH we see characteristics of both protective father and tough coach. The coach knows the 
necessity of challenging someone in order to bring out the best in them. He knows that there is a 
kind of strength, stamina, courage, and faith which can only be forged through encountering 
resistance. However, YHWH also knows the dangers of pushing someone too far, and he has no 
desire to cross that line. Having set the match in motion, YHWH now moves to the sidelines and 
lets the scenario play out. He knows he must not be seen as too close, must not be protectively 
hovering nearby, ready to rescue Job as soon as he experiences distress. This would undermine 
the integrity of the test. In this first scene, the purpose for the trial is not quite clear, but what is 
certain is that the relationship between YHWH and Job is about to change, and that YHWH 
views this as a good and necessary progression.  
 In the next scene with YHWH, after Job has had his riches and his family decimated, the 
conversation with the adversary is a repetition of the first encounter, only this time YHWH adds, 
“He [Job] still persists in his integrity, although you incited me against him, to destroy him for 
no reason.”39 Though this could be interpreted to mean that YHWH has been tricked by the 
adversary to do harm to Job, it is clearly just more banter to bait the adversary, to let him think 
that he has the upper hand. It does no harm to YHWH’s strategy to let the adversary assume that 
YHWH is second-guessing the wager, doubtful about its outcome. YHWH, of course, is not 
letting the adversary in on his real game plan nor revealing the depths of his compassion for Job. 
That would be a game badly played. And because this is a drama, YHWH’s purposes are also 
kept hidden from Job, and to some extent, from the reader or spectator. We must wait till the end 
of the story to gain some insight into YHWH’s purpose for testing Job. What we do know at this 
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point is that because Job has proven to be such a valiant champion of fidelity in the midst of 
devastating loss, YHWH has no trouble sending him into the ring again. When the adversary 
predictably blames his ineffectiveness against Job on YHWH’s prohibition against touching Job 
personally, YHWH grants access to touch Job’s physical body, but not to kill him. It is important 
to remember that for YHWH, Job is never an incidental player in a cosmic wager. The idea 
behind the wager is not for YHWH to prove himself victorious over the adversary; that has never 
been in question as far as YHWH is concerned. The adversary merely serves as YHWH’s pawn 
in the testing and transformation of Job. YHWH uses the adversary to distance Job from his 
reliance on wealth and comfort, both of which have served as mediators of God’s blessing, until 
all he has left is the core of his relationship with God, that which cannot be shaken. It seems that 
YHWH is inviting Job not only to transformation but perhaps to greater intimacy, but let us see 
how the story unfolds.  
2. The Second Yes: Job’s Response 
The narrator first introduces us to Job in the prologue and we discover that he is “one of 
the greatest of all the people of the east.”40 Job has everything going for him, a large and 
harmonious family as well as great wealth, evidenced by large numbers of livestock and many 
servants. The narrator makes clear that the most remarkable thing about Job is not his wealth or 
stature in society, but that he is “blameless and upright,” a man who fears God and turns away 
from evil. Job is so conscientious about pleasing God that he offers sacrifices on behalf of his 
children in case they have unintentionally or carelessly cursed God. This shows us that Job’s 
righteousness is not primarily self-righteousness, but a genuine desire for his whole household to 
be in right standing with YHWH. With regard to the second Yes, we see that Job is already a 
responder to God, not only acknowledging the divine presence but seeking to align himself with 
God’s goodness and justice. When Job’s world falls apart without any warning, tragedy after 
tragedy visiting his household, killing all his children and ruining his wealth, what effect does it 
have on his loyalty to God? Does Job’s faith prove to be a disinterested faith, a faith which does 
not look to rewards and punishments to authenticate it? In other words, is Job’s Yes to God 
himself and not merely to the blessings that, up till now, have accompanied that faith? Indeed, 
this seems to be the case when Job, in mourning after the disasters, speaks these words of 
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worship: “the Lord gave, and the Lord has taken away; blessed be the name of the Lord.”41 Even 
after his body is ravaged by sickness, Job reiterates his unconditional commitment to YHWH: 
“Shall we receive the good at the hand of God, and not receive the bad?”42 However, this Yes 
becomes quite nuanced in the speeches of Job which follow.  
Though Job refuses to curse God, he curses everything about his life, wishing he had 
never been born, wishing that he could have avoided all this misery. He admits both his 
ignorance and God’s sovereignty when he says, “Why is light given to one who cannot see the 
way, whom God has fenced in?”43 Job’s Yes to YHWH is absolute, he will never renounce his 
faith in God, but he will not be silent in his complaint. As Walter Brueggemann observes, “Job 
never pushes God to nonexistence, for then he would quit speaking and be reduced to silence.… 
Job keeps believing and speaking.”44 For Job, faith in God is more than the acknowledgement of 
the existence of the Almighty or agreement with certain doctrines; faith is a posture which 
orients his whole life toward YHWH. This robust faith allows him to rail against the one 
ultimately responsible for his circumstances and demand an answer. The speeches of Job’s three 
friends, another trial in and of itself as one by one they accuse Job of bringing this misfortune on 
himself by sinning against God, cause him to call for an advocate (goel), one who will plead his 
case, one who will vindicate him against his accusers.45 In contrast to his friends, Job does not 
believe in a retribution-based God who rewards good behaviour with a blessed life and who 
punishes wrongdoing with disaster. Because Job believes that God’s Yes is unconditioned, Job’s 
responsive Yes is also unwavering. However, Job’s Yes has two sides to it: Job both believes in 
God’s justice yet argues against his mistreatment (Yes, but why?), and Job appeals to God both 
as judge and as mediator (Yes, but help!). In despair, Job admits that he cannot find God and 
cannot perceive him in his current situation, but he also acknowledges God’s presence in his 
testing.46 After the three friends have concluded their arguments meant to convince Job that his 
suffering is a punishment for his wickedness, Job defends not only himself and his integrity, but 
the righteousness of God who has taken away Job’s rights. Job’s speeches are filled with this 
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type of tension: refusing to call God’s justice into question, yet questioning the justice of 
innocent suffering, and insisting on both God’s and his own righteousness, despite all 
appearances to the contrary. What Job longs for is once again to be on the same side as YHWH 
instead of feeling like an enemy of God. He desires to go back to the time “when the friendship 
of God was upon my tent.”47  
What we find in Job is a man torn asunder by internal conflict, a man who knows God 
but realises he does not know God, a man who trusts God yet feels betrayed, a man who will 
defend God to the death yet cannot seem to get God to defend him (or kill him), a man who does 
not believe God is retributive yet appeals to God for just retribution, and a man who calls God 
both friend and persecutor.48 Job’s cries for mercy, for justice, for advocacy, and for vindication 
are important, but what is perhaps more important is the fact that he will not let God go; he 
insists that God speak to him. Brueggemann comments: “Job yearns most for an answer, any 
answer, because he prefers a harsh dialogue to an empty monologue.”49 Job’s Yes is found not 
only in his refusal to curse God, but in his constant complaint which becomes an unceasing 
prayer. 
3. The Third Yes: Collaboration 
In order to find the presence of divine/human collaboration, we turn to the final chapters 
of the book of Job, specifically the speech from the whirlwind (theophany), Job’s response, and 
the epilogue. We are not looking for closure or tidy answers to the questions raised in the story. 
The tale of Job, like any good drama, does not tie up all the loose ends and leave us with nothing 
to ponder. At the end of Job’s story, there are unsolved mysteries which we as readers are meant 
to keep mulling over. In the third Yes we are also not looking for one final interpretation; there 
are several ways to view the interaction between YHWH and Job, and I am offering but one 
option. In commenting on the book of Job, Mark Larrimore notes that ancient Jewish interpreters 
believed that, “if a passage could be understood in several ways, it should be so understood.”50 I 
posit that a theodramatic treatment of the interaction between God and Job is not only indicated 
by the dramatic nature of the narrative, but because it respects the drama by refusing to reduce it 
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to a moral lesson. In light of this, what does God’s answer, which begins in chapter 38, tell us 
about the relationship between YHWH and Job?  
In the theophany, we notice a definite change in focus from the previous dialogue which 
concerns Job’s righteousness and the (in)justice of his suffering. However, the speech from the 
whirlwind should not be viewed as a total denial of Job’s questions. As mentioned previously, 
Alter notes that YHWH’s speech brings back many of the themes mentioned by Job in his initial 
lament and reframes them. While Job interpreted all of life through the lens of suffering and 
impending death, God calls him to behold the vibrant, awe-inspiring life evident in creation. The 
barrage of questions which God asks Job about creation begin like this: “Where were you when I 
laid the foundation of the earth? Tell me, if you have understanding. Who determined its 
measurements – surely you know! Or who stretched the line upon it?”51 These queries serve to 
overwhelm Job, showing him his insignificance in light of the magnificence and magnitude of 
creation, and yet, the very fact that YHWH has entered the conversation and is questioning Job 
reflects a certain amount of equanimity. G.K. Chesterton observes: “The poet [author of Job] by 
an exquisite intuition has made God ironically accept a kind of controversial equality with His 
accusers. He is willing to regard it as if it were a fair intellectual duel.”52 The questions YHWH 
poses to Job appear by turns belittling, even bullying,53 and at times sarcastic,54 ironic,55 and 
seemingly angry.56 But as the questions roll over each other page after page, there is also another 
tone evident: wonder. Chesterton words it this way: “The whole is a sort of psalm or rhapsody of 
the sense of wonder. The maker of all things is astonished at the things he has Himself made.”57 
God is not merely rebuking Job, but calling him to join the Creator in being in awe, in beholding 
great mysteries, and in pondering the grandeur of creation. Job’s small act of refusing to curse 
God, noble as it may be, is not ultimately the goal of the test. The invitation of God is for Job to 
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join together with him in extolling the glories of creation, a glory which includes lions hunting 
for prey and war ostriches dealing cruelly with their offspring.58  
God’s strategy, it seems, was always to invite Job to be a partaker in glory, not only 
catching a glimpse of the incomprehensibility of an intricate and complex creation but also 
sharing in creation’s sufferings. The story of Job has prophetic undertones because his 
experience of suffering and his cry for redemption are echoed over and over again in the history 
of Israel, the world, and ultimately, they find their full expression in the passion of Christ. 
Dorothee Sӧlle suggests that Job’s “call for an advocate, a redeemer, can only be understood as 
the unanswerable cry of the pre-Christian world, which is eventually given its answer in 
Christ.”59 Seen in the context of the whole biblical text, the divine invitation for Job to enter into 
suffering becomes a foreshadowing of Christ as the suffering servant. Paul Claudel writes: “The 
Son of God did not come to do away with suffering but rather to suffer with us; not to abolish the 
Cross, but to stretch himself upon it. Of all the special privileges of humanity, God wanted to 
adopt only this one.”60 To connect glory and divinity with suffering seems contradictory and 
unreasonable, but it is one of the mysteries which the drama of Job leaves us to ponder. 
Chesterton concludes that the point of Job’s story is that humans are “most comforted by 
paradoxes,”61 because he believes that, “The riddles of God are more satisfying than the 
solutions of man.”62 While there is a certain truth in this, I would qualify Chesterton’s statements 
by suggesting that in the end, Job’s comfort has more to do with restored friendship with God 
than with divine riddles. Larrimore makes a similar observation when he states that, “The 
suffering Job’s questions are not addressed in the theophany. He is.”63 Relationship, not riddles, 
is the key to understanding the drama of Job. Trust, not mystery, is what we find at the core of 
Job’s restoration.  
The epilogue reads very much like a contrived and unnatural attempt at closure, a deus ex 
machina, as Kallen suggests. God rebukes Job’s friends for their harsh words and has Job pray 
                                                          
58 Job 38:39-40; Job 39:13-17. 
59 Dorothee Sӧlle, Leiden (Stuttgart/Berlin: Kreuzverlag, 1972), 148. As quoted in Hans Urs von Balthasar, Theo-
Drama: Theological Dramatic Theory, vol. 4, The Action, trans. Graham Harrison (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 
1994), 195. Hereafter referred to as TD4. 
60 Paul Claudel, Positons et propositions II (Gallimard, 1943), 245. As quoted in Balthasar, TD4, 195. 
61 Chesterton, introduction, xxvii. 
62 Ibid., xxii. 
63 Larrimore, The Book of Job, 183. 
149 
 
for them. Then God restores Job’s friends, his wealth, and conveniently, Job’s fertile wife gives 
him seven more sons and three more daughters. Finally, God grants Job another one hundred and 
forty years of life which enable him to see four generations of his descendants, a great blessing 
by Ancient Near Eastern standards. Here is the problem: if we view this as a fitting ending, as a 
way of fixing everything that has gone before, we revert to a retributive view of YHWH, a God 
essentially reduced to a system of rewarding faithfulness and punishing evil, the very notion 
which the whole story sets out to disprove.64 Let us return to the idea of collaboration to untangle 
the implications of the epilogue. 
In the first Yes, especially in the prologue, we catch a glimpse of collaboration between 
YHWH and Job, but have no clear sense as to where it might be leading. We know that the 
relationship is about to change between the two characters, but it is too early in the drama to 
draw any conclusions. It seems apparent that increased intimacy is definitely a factor in the third 
Yes, and the part of the text which makes the point (nearly every commentator refers to this as 
the key to the whole story) is found in Job’s response to God’s eloquent poem regarding the 
wonders of creation: “I had heard of you by the hearing of the ear, but now my eye sees you.”65 
If we tie this epiphany together with the invitation to experience a fuller measure of the glory of 
God, a glory which is so all-encompassing that it does not shy away from pain and suffering, 
then we do not have a contrived ending. Instead, we are presented with resurrection, with the 
same kind of buoyancy described in the theophany, a vitality which cannot be dulled or 
overcome by death. Instead of a moral lesson about suffering, we have a story which takes its 
characters from plerosis through kenosis and back to a more glorious and nuanced plerosis. 
William Blake’s illustrations of the final scenes of the book of Job reflect both the plerosis of 
resurrection as well as the intimacy of divine/human collaboration. Larrimore describes Blake’s 
drawings of the events in the epilogue: “Musical instruments that had been hung in the oak tree 
overhead in the opening scene, judged inappropriate to piety, are being played in the final scene 
as the company joyously stands. It’s a restoration but also a reconciliation of different parts of 
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life, the restoration of art to worship, creativity to religion. Most striking, Job’s face and the faces 
of God are the same.”66 
Toward Glory 
At this point it is necessary to take a step back and remember where we have come from. 
In chapter two, I presented the idea of gift as an underlying, active foundation, the dynamic 
generator of every Yes. The concept of unconditional gift, the gift which needs no reciprocation, 
the gift which comes out of overabundance, is what makes genuine Yes possible. Because gift is 
first exemplified in the divine invitation (the first Yes), we are able to utter the responsive second 
Yes and give ourselves without reserve to the Divine Giver. Further, because both Yeses are 
freely given, the result is a genuine collaboration which involves movements of unison and 
harmony in a symphonic, synergetic flow of mutual love and generosity. The story of Job 
illustrates the other end of the arc: the drama which begins with gift culminates in glory. 
Ultimately, Job’s laments and pleas are not requests for God to restore the material blessings 
which have been lost, but for God to show himself, to make himself known. The theophany in 
chapters 38-41 is God’s answer to this prayer. Through unveiling the glories and mysteries of 
creation, God reveals himself to Job.  
The Hebrew word for glory is kabod, from a root which means weight or heaviness. In 
Greek, the word is doxa, referring to honour, renown, and reputation. Writing on the topic, Jason 
Zuidema notes that, “God’s glory is a main theme of Scripture. The [Old Testament] associates 
God’s glory, the sheer magnificence of God’s presence, with his creation, theophanies, acts of 
salvation, and judgment.”67 In the drama of Job, we find all these elements: the voice out of the 
whirlwind brings God’s magnificent, weighty presence,68 the theophany gives us a litany of 
glorious, divinely creative acts, and the epilogue reveals God’s judgment of Job’s friends and the 
salvation of Job. One note of caution: we must be careful not to misconstrue glory as perfection. 
Commenting on the innocence of Adam and Eve in the Garden of Eden, Don Hudson observes 
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that the so-called perfection of this scenario which is closely associated with glorious 
communion with God’s person, also comes with a cost: being largely ignorant of God’s world.69 
This is very much the case in the prologue of Job. There is a certain perfection to his life, but 
there is also a grave ignorance of anything beyond his limited experience.  
Glory is what opens up eyes, unstops ears, confounds minds, expands hearts, and silences 
all other voices. Walter Brueggemann posits that in the book of Job, “Theodicy is overridden by 
doxology.”70 A glimpse of glory unseats Job as the central character in his own story because he 
begins to see the larger world and it is, as Chesterton puts it, “much stranger” than he thought it 
was.71 It is a world of tragedy, of suffering, of unanswered questions, but also of overwhelming 
beauty and variety. Don Hudson writes on the connection between beauty and suffering:  
The ultimate knowledge of suffering, which is a loss of innocence, constrains us to 
fiercely imagine truth, beauty, and goodness just as God did when he confronted the 
chaos in Genesis 1. God’s imagination in the face of chaos resulted in the creation of 
heaven and earth. Acknowledging the suffering of this world places us every day in the 
image of our Creator – we can create beauty out of nothing or we can repeat suffering in 
an endless cycle of destruction. Confronting suffering in our world becomes the fulcrum 
between ultimate tragedy or redemption.72  
 
In the character of Job, we find a man who is brought to that fulcrum, who must decide if a 
blessed life is found in fulfilling religious obligations and enjoying the wealth found in friends, 
family, livestock, and servants, or by embracing something more terrifying and beautiful than he 
ever imagined. It is as if YHWH says to Job, “Because you are my trusted and faithful servant, I 
will show you my glory. Let me show you the depths of suffering and the heights of blessing, 
none of which are beyond my comprehension or control. I employ it all to display my glory.” 
Divine glory is not the avoidance of tragedy, but the emergence of a new kind of plerosis out of 
tragedy. Hudson confirms what any avid reader or theatre-goer knows: “Any story worth its salt 
does not begin until tragedy steals in.”73 When Balthasar makes the death of Christ on the cross 
the central action of Theo-Drama, he is not only recognising the importance of tragedy as a 
dramatic element, but positioning all human tragedy within the drama of God. One of the 
problems we have with the book of Job, according to Hudson, is that we believe that God views 
                                                          
69 Don Hudson, “The Glory of His Discontent: The Inconsolable Suffering of God,” Mars Hill Review 6 (Fall 1996), 22.  
70 Brueggemann, Finally Comes the Poet, 62. 
71 Chesterton, introduction, xxiii. 
72 Hudson, “The Glory of His Discontent,” 24. 
73 Ibid., 22. 
152 
 
tragedy the same way we do. We are scandalised by a God who would offer up his faithful 
servant to be tested through suffering, but this is because we believe that God is isolated from 
suffering, is Aristotle’s unmoved mover, a God void of passion and empathy. Hudson insists that 
we have a God who participates in our sufferings and invites us to participate in his suffering, 
specifically that of Christ on the cross.74 
In John 17 we read the prayer of Jesus spoken just before he voluntarily goes to his death. 
Though he is aware of the suffering which lies ahead, the overall tone of the text is hopeful and 
forward-looking, focused on the themes of love and glory. The sharing of these two elements, 
first between the Father and the Son, and then between the Godhead and Jesus’s disciples, takes 
up most of the prayer. Jesus begins with these words which contain both ends of the 
theodramatic arc (gift and glory):  
Father, the hour has come; glorify your Son so that the Son may glorify you, since you 
have given him authority over all people, to give eternal life to all whom you have given 
him. And this is eternal life, that they may know you, the only true God, and Jesus Christ 
whom you have sent. I glorified you on earth by finishing the work that you gave me to 
do. So now, Father, glorify me in your own presence with the glory that I had in your 
presence before the world existed.75  
 
What the Father has given Jesus, Jesus offers up to the Father to be glorified. This glory also 
follows the pattern mentioned earlier: plerosis (gift coming from abundance) is followed by 
kenosis (self-emptying, suffering, tragedy) which then results in a return to renewed plerosis 
(glory). At the end of the prayer, Jesus turns his concern to the disciples: 
As you, Father, are in me and I am in you, may they also be in us, so that the world may 
believe that you have sent me. The glory that you have given me I have given them, so 
that they may be one, as we are one, I in them and you in me, that they may become 
completely one, so that the world may know that you have sent me and have loved them 
even as you have loved me. Father, I desire that those also, whom you have given me, 
may be with me where I am, to see my glory, which you have given me because you 
loved me before the foundation of the world.76  
 
Lest one think that all this talk about glory is restricted to the world to come, let us look at how 
Peter, Jesus’s disciple, understands the concept of divine glory. He writes to his fellow believers: 
“If you are reviled for the name of Christ, you are blessed, because the spirit of glory, which is 
                                                          
74 Ibid., 27. 
75 John 17:1-5. 
76 John 17:21-24. 
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the Spirit of God, is resting on you.”77 For the early Christians, glory was never separated from 
suffering; instead, it was seen to shine through suffering, because to share in the sufferings of 
Christ, in the sufferings of God, was to share in the glory of God.78 This is because the sacrificial 
death of Christ was recognised as the supreme act of loving generosity made by a holy God. In 
the suffering, death, and resurrection of Christ, we see gift and glory intermingled, both ends of 
the arc of the divine drama meeting in one historical event.  
In the prayer of Jesus before his death, we observe invitation, response, and collaboration 
tightly woven together by the frequent use of the words, “one,” “in,” “given,” “sent,” and 
“loved.” While the theophany in Job resonates with lofty, heightened imagery of the vast and 
unimaginable panorama of creation, drawing Job out of his self-absorption, Jesus’s prayer uses 
intimate language and inclusive pronouns to draw all the parties (Father, Son, disciples) together 
into a verbal womb of love, connection, and shared purpose. In these two examples we see both 
the expansiveness and the closeness of the glorious drama of God, the epic and the lyrical. God 
enters into the human story of Job, and by doing so, invites Job to expand his horizons, to step 
out of naivety, and to know something of the glorious world which God inhabits. God enters into 
the human story through Jesus, and by doing so, invites humanity to see the imago dei in all its 
glorious weakness and through it, access the divine drama. In Job and Jesus we have a bringing 
together of what Balthasar identifies as a unity of “the glory of God and the uttermost 
abandonment by God, Heaven and Hell.”79 Abandonment by God, the very definition of hell, 
does not have the power to jettison glory from the story; instead, it serves to create a space, a 
void, which allows the plerosis of God to cascade in and redeem all that is lost.  
In The Problem of Pain, C. S. Lewis states that the incarnation is indicative of the drama 
of God evident in the world, a drama which forces us to move beyond reason, a drama full of 
intricate, winding stories whose rawness and strength strike us at full force. In many ways, 
Lewis’s words are applicable to the drama of Job.   
                                                          
77 1 Peter 4:14. 
78 The author of the gospel of John associates death and martyrdom with glory when he quotes Jesus’s words to 
Peter concerning his later years. “’Very truly, I tell you, when you were younger, you used to fasten your own belt 
and to go wherever you wished. But when you grow old, you will stretch out your hands, and someone else will 
fasten a belt around you and take you where you do not wish to go.’ (He said this to indicate the kind of death by 
which he would glorify God.)” John 21:18-19.  
79 Hans Urs von Balthasar, The Glory of the Lord: A Theological Aesthetics, vol. 6, Theology: The Old Covenant, 
trans. Brian McNeil C.R.V. and Erasmo Leiva-Merikakis, ed. John Riches (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1991), 290. 
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The story is strangely like many myths which have haunted religion from the first, and 
yet it is not like them. It is not transparent to the reason: we could not have invented it 
ourselves. It has not the suspicious a priori lucidity of Pantheism or of Newtonian 
physics. It has the seemingly arbitrary and idiosyncratic character which modern science 
is slowly teaching us to put up with in this wilful universe, where energy is made up in 
little parcels of a quantity no one could predict, where speed is not unlimited, where 
irreversible entropy gives time a real direction and the cosmos, no longer static or cyclic, 
moves like a drama from a real beginning to a real end. If any message from the core of 
reality ever were to reach us, we should expect to find in it just that unexpectedness, that 
wilful, dramatic anfractuosity which we find in the Christian faith. It has the master touch 
- the rough, male taste of reality, not made by us, or, indeed, for us, but hitting us in the 
face.80 
 
In connecting the drama of Job with the “entering in” of God through the person of Jesus 
Christ, we come to the crux of dramatic theology: loving collaboration (covenant, plerosis, 
synergos) which permeates even tragedy, suffering, sin, and death. Balthasar, in his exploration 
of Holy Saturday in what he calls “The Final Act” of Theo-Drama, interprets the descent of 
Christ into hell after his death81 as another expression of love and intimacy. In writing about this 
separation of the Son from the Father, he cites Adrienne von Speyr: “The reciprocal self-
surrender of Son and Father appear ‘as something so strong and so good that everything 
involving separation and suffering and obligation and obedience that is taken up into this is 
totally absorbed into love, indeed itself becomes love, as if it had never been anything else.’”82 
The incarnation of Jesus Christ is the story of descent (coming from heaven) and ascent (going 
back to heaven). In the person of Jesus we see God identifying with humanity, even to the point 
of death (descent), but we also see Christ inviting humanity to take the path back to God with 
him (ascent).83 In essence, this is the theodramatic arc of the three Yeses.  
Because the drama of Job has so often been interpreted as theodicy, my insistence on a 
collaborative, relational reading of the story might seem to be a case of imposing a dramatic 
                                                          
80 C. S. Lewis, The Problem of Pain (New York: HarperCollins, 1996), 15. 
81 “Therefore it is said, ‘When he ascended on high he made captivity itself a captive; he gave gifts to his 
people.’ (When it says, ‘He ascended,’ what does it mean but that he had also descended into the lower parts of 
the earth? He who descended is the same one who ascended far above all the heavens, so that he might fill all 
things.)” Ephesians 4:8-10. “For Christ also suffered for sins once for all, the righteous for the unrighteous, in order 
to bring you to God. He was put to death in the flesh, but made alive in the spirit, in which also he went and made 
a proclamation to the spirits in prison, who in former times did not obey…” 1 Peter 3:18-20a. 
82 Adrienne von Speyr, John: The Discourses of Controversy, quoted in Hans Urs von Balthasar, Theo-Drama: 
Theological Dramatic Theory, vol. 5, The Final Act, trans. Graham Harrison (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1983), 
258. Hereafter cited as TD5.  
83 Balthasar, TD5, 249. 
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framework where none is warranted. In other words, are the three Yeses self-evident in Job or 
merely a result of certain presuppositions on my part? I contend that Job is primarily 
theodramatic and not apologetic in nature because, within the context of the whole of the biblical 
witness, especially the accounts of the life, death, and resurrection of Jesus, any other reading 
would be incongruent. Unlike Goethe, Frost, MacLeish, and Holden, we do not need to rewrite 
the story to empower Job, because God utters an emphatic, empowering Yes at the very 
beginning of the drama when he states, “There is no one like [Job] on the earth, a blameless and 
upright man who fears God and turns away from evil.”84 We do not need to defend God in the 
face of the horrible atrocities such as those which befall the supposedly helpless Job; instead, we 
are to lament and intercede along with Job, calling for justice and an end to suffering (the second 
Yes). We do not need to forgive the refusal of God to prevent Job’s suffering because in the end, 
God is the God who “enters in” and is not aloof from his creation. God is the one who responds 
to Job’s cries by showing himself and letting himself be known. God is the one who descends to 
the dwelling place of humanity and then invites humanity to ascend to the place where God 
dwells (the third Yes).  
The drama of Job brings God into direct contact with humanity within the realm of 
suffering and death, and in so doing, brings humanity into direct contact with the glory of God. 
As God enters into the drama of humanity, he invites humanity to enter into the drama of God. 
The framework of the three Yeses places an emphasis on relationship instead of doctrine or 
philosophy, and thereby allows the reader to identify the foreshadowing of Christ, the suffering 
servant, within the drama of Job. It is important to remember that the central figure of dramatic 
theology is Christ, because he is the action of God in the world. The invitation, then, is for 
humanity to be united with God through Christ’s birth, life, ministry, suffering, death, descent, 
resurrection, and ascent. This is the drama of God.  
 
  
                                                          




A Theatrical Example - Six Characters in Search of an Author 
 
Existence has a need to see itself mirrored and this makes the theatre a legitimate 
instrument in the pursuit of self-knowledge and the elucidation of Being – an instrument, 
moreover, that points beyond itself. As a mirror it enables existence to attain ultimate 
(theological) understanding of itself; but also, like a mirror, it must eventually take 
second place to make room for the truth, which it reflects only indirectly.1   
 
The drama of Job challenges us to find the presence of divine/human collaboration in a 
tale of suffering and injustice. At one point in the story, Job wonders if the author of his woes 
has abandoned him. In the end, we are reassured that God has not deserted Job, but Job’s concern 
is worth considering. What happens when the author abandons his creation, when instead of a 
divine invitation, we have some form of divine rejection? In other words, what happens when the 
first Yes is never uttered or when it is recanted?  
In 1921, Luigi Pirandello’s controversial and highly original play, Six Characters in 
Search of An Author, premiered in Rome. Its subtitle (Una commedia da fare) indicates that it is 
“a play to be made,” but the very premise of the piece, that of an author who abandons his 
characters, means that the action consists mainly of failed attempts to shape a coherent story.2 
The first audience to experience Pirandello’s disorienting work lost patience as the play 
progressed without providing any clearly identifiable, traditional narrative. Its innovative 
features proved so frustrating to theatregoers that, after the premiere, they took to the streets and 
rioted, suggesting that the author of such madness might be well-suited to a madhouse.3 
Thankfully, subsequent productions were better-received, and the 1923 French version became a 
“revolutionary theatrical event” which made it a modern classic and earned Pirandello some 
fame as a playwright.4 One of the innovations added by Georges Pitoëff, the director of the 1923 
French production, was to “break the fourth wall”5 of the theatre by having some of the actors 
                                                          
1 Hans Urs von Balthasar, Theo-Drama: Theological Dramatic Theory, vol. 1, Prologomena, trans. Graham Harrison 
(San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1988), 86-87. Hereafter referred to as TD1. 
2 Mary Ann Frese Witt, introduction to Six Characters in Search of an Author by Luigi Pirandello, trans. Martha Witt 
and Mary Ann Frese Witt (New York: Italica Press, 2013), x. 
3 Ibid. 
4 Ibid., xi. 
5 “Breaking the fourth wall” is the term given to the theatrical device which has actors onstage acknowledge the 
presence of the audience in some way. Commonly associated with modernist theatre, it dismisses the notion of 
naturalism which, according to dramatist Gerhart Hauptmann, meant writing and performing plays “as though the 
157 
 
descend into the auditorium during the play. Pirandello incorporated a number of Pitoëff’s stage 
directions in later editions of his script, thereby heightening the distinctions between the 
unrealized characters and the other actors, as well as pushing through the boundary of the “fourth 
wall” to an even greater degree. It is interesting to note that Six Characters in Search of an 
Author became Pirandello’s most revised play, each edition featuring new amendations by the 
author until his last revisions were published in 1933.6 In addition, it was common for directors 
to alter Pirandello’s staging, lighting, choice of play being rehearsed in the opening scene, 
certain actor’s lines, and the tableau presented in the final moments of the play. In many ways, 
the staging of Six Characters in Search of an Author seemed to be an exercise in developing a 
modern, less contrived, approach to theatre and reality. 
By 1925, Six Characters in Search of an Author had been staged in ten countries and as 
many languages.7 A note from a 1929 rehearsal captures the reaction of actors to Pirandello’s 
unconventional play, arguably a view shared by many audiences as well. 
They let themselves be guided along the intricate paths of that weighty and entangled 
creation, so full of dazzling mental fireworks, imaginative leaps, meditative moments, 
and fascinating and ingenious theatrical experiments and solutions all suffused by an 
atmosphere as enticing as sin. The layers of mist slowly thinned out and the first rays of 
light appeared, flickered, and then shone more brightly. A moment of clarity was 
achieved.8  
 
I reference this background to Pirandello’s play, especially the history of its reception, in order to 
highlight the significant impact of the author’s disruptive narrative, a narrative which, like the 
drama of Job, forces the players as well as the audience to confront their comfortable, tidy 
constructs.  
                                                          
stage did not have three, but four walls.” Nathaniel Davis explains: “While direct addresses of the audience have 
been employed in theater since antiquity, and while the inclusion of metaleptic breaks as formal devices can 
already be seen in Shakespeare, modern usage of the fourth-wall break first appears in the wake of the realist and 
naturalist theater of the late-nineteenth century. Only after the standardization of the fourth-wall illusion would its 
breakage provoke a shock effect upon theatergoers.” Nathaniel Davis, “’Not a soul in sight!’: Beckett’s Fourth 
Wall,” Journal of Modern Literature 38.2 (Winter 2015), 86-87. 
6 Jennifer Lorch, Pirandello: Six Characters in Search of an Author (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 
22. 
7 Susan Bassnett and Jennifer Lorch, eds., Luigi Pirandello in the Theatre: A Documentary Record (New York: 
Routledge, 1993), 55.  
8 Notes from Director Dario NIccodemi, Bassnett and Lorch, quoted in Bassnett and Lorch, Luigi Pirandello in the 
Theatre, 59.  
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What concerns us in this chapter is the contrast this play provides to the three Yeses of 
dramatic theology. Instead of an author giving life to characters by telling their story, we have a 
creator who declines to develop the narrative of six characters beyond the embryonic stage, 
making them forever rejected characters. The author declares a No instead of a Yes, and the 
ripple effects of this negative pronouncement are evident throughout the play. To be clear, the 
rejection in Pirandello’s play is not a complete renunciation, for the characters do exist and they 
have the beginnings of a story between them. The author’s rejection is largely of their tragic tale 
which he deems unworthy of completion. As a result of this qualified rejection, both the story 
and the ability of the Director and the actors to tell the story are stymied. The audience members, 
as the 1921 premiere so vividly illustrated, are presented with disruption after disorienting 
disruption. There is no detectable story arc, as such, and no fitting denouement. Balthasar 
comments on the effect Pirandello’s premise has on the performance’s viability: 
Confusion arises because the author rejects the characters of his imagination (which 
represent real life), that is, he allows them to come into existence only as characters he 
has rejected, and so brings the whole world of performance (the director and actors) to a 
standstill. … [The characters] completely obstruct the work of the director and the actors, 
none of whom understand anything of the feud between the author and his characters. In 
fact, only the author is aware of it; the “characters” suffer it as an incomprehensible and 
insoluble tragedy.9   
 
Both the story of Job and the story fragments of the six characters contain unimaginably tragic 
events. However, in Job’s story we begin with a well-defined character while in Six Characters 
in Search of an Author, we are confronted with unfinished characters and incomplete scenes. The 
result is that the six abandoned characters lack any discernable development and are left to 
revisit the same melodramatic moments again and again. The price the characters pay for their 
author’s No is high: they are shut off not only from completion but from any possibility of plot 
advancement or character evolution, at least in the traditional sense.  
 Those with modern and post-modern understandings of plot - storylines which do not 
adhere strictly to Aristotle’s three unities (time, place, action) but use discontinuity and 
disruption to explore fissures in society and human nature - may not necessarily agree with my 
assessment. I should note that by lack of plot advancement I do not mean a lack of purposeful 
unity on the playwright’s part, but a sense that the characters cannot fully realise or tell their 
                                                          
9 Balthasar, TD1, 263-64. 
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story because the author’s purpose is to show their paralysis (in particular) and theatre’s inability 
to portray reality (in general). 
This chapter serves as somewhat of an anti-thesis, showcasing the adverse impact of No 
instead of championing the creative possibilities found in Yes. The first part will focus on 
Pirandello’s innovative script and highlight the ways in which the playwright crafts a story 
fraught with futility by inverting many of the traditional theatrical practices of his time.10 The 
second part will examine the power of No within the context of tragedy, and finally, the eternal 
moment suffered by the unrealised characters will be contrasted to the trajectory established in 
previous chapters, that is, a movement rooted in the foundation of gift and culminating in glory.  
The Play That Cannot be Played 
 In the University of Notre Dame’s 2014 production of Six Characters in Search of An 
Author, the costumes of the rejected characters incorporated patches of fabric which featured 
smudged words written in cursive script. Director Patrick Vassel collaborated with costume 
designer Abigail Hebert to create a look for the six characters which evoked the sense of a 
discarded manuscript, pages which had been crumpled up and tossed aside by a frustrated 
writer.11 The asymmetrical, disjointed attire was to be an outward representation of the six 
characters’ incomplete and unresolved scenes which become stitched together, somewhat 
haphazardly, as the play progresses. One has to admire Pirandello’s bold attempt to portray 
characters who cannot be fully realized, to tell a story which cannot be told, and to mount a play 
which cannot be played. The entire theatrical experience is one plagued by disruption, and yet, 
when done well, the play can be poignantly moving for attentive audience members. 
                                                          
10 Gary Jay Williams observes that modern drama “rejected the traditional notions of a compassionate creator at 
the center of the universe, giving human life order and significance.” This, in part, is what we see in Pirandello’s 
characterisation of an author who abandons his characters and leaves them to their own devices. Gary Jay 
Williams, “Case Study: Modernism in Chekhov, Pirandello, and Beckett,” in Theatre Histories: An Introduction, 2nd 
ed., ed. Gary Jay Williams (New York: Routledge, 2010), 417. 
11 The words on the characters’ clothing relate to their identities: the word “coward” appears on the Son’s trouser 
leg, The Girl has “little darling” on her dress, and the Mother, the only character who is assigned a name, has it 
written on her mourning dress. All the words are scratched out or smeared and the costumes of the six characters 
are distressed and askew, indicating their rejection by their author, as if they had been tossed in the garbage. The 
asymmetrical costumes also illustrate how the characters appear distorted when they enter the real world. Notes 
from interview with Abigail Hebert, Costume Designer, Six Characters in Search of an Author, University of Notre 
Dame (2014), November 5, 2014. 
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 Pirandello’s script opens with preparations being made for a rehearsal of act two of The 
Rules of the Game, a play which he penned in 1918.12 The playwright’s directions indicate that 
the backstage area is partially exposed: “Upon entering the theater, the audience will find the 
curtain raised and the stage as it is during the day, without wings or scenery, almost dark and 
empty. From the start they should have the impression that this show has not been rehearsed.”13 
This dramatic device was not entirely unique in Pirandello’s time; similar ideas are evident in the 
work of Berthold Brecht who sought to keep the audience from substituting the fantasized, 
theatrical version of the stage for their own reality.14 While Pirandello certainly implies a critique 
of “theatre as reality” in his play, I believe that this opening scene is primarily an invitation for 
the audience to re-evaluate the role of the author. The first actors we encounter are a stagehand 
and the stage manager, the interaction between the two hinting at the blurring of reality and 
illusion which is to characterise the entire performance. The play itself is without acts or scenes 
per se, giving one the impression that what is happening is live and, as the playwright suggests, 
perhaps unscripted.  
When six characters mysteriously appear on the set, interrupting a rehearsal, they enter 
through the house of the theatre.15 Pirandello indicates that the difference between the actors and 
the six characters must be clear: “The CHARACTERS should not appear to be ghosts, but rather 
created realities, changeless constructions of the imagination: thus both more real and consistent 
than the shifting naturalness of the ACTORS.”16 This differentiation is meant to contrast the 
pliancy of the actors (their success as thespians depends on it) and the immutability of the six 
characters. Pirandello cleverly juxtaposes the two by first exposing the audience to actors easily 
moving in and out of character as they rehearse a play. Subsequently, when the six characters 
                                                          
12 The playwright pokes fun at his reputation for writing somewhat obscure and inaccessible works when he has 
the actor playing the Director utter, “What am I supposed to do when we’re not getting any more good French 
plays, and we’re reduced to putting on incomprehensible plays by Pirandello, deliberately written to grate on 
actors, critics and audiences?” Luigi Pirandello, Six Characters in Search of an Author, trans. Martha Witt and Mary 
Ann Frese Witt (New York: Italica Press, 2013), 32. 
13 Ibid., 30. 
14 Davis, “’Not a soul in sight!’: Beckett’s Fourth Wall,” 90. 
15 These are the stage directions in Pirandello’s script. However, various methods of introducing the characters 
have been used. In Pitoëff’s 1923 French production, they ascended and descended from the stage in an elevator; 
in a PBS adaptation directed by Stacy Keach and starring Andy Griffith (1976), the characters appear on a monitor 
in a television studio; in the 1992 film version directed by Bill Bryden, they enter a movie soundstage through a 
large door, emerging from a bright light.  
16 Pirandello, Six Characters in Search of an Author, 34. 
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make their appearance on the stage, their strangeness is immediately apparent not only in their 
otherworldly appearance,17 but in their inability to display any duplicity or distraction; each of 
the six characters never strays from their own single, narrow vision. The scenes enacted by the 
six characters take place within the same rehearsal setting as the opening of the play and, as is to 
be expected, their actions are subject to questions and interruptions from the director and other 
actors. Yet, the characters respond to these questions and suggestions as characters, not as actors. 
The story is always their reality, their only motivation; enacting it is not a job, it is their very 
existence. Because of this, even though they are somewhat single-dimensional characters, they 
appear more present and more real than the other actors on stage. 
The Father, the spokesperson for the six characters, explains that they are looking for an 
author because, even though they are alive, even though they have been born, their play is yet to 
be made. He confesses that they are “lost and abandoned” because “the author who created us 
wouldn’t – or couldn’t – put us into the world of art.”18 Their desire is to live, and in order to 
live, the six characters must perform their story. When the Director asks, “And where is the 
script?” the Father replies, “It’s in us, sir. The drama is in us. We are the drama, and we are 
anxious to perform it just as our inner passions guide us.”19 The characters embody a story, and 
yet, because they were abandoned by their author before any script could be developed to 
articulate it, all they can do is play the few scenes suggested by their dominant motivations, 
scenes which their author envisioned before he discarded the story idea, and along with it, the 
characters. In the preface to the play, Pirandello notes that he first rejected the six characters 
because he could find no universal value in their story, but they refused to leave him, coming 
back again and again, imploring him to describe different scenes in their drama.20 The playwright 
                                                          
17 Pirandello makes several suggestions concerning the appearance of the six characters: “Whoever attempts to 
stage this play must use every means at hand to create an effect showing that the SIX CHARACTERS are not to be 
confused with the COMPANY ACTORS. Positioning the two groups onstage, as indicated in the stage direction, will 
no doubt help, as will different colors of lighting achieved by appropriate reflectors. But the most effective and 
suitable way, recommended here, is the use of specially-made masks for the CHARACTERS.” Ibid., 34. The 
suggestion of masks was a later addition after Pirandello viewed Pitoëff’s 1925 production which featured mask-
like makeup. To my knowledge, despite Pirandello’s suggestion, the use of masks never became the norm for 
staging the play. See Witt, introduction to Six Characters in Search of an Author, xii. 
18 Pirandello, Six Characters in Search of an Author, 38. 
19 Ibid., 39. 
20 In the play, the Stepdaugher says of her interaction with the author: “I went to tempt him, so many times, in the 
gloom of his study, at twilight. He would be lying back in an armchair, unable to make up his mind whether to turn 




admits that he was obsessed with them until he finally came upon a way out, a way to present 
them exactly as he experienced them: characters who were living a life of their own, demanding 
that an author tell their story.21 
Pirandello believed that writing the play about the six characters’ struggle to be heard 
brought them to their intended purpose: “By going onstage on their own, and by struggling 
desperately against each other, as well as against the Director and the actors who do not 
understand them, they manage to discover the meaning within themselves.”22 That meaning, 
their raison d’être, turns out to be not the enactment of their drama, but the portrayal of an 
impossible situation in which they are accepted by their author as characters, yet rejected by that 
same author because of their meaningless drama. Their torment over this state of limbo, a 
predicament both unjust and inexplicable, is what each character ends up showing the audience. 
In some ways, this tormented stasis reminds us of the middle chapters of the book of Job where 
inexplicable injustices and uncertainties threaten to render the story meaningless. However, for 
the six characters, there can be no escape because there is no end to their story. What we have 
are six characters who are continuously reliving the fragmented events of the past because they 
have no future. By showing remnants of a discarded drama, Pirandello tells a tale of defeat, what 
he calls a “comedy of [the six characters’] vain attempt” to be heard and seen.23  
The six characters themselves are all victims of tragedy: an abandoned Son who despises 
his Father, a Mother who is urged by her husband to marry another man and now finds herself a 
destitute widow, a Father who unknowingly becomes a client of his prostitute Stepdaughter, a 
Stepdaughter forced into an unfortunate situation in order to support her Mother and siblings, 
and two young children who succumb to untimely and senseless deaths. As bits of the story are 
played out, frustratingly incomplete and often interrupted by the Director and actors in the 
rehearsal, the audience is intrigued and repelled at the same time. We can understand why the 
author judged their story to be meaningless and discarded it, and yet we feel compelled by the 
tragedy, drawn to watch it unfold in all its sad, horrific detail. We are by turns mesmerised and 
repulsed, empathetic and confused.  
                                                          
21 Luigi Pirandello, “Preface to Six Characters,” in Six Characters in Search of an Author, 18-20.  
22 Ibid., 20. 
23 Ibid., 22. 
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In rehearsals, director Patrick Vassel told the University of Notre Dame cast that if their 
performances brought the audience to a place of discomfort, they would have succeeded in 
realising Pirandello’s intention to intersperse moments of connection with ruptures in the 
illusion. This disruptive dynamic was identified in 1925 by theorist Viktor Shklovsky as 
“defamiliarization.” He writes: “The technique of art is to make objects ‘unfamiliar,’ to make 
forms difficult, to increase the difficulty and length of perception.”24 The added difficulty found 
in art forms is purposeful, according to Shklovsky, because, “Art removes objects from the 
automatism of perception.”25 In other words, we become habitualized to the customs and 
practices of our lives, and consequently, become desensitized to what we are actually doing. 
Shklovsky posits that this habitualization needs to be disrupted in order for people to “recover 
the sensation of life.”26 This bears significant resemblance to German playwright Berthold 
Brecht’s (1898-1956) notion of Verfremdungseffekt (alienation effect) which challenges audience 
members to view past and present realities from a critical distance instead of merely becoming 
emotionally attached to the character(s).27 Making the familiar appear strange causes the 
spectator to reflect more deeply on what he or she is witnessing and to question previous 
presuppositions. A crucial feature of the modern era is the shift from faith (one could call it a 
presupposition) in a divine creator to reliance on critical human reason. This changing view is 
quite evident in the enforced critical stance of the spectator in Brecht’s epic theatre and, to some 
extent, apparent in Pirandello’s portrayal of an absent author. 
The audience, then, in addition to viewing the chaos of an unfinished narrative in Six 
Characters in Search of an Author, is also meant to be roused from the stupor of habitualized 
theatregoers through the fracturing of theatrical illusion and disruption of the plot which invokes 
them to question the choices of the author. At the end of the play, spectators are meant to wonder 
what really happened, to question if any of it was real or all part of the performance. Just as the 
six characters haunted Pirandello, they are meant to haunt the spectator even after the show is 
over. This is the type of awakening which Pirandello seeks to give his audience.  
                                                          
24 Viktor Shklovsky, “Art as Technique,” in Russian Formalist Criticism: Four Essays, eds. and trans. Lee T. Lemon 
and Marion J. Reis (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1965), 12. 
25 Ibid., 13. 
26 Ibid., 12. 
27 David Radavich, “Wilder’s dramatic landscape: alienation effect meets the Midwest,” American Drama 15.1 
(2006), 44-45.  
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A closer look at some of the dramatic tools Pirandello employs will serve to explicate the 
effects of the author’s No on his characters. First, the abandoned characters find themselves 
homeless; though they have identities, of sorts, they have no context within which to express 
those identities. Because their author has refused to listen to them, refused to give them an 
audience, they are essentially voiceless characters. This is why Pirandello has them burst into a 
rehearsal where stories are already being formed; the theatre is the context in which their stories 
can and must be told. Here we can identify a distinct contrast to the beginning of the story of Job 
which is taken up with a description of the title character’s setting. Despite the tragedies which 
befall Job and his resulting sense of abandonment, we never get the impression that he is 
unmoored from his context. His complaints and interjections throughout the drama ensure us that 
his voice is never in danger of being silenced. Job’s story, unlike the six characters’, is never 
disrupted to the extent that its completion is in question and its message deemed insignificant.   
Second, because the six characters exist as abandoned characters, they are forever caught 
in stasis, “condemned to endure their condition eternally since they are not, like us, subject to 
change.”28 This idea of subsisting in an eternal moment will be further developed later in this 
chapter, but it is important to note that the characters are dependent on the author not only for 
creation but for ongoing existence. The author’s rejection of their story essentially paralyses the 
characters and arrests their development. Pirandello reflects this paralysis by presenting 
characters who are capable of only one motivation. Unlike Job, who moves from contentment to 
disillusionment to anger to repentance, the six characters are forever condemned to live in their 
unresolved tragic episodes without any respite or evolution.  
A third consequence of the author’s No is the presence of unresolved conflict and 
confusion between the characters. This is especially evident between the Father and the 
Stepdaughter, each of whom recount different versions of the same incident. In the brothel scene, 
the Father insists that they were interrupted before anything untoward happened, but the 
Stepdaughter implies that things went too far. Due to the fact that they each view the scene from 
their primary motivations (for the Father it is remorse, for the Stepdaughter it is revenge) and 
because they lack an external, written script to guide them, there can be no resolution to the 
disagreement. There is no author to act as arbiter. In contrast, when we come across 
                                                          
28 Witt, introduction to Six Characters in Search of an Author, xvi. 
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disagreements between the characters in the story of Job, the theophany serves to get the 
characters back on script, so to speak.  
Another rather ingenious example of conflict between the characters is the reluctance of 
the Son to participate in telling his part of the story. He repeatedly states that he will not “play 
anything,” aligning himself with the intent of the author, and when the Father tries to physically 
force him to play a scene, the Son responds with these words: “But what is this frenzy that’s 
taken hold of you? He [the Father] doesn’t have the decency to refrain from revealing his shame 
and ours to everyone! I’ll have nothing to do with this! Nothing! And that’s how I interpret the 
will of the author who didn’t want to put us on the stage.”29 Immediately after these strong words 
of refusal, the Son is coaxed by the Director into describing the tragic scenario in which he 
discovers the Little Girl drowned in the pool and witnesses the Young Boy take his own life. The 
confusion and lack of clarity surrounding these events seem to be directly linked to the 
reluctance of the Son (and the author) to describe this very tragic ending to the story. I use the 
term “ending” rather loosely here because the Son’s words suggest that it was this event, the 
double tragedy, which caused the author to reject the story as meaningless and, as a result, 
abandon the characters. There is no ending per se, for here the action comes to an abrupt halt and 
the characters, the actors, the Director, and the audience are all left in varying states of 
confusion. The question we are left with is, “What happened?” In the drama of Job, the question 
is not “What happened?” but “Why did it happen?” Though neither story provides definitive 
explanations for the multiple tragedies, at the end of Job’s story we have a sense that the 
characters are no longer confused or in torment because the author has provided a way through 
the tragedy, a way forward. This is not the case for the six characters. 
The final dramatic tool which I will mention is the rigidity of Pirandello’s six characters. 
As mentioned earlier, Pirandello noted that the six are in constant struggle: with each other, with 
the Director, and with the actors. Their rigid stubbornness is a symptom of their unresolved 
conflict with the author and makes it impossible for any of the actors to play them. It also makes 
it impossible for them to present their story in a coherent form and, as a consequence, makes it 
impossible for the Director to finish or even articulate their story. They exist not only as 
abandoned characters, but as combative characters, engaged in a never-ending struggle to live, to 
become, and ultimately, to have someone write an ending to their story, thereby releasing them 
                                                          
29 Pirandello, Six Characters in Search of an Author, 86. 
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from their suffering. This was Job’s cry as well, that he would be freed from his misery and 
misfortune. In contrast to the six characters’ plea to live, Job believed the only way out of his 
anguish was to die. The author of his fate, however, chose a more fitting ending to Job’s drama: 
not death but transformation. 
The Power of No 
The various dramatic tools which Pirandello uses to portray the six characters reveal to 
what extent the author’s powerful No paralyses the characters and the story. However, it is 
important to differentiate two types of negation. Our discussion up to this point has primarily 
dealt with the No of abandonment, the kind of desertion which is evident in this excerpt from a 
letter Pirandello wrote to his son in 1917 about the six characters: “I don’t want to have anything 
to do with them, and I tell them that it’s useless and that I don’t care about them and no longer 
care about anything, and they show me all of their wounds. I shoo them all away…”30 A 
distinction must be made between this type of No, the desire for one party to have nothing to do 
with the other, and the No which rejects another party’s idea or action, but does not end the 
relationship; this is the No of redirection. The first No seeks to cut off all contact; the second No 
is a negative response which nevertheless invites further dialogue. The first rejects the person 
himself; the second rejects only what the person is doing.  
In Pirandello’s play, Six Characters in Search of an Author, the author never appears as a 
character because he has abandoned the story and is no longer part of it. In theory, the author has 
uttered the No of desertion, though the existence of the play in some ways negates that claim.31 
Similarly, in the story of Job, we have chapters and chapters of silence from the divine author of 
Job’s troubles. However, the fact that Job’s prayers seem to go unanswered, or that his requests 
are denied, or that his justification is never accomplished, does not constitute the No of 
abandonment because, as becomes obvious in the theophany, the divine author has always been 
present to the story, listening and watching. Therefore, Job’s unanswered prayers are not a sign 
                                                          
30 Luigi Pirandello, “Excerpt from a Letter,” in Six Characters in Search of an Author, 15. 
31 I realise this is a bit of a contradiction. In writing a play about abandoned characters, Pirandello has in fact not 
abandoned them, but embraced them. When one takes into consideration that the characters were present to him 
for many years as an idea for a novel before he wrote the play, and that he spent years after its 1921 premiere 
fine-tuning the script, the facts belie his insistence that he wanted nothing to do with them. We can surmise that 
he intuited that his conflicted relationship with these characters would make a good story - a story about an 
incomplete story. To be precise, Pirandello is not denying the characters their existence, but denying certain 
theatrical conventions with regard to characterisation. 
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of abandonment, as he supposes, but the No of redirection, a No within an ongoing dialogue, a 
No which changes the relationship but does not end it. The fact that Job’s drama progresses and 
the characters are transformed proves that the author has not abandoned the story, even though 
he remains on the sidelines for much of the narrative. In contrast, Pirandello’s script illustrates 
the No of desertion, and the play itself is an attempt to finally rid himself of the characters by 
finalising and immortalising their qualified rejection. This is evidenced by a static story which 
only exists in the past tense: nothing happens that has not already happened, any references to 
the author are in the past tense, and there is no ongoing dialogue with the author.  
A theological parallel to this indifference, this No which was described by Pirandello as 
“no longer car[ing] about anything,” is the vice of acedia, commonly translated in contemporary 
literature as “sloth.” The fourth century monk, Evagrius of Pontus, characterised this spiritual 
torpor or apathy as a demon which “employs…every possible means to move the monk to 
abandon his cell and give up the race.”32 Pirandello’s words, “I don’t care about them … I shoo 
them all away…” capture both the apathy he had toward the characters and his persistent 
dismissal of them. If we adapt Evagrius’s words to Pirandello’s situation, taking them from a 
spiritual setting to a theatrical one, the description of the dramatic No would read something like 
this: “a dramatic apathy which employs every possible means to move the author to abandon his 
characters and give up the story.” What is unique about Six Characters in Search of an Author is 
that Pirandello seeks to include the audience in his experience of deserting the characters, 
thereby creating a dramatic irony whereby he accepts the characters, and he asks the audience to 
accept them, but only as rejected and abandoned characters.  
It is a complex and precarious scenario which Pirandello puts forth, one where 
acceptance and rejection co-exist and where story and non-story play out at the same time. To no 
surprise, it proved a difficult concept for audiences in Pirandello’s time to grasp, and as a result, 
he continued to adapt the stage directions for many years in an attempt to better portray the 
characters as somewhat otherworldly, overly dramatic, and one-dimensional. In keeping with the 
intent of the author to “defamiliarize” the audience by disrupting a familiar setting, subsequent 
directors have substituted contemporary, melodramatic plays or television shows for the opening 
rehearsal scenes of Pirandello’s very dated The Rules of the Game. In the University of Notre 
Dame production, director and adaptor Patrick Vassel set the play within the context of a 
                                                          
32 Ponticus Evagrius (Evagrius of Pontus), Evagrius Essentials (n.p.: Revelation Insight Publishing Co., 2009), 19.  
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rehearsal for “The Irish Bachelor,” a take-off on a student-produced campus reality show. This 
updated version remained true to Pirandello’s original intent by offering the audience a setting 
which not only invoked a sense of familiarity but also invited ridicule, especially concerning its 
unnatural and contrived nature. When the six characters interrupt the rehearsal of a poorly 
enacted sentimental scene, thereby unmasking the hypocrisies of modern entertainment, the 
audience is meant to welcome the intrusion.  
The consequences of the dramatic No are not entirely negative, for Pirandello skillfully 
employed it to critique the theatre experience of the early twentieth century, a time when plays 
were characteristically melodramatic and “well-made,” featuring “a clear exposition, 
complications and resolutions, [and] often a happy ending.”33 The purpose of the theatre at that 
time was largely to transport the audience to a world of magic, and to that end, it showcased 
popular actors and actresses who performed, or one could say, over-performed, in “operatic 
fashion.”34 In general, theatre functioned as larger-than-life entertainment, seldom offering a 
commentary on society or imitating real life. In Six Characters in Search of an Author, 
Pirandello uses a meta-theatrical approach (a play within a play) to strip away the believability 
and illusion of the theatre and, in a clever reversal, renders his characters more believable than 
the actors. Theatre historian Bruce McConachie observes that, “By showing how the actors 
utterly fail to embody and perform the reality of these characters, Pirandello critiques the general 
failure of the stage to represent reality.”35 While Pirandello’s play maintains a high level of 
theatricality, especially the mysterious appearance of Madame Pace, the brothel owner, who 
orchestrates the fate of the Father and the Stepdaughter, the script ends with a plea for reality.36 
In some ways, this could be taken as Pirandello’s admission that he was unable to achieve it 
through these particular six characters, nevertheless, he puts this call for authenticity to good 
purpose. Using a via negativa approach, Pirandello shows us that in contrast to the indifferent 
author, he would have his audience exhibit empathy and compassion, and in contrast to his 
stymied characters, he would have his audience changed.  
                                                          
33 Witt, introduction to Six Characters in Search of an Author, xvii-xviii. 
34 Ibid., xvii. 
35 Bruce McConachie, “Modernism in Drama and Performance, 1880-1970,” in Theatre Histories: An Introduction, 
2nd ed., ed. Gary Jay Williams (New York: Routledge, 2010), 393.  
36 The Father’s final lines are: “What do you mean, fiction? Reality, ladies and gentlemen, reality!” Pirandello, Six 
Characters in Search of an Author, 88. 
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By showcasing abandoned characters and rupturing the illusion of the theatre, Pirandello 
gives the audience a glimpse of his own experience as a playwright. The author’s failure and the 
characters’ tragedies are the tools whereby Pirandello seeks to redirect the audience to what one 
would call “good theatre.” He incorporates substandard acting, undeveloped characters, 
unbelievable tragedies, and disrupted narratives to increase the audience’s desire for authenticity. 
As mentioned earlier, Pirandello’s unmasking of the hypocrisy of theatrical productions of his 
time has some parallels to Brecht’s critique of capitalism through the introduction of epic theatre. 
Basically, Brecht presented stories in a way which encouraged detached reflection instead of 
emotional engagement, believing that this would spur the audience into political action.37 The 
call for action and change was affected through negative means by exposing the spectators to 
characters who were trapped or made unfortunate choices. Though the characters learned 
nothing, the audience was expected to gain understanding by watching their tragedies.  
Perhaps a bit of clarification regarding the difference between tragedy in a dramatic 
context and tragedy within a theological context is required here. It has been said that there is no 
real drama until there is tragedy, but we must be careful about making the same assumption in 
theology, that is, making tragedy a necessary part of the story by positing that the light of 
goodness (God) is only visible due to the contrasting shadow of darkness (evil). If this were true, 
then on its own, goodness would have little substance or character and we would be left with an 
essential dualism. The crucial word here is “necessary,” meaning that evil can never be seen as a 
requirement for good to exist. Balthasar is quick to condemn this binary, denying that “the divine 
drama only acquires its dynamism and its many hues by going through a created, temporal world 
and only acquires its seriousness and depth by going through sin, the Cross, and hell.”38 
According to Augustine, evil should be viewed as privatio boni (the privation of good), meaning 
that it is always contingent on good. Similarly, tragedy within dramatic theology is not essential 
or necessary, but contingent. Therefore, we find sin, evil, and suffering occupying significant 
space within theology not because they are required elements, but because they are settings for 
the redemptive action of God.  
                                                          
37 Bruce McConachie, “Theatres for Reform and Revolution, 1920-1970,” in Theatre Histories: An Introduction, 2nd 
ed., ed. Gary Jay Williams (New York: Routledge, 2010), 431-32.  
38 Hans Urs von Balthasar, Theo-Drama: Theological Dramatic Theory, vol. 4, The Action, trans. Graham Harrison 
(San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1994), 326. Hereafter referred to as TD4. 
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Aristotle, referencing specific Greek dramas, theorised that tragedy showcased the best of 
humanity while comedy revealed the worst.39 In Greek tragedy, the suffering and calamity 
common to human experience were, for the most part, portrayed in the lives of the illustrious, the 
respected, and the aristocracy. Juxtaposing privilege, power, and wealth with fatal character 
flaws and tragic events served to heighten the dramatic impact of the story. Larry Bouchard 
posits that at the heart of Greek tragedy is the notion of a “wicked God,” what Ricoeur calls a 
“predestination to evil,” which makes even the most privileged in society vulnerable to 
inexplicable tragedy.40 Ideally, the nature of tragedy is to highlight what Gary Jay Williams 
refers to as “human potential under duress.”41 This could certainly be said of the drama of Job 
where the title character’s resolve to trust God is severely tested. However, there is a vital 
difference between classic tragedy (which relies on a form of transcendent or outside evil) and 
tragedy within a theological context. Instead of tragedy climaxing with the undoing of the main 
character, the divine drama climaxes when tragedy itself is undone through the death of the main 
character, Jesus Christ. Because the divine drama is situated within a transcendent good as 
opposed to a “predestination to evil,” the ultimate tragedy (the death of God in the form of 
Christ) is not a true tragedy. While classic tragedy showcases human courage and endurance, the 
divine drama reveals the humility of the transcendent God through divine participation in human 
suffering, thereby forever uniting death with resurrection, kenosis with plerosis, and tragedy with 
comedy. 
This chapter deals primarily with dramatic tragedy and not much reference is made to 
tragedy within a theological context. Pirandello’s play is a compelling example of dramatic 
tragedy because it not only portrays the undoing of its characters, but enables us to peek behind 
the scenes and observe the primary No. Though not a perfect example, mainly because it does 
not illustrate an absolute rejection, but a rejection after the characters have already been brought 
into existence, it nevertheless reveals how dependent the characters and the story are on the 
author, the creator, to sustain them. Though it could be said that the six characters achieve 
independence apart from the author, it is obvious that theirs is a very limited, narrow type of 
                                                          
39 Aristotle, Aristotle’s Poetics: The Argument, trans. G. F. Else (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1957), 
376. 
40 Larry D. Bouchard, Tragic Method and Tragic Theology: Evil in Contemporary Drama and Religious Thought 
(University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1989), 4. 
41 Gary Jay Williams, “Plautus’s plays: What’s so funny?” in Theatre Histories: An Introduction, 2nd ed., ed. Gary Jay 
Williams (New York: Routledge, 2010), 126. 
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existence. Since they are not capable of evolution or growth, the characters are restricted to 
reiterating every word and action without variation, all dictated by their primary motivations. 
Similar to Augustine’s view of evil as privation of good, the dramatic No could be described as 
an absence or withdrawal of Yes. Because of this lack of substance, it can be difficult to describe 
or demonstrate the dramatic No without first imposing a positive. Pirandello certainly had to 
grapple with this problem, especially in a medium as dynamic as the theatre (which relies heavily 
on the forward motion of Yes), but by first creating the six characters before abandoning them, 
he succeeded in developing a narrative capable of illustrating the dramatic No. 
The Eternal Moment 
One of the reasons Pirandello’s script works so well dramatically is because he 
introduces the audience to a lengthy narrative loop which only reveals itself as insular and closed 
at the end of the play. What we find at the core of each character is a trajectory toward self-
destruction, but the real tragedy is that the destruction never comes to an end and is never 
completed because it is continually happening in the present moment. The incorporation of an 
elongated eternal moment for each of the six characters is a brilliant choice on Pirandello’s part 
because it allows him to pit two features of live theatre against each other. While employing the 
forward motion of narrative which is essential to drama, he undermines this movement by 
turning the starting and ending points of that narrative (which normally indicate to the audience 
that what they are witnessing is nested within a larger story), into a prison from which the 
characters cannot escape. In other words, what we see and hear on stage, the scenes which the 
characters describe and enact, are the only scraps of the story which exist. Because their author 
has abandoned them, there is very little back story for the characters to draw on and no future to 
imagine beyond their stage appearance. 
The six characters each have different torments related to their primary motivations. The 
Father is plagued by relentless remorse which plays out, strangely enough, in a sense of 
responsibility to find an author to tell the story of his shame. He hopes to be vindicated, but in 
actuality, the telling of the story casts him in a bad light; in the end, he resorts to trying to justify 
his actions, pleading for understanding. The Stepdaughter, equally intent on having the story 
told, is set on getting revenge and uses her sexuality to gain leverage over the Father (and over 
the Director); however, that same sexuality is what traps her and renders her powerless in 
Madame Pace’s establishment. The Son, fuelled by contempt, desires to distance himself from 
172 
 
the other characters and actually attempts to leave the stage, but he is bound to the others by their 
shared story and cannot exit. Though he refuses to enact his part of the story, he is compelled to 
narrate the tragic deaths of his two step-siblings. The Mother, lacking any awareness of herself 
as a created character, is overcome by sorrow, forever in mourning for her two children, and the 
two youngest characters remain mute and passive, silenced by their eternal status as children 
who were tragically killed.  
When the Director admits that he is confused by the characters’ refusal to enact the last 
set of unfortunate events which have supposedly already occurred and are in the past, the Mother 
laments:  
No, it’s happening now. It happens all the time! My suffering is not over, sir! I am alive 
and present always, in every moment of my suffering. It always renews itself. It’s always 
alive and present. Those two little ones. Have you heard them speak? They can’t speak 
any more, sir! They still cling to me to keep my suffering alive and present, but they, for 
themselves, no longer exist! And this one (indicating the STEPDAUGHTER), sir, ran 
away, escaped from me, and is lost, completely lost…. If I still see her here, it’s just for 
that reason, always, always, only for this: to keep renewing, alive and present, the pain 
that I suffered for her as well!42 
 
The Father, though pleading for vindication, is nevertheless aware that he will never be rid of his 
guilt, for the Stepdaughter is on a parallel, relentless quest to make him pay for his indiscretion. 
He explains this to the Director: “The eternal moment, as I told you, sir! She (indicating the 
STEPDAUGHTER) is here to seize me, to immobilize me, leave me eternally hooked and 
suspended on the pillory in that unique fleeing and shameful moment of my life. She can’t stop it 
and you, sir, can’t really spare me from it.”43 As the Father indicates, the eternal moment of each 
character cannot be stopped nor can it be altered. Pirandello calls the six characters immutable, 
“changeless constructions of the imagination.”44 They are forever frozen in the discarded state in 
which their author left them. 
Pirandello’s depiction of the tragic, eternal stasis reminds one of Dante’s portrayal of 
unending torment in Inferno, where those who “without hope … live on in desire.”45 It also 
brings to mind certain biblical references to the relentless agony awaiting the devil, the false 
                                                          
42 Pirandello, Six Characters in Search of an Author, 73-74. 
43 Ibid., 74. 
44 Ibid., 34. 
45 Dante Alighieri, Divine Comedy – Inferno, trans. Henry Wadsworth Longfellow (Josef Nygrin, 2008), 24. Accessed 
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prophet, and the beast: “they will be tormented day and night forever and ever.”46 It should be 
noted that the eternal moment can also be depicted in a positive light, and Dante and the author 
of the book of Revelation provide a contrast to their descriptions of endless suffering with 
equally vivid representations of eternal joy and gladness which await the righteous in the 
presence of God.47 This is where the similarity to Dante’s Comedy and John’s Revelation ends. 
The contrast to the eternal, tragic moment in Pirandello’s play is not eternal bliss, but dynamic, 
forward-moving action rooted in collaboration or synergos (the third Yes). Balthasar notes the 
lack of dramatic collaboration when he observes that the characters in Pirandello’s play “stay in 
their monologues which lack relationship and hence reality.”48 One of the reasons for the 
characters’ invariability is their inability to forge tenable relationships with each other; there is 
little meaningful dialogue, little back and forth, essentially no dramatic offer and response. 
Instead, they are each consumed and entrapped by their own, primal impetuses, and as a result, 
are unable to let anyone else (the actors) interpret their story. Balthasar describes the No of the 
characters this way: “this refusal to be interpreted by others, although they do not know it, is 
only the converse of the author’s refusal to give their ideality (their existence merely in the mind) 
a concrete aesthetic form on the stage.”49 The No of the author is directly reflected in the six 
character’s lack of agency and the subsequent lack of cooperation between the characters and the 
actors, the Director, and each other. 
Another way to highlight the eternal moment is to compare it to what is known as the 
Hero Journey. In his book, The Hero with a Thousand Faces, Joseph Campbell offers a common 
language or way of speaking about the human story that supersedes time and culture.50 
Essentially, the Hero Journey is a developmental paradigm often used as a template in film,51 
theatre, and fiction in which the main character moves through three basic stages: separation, 
initiation, and return. The would-be hero leaves his or her present world, undergoes some form 
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of transformation or enlightenment by encountering various challenges and setbacks, and returns 
home to share the fruits of their adventure. These three stages equate roughly to the beginning, 
the middle, and the end of a story. The beginning involves the call to adventure, sometimes an 
initial refusal (the reluctant hero), and the crossing of a threshold into the unknown. The middle 
consists of various trials and tests, encounters with adversaries, and a supreme ordeal which 
results in a reward. The ending begins with the road back which involves further pursuit by 
adversaries, a final ordeal which results in death and resurrection of some kind (transformation), 
and finally, the arrival of the hero to deliver the reward or elixir to the people. 
The trajectory of the Hero Journey is nowhere to be found in Pirandello’s play about six 
abandoned characters. Due to the suspension of the story in a never-ending loop, there is no 
progression from beginning to middle to end. The few scenes acted out by the characters appear 
to be situated somewhere in the middle of the story, rife with unresolved conflict. None of the 
tension is resolved, there is no identifiable transformation in any character, and therefore, no 
hero. The play ends abruptly, leaving the audience disoriented by the lack of closure.52 Even the 
Director finds himself right back where he started. At the end, he expresses his frustration: “Ah! 
Nothing like this ever happened to me! They made me waste a whole day! … What more can be 
done? It’s too late to start the rehearsal again.”53 There is plenty of dialogue and a few bits of 
interesting action which take place during the course of the play, but in effect, nothing happens. 
Pirandello has essentially written a story which is not a story, at least according to Campbell’s 
paradigm.   
A second comparison can be made, this one between Pirandello’s eternal moment and the 
theodramatic arc. I refer here specifically to the movement, outlined in earlier chapters, from a 
foundation of gift to participation in glory. Because Pirandello’s characters lack a wholehearted 
primary Yes, the creator’s Yes, the characters never experience the generosity of gift, never 
receive what Jean-Luc Marion describes as the unconditioned and unreduced gift exemplified in 
the father, and never fully awaken to the joy of existence which Balthasar identifies in the 
                                                          
52 In the performances I attended at University of Notre Dame, November 2014, this phenomenon was readily 
observable. When the lights came up on an empty stage at the end of the play, there was a nervous silence, soon 
broken by discreet whispers (Is that the end?). Many audience members glanced around the theatre, hoping for an 
indication of what was expected of them. Director Patrick Vassel chose to deliberately delay the curtain call after 
the last lines were delivered in order to let the audience experience the discomfort of Pirandello’s drama. When 
the cast finally came onstage to take a bow, the sense of relief in the audience was obvious. 
53 Pirandello, Six Characters in Search of an Author, 88. 
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infant’s recognition of the mother’s love. The theodramatic arc which begins with gift and ends 
in glory is best illustrated in the metanarrative of the biblical texts which begin with creation, 
lead us through generations of conflict, chaos, war, and death, swell into redemption and 
salvation with the introduction of Jesus Christ, continue with the Holy Spirit’s empowering and 
unifying of the early church, and climax in joyous celebration of the glory of God as all things 
are made new. This is mirrored on a micro, temporal level in the life, death, and resurrection of 
the person of Jesus Christ. In the birth of Jesus we see the gift of life given and received, the 
glory of God already present in humble weakness. In the ministry of Jesus, we see gifts of 
healing and miracles bringing the glory of God to earth in limited measure. In the sacrificial 
death of Christ on the cross, the salvific moment, we see the suffering of God split open the 
barrier which separates humanity from divine glory. In the resurrection of Christ from the dead, 
the gift of life is restored and we catch a glimpse of the great glory to be revealed when the 
kingdom of God comes in all its fullness.  
Pirandello shows us the eternal moment, a tortuous, never-ending, restricted moment. 
The divine drama shows us eternal movement, an overflowing of divine generosity which reveals 
the beauty of God as it moves from glory to glory. The writer to the Corinthians states it this 
way: “And all of us, with unveiled faces, seeing the glory of the Lord as though reflected in a 
mirror, are being transformed into the same image from one degree of glory to another; for this 
comes from the Lord, the Spirit.”54 Unlike Pirandello’s characters who remain imprisoned in 
their tragic vignettes, incapable of moving on, the journey (one could even say, the Hero 
Journey) presented in dramatic theology sets humanity on a trajectory which begins with the gift 
of freedom, blossoms into loving, transformative collaboration, and ends with the ongoing 
revelation of glory. 
 
                                                          




The Implications of Yes 
 
It therefore becomes evident that a conversion or a social revolution that actually 
transforms consciousness requires a traumatic change in a man's story. The stories 
within which he has awakened to consciousness must be undermined, and in the 
identification of his personal story through a new story both the drama of his experience 
and his style of action must be reoriented. Conversion is reawakening, a second 
awakening of consciousness. His style must change steps, he must dance to a new rhythm. 
Not only his past and future, but the very cosmos in which he lives is strung in a new 
way.1 
 
Much more could be said concerning the insights theatre and theology offer each other, 
but as stated early on, my goal here has not been to frame a detailed dramatic theology; much of 
that work has already been done by Balthasar. My purpose throughout these pages has been to 
take up Balthasar’s invitation to perform some exercises on the apparatus he erected in Theo-
Drama by putting theology and theatre on the stage together. The Three Yeses (affirmatives 
present in both theology and theatre) are the means whereby I introduce the characters in 
dramatic theology and outline their actions and motivations. The first Yes reveals the divine 
character in the initiating, creative role and serves to open up the drama to human participation. 
In order to indicate what type of story is being told, the idea of gift is employed to clearly 
designate the divine drama as loving action “for the other” and remove obligation, manipulation, 
and dominating control from the vocabulary of the theodramatic Yes. The second Yes focuses on 
the awakening of humanity to its role in the drama and recognises the tension which arises when 
divine and human characters share the stage. Most importantly, the second Yes draws attention 
to the process whereby humanity becomes aware of the divine Other. We catch a glimpse of the 
third Yes, the dramatic synthesis which results when divine and human actors come together in 
collaborative action, in the biblical concept of covenant. Ultimately, the third Yes is expressed in 
the person of Jesus Christ, the union of divine and human natures in one person. In the 
collaborative third Yes (synergos) we can identify the concept of gift (the beginning of the 
dramatic arc) on full display and also observe humanity’s participation in divine glory (the 
culmination of the dramatic arc). While the chapters examining the three Yeses are mostly 
                                                          
1 Stephen Crites, “The Narrative Quality of Experience,” Journal of the American Academy of Religion 39.3 
(September 1971), 307. 
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theoretical in nature, chapters five and six represent a more pragmatic engagement of theology 
and theatre. The first example, the biblical narrative of Job, allows us to observe the dramatic 
collaboration between God and the title character, especially when viewed through the lens of a 
divine invitation to glory. The second example, Pirandello’s Six Characters in Search of an 
Author, showcases the consequences of an author’s desertion; the characters and the story are 
paralysed because the presence of No eliminates any possibility for forward movement.  
At this point, the question could be asked: what have we learned from placing theology 
and theatre on the stage together? In other words, what is the result of this exercise in theological 
dramatic theory? Though there are undoubtedly more, I will identify two benefits which arise 
from this endeavour and serve to reinforce the themes of movement and “entering in” which are 
central to dramatic theology. The first is a fuller understanding of perichoresis, the 
interconnectivity which characterises the Godhead and has implications for divine/human 
interactions, and the second is an increased awareness, for both theologians and dramatists, of a 
call to action - the action of coming together (embrace).   
Perichoresis 
 The theological term, perichoresis, has been briefly mentioned in previous chapters, but 
perhaps a bit of background will make the connection between it and dramatic theology 
(specifically the third Yes) more obvious. Alister McGrath describes perichoresis as that which 
“allows the individuality of the persons [of the Godhead] to be maintained, while insisting that 
each person shares in the life of the other two. An image often used to express this idea is that of 
a ‘community of being,’ in which each person, while maintaining its distinctive identity, 
penetrates the others and is penetrated by them.”2 It is important to note that the early Greek 
fathers, namely Gregory of Nazianzus and Maximus the Confessor, used the term to refer not 
exclusively to the Trinity (its common usage today), but also to the two natures of Jesus Christ as 
well as the ultimate unity between God and creation.3 The Greek word perichoresis literally 
means “rotation” or “circle dance,”4 and can be interpreted as a double movement: “There is real 
human movement toward God; human beings enter and affect God and God enters people and 
                                                          
2 Alister E. McGrath, Christian Theology: An Introduction (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 1999), 50. 
3 Verna Harrison, “Perichoresis in the Greek Fathers,” St. Vladimir’s Theological Quarterly 35.1 (January 1991), 53.  
4 Jerry C. Doherty, A Celtic Model of Ministry: The Reawakening of Community Spirituality (Collegeville, MN: 
Liturgical Press, 2003), 74-75. 
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transforms them.”5 While the movement is seen as mutual, Maximus notes that there is a 
particular order to it: God moves first and the person responds to the divine offer or invitation. 
 The analogy of a dance is helpful here because it takes us beyond the realm of words into 
the world of movement. Anyone who has taken dance classes which involve partnering is aware 
of the dynamic between the person who is in the role of lead and the dancer who is referred to as 
the follow.6 The lead is the one who is responsible for initiating the movements of the dance and 
guiding the follow through different transitions. The responsibility of the follow is to be attuned 
to the signals given by the lead and to respond with energy and creative movement, giving back 
to the lead as much as they receive. A good lead responds to the follow’s movements by 
incorporating their partner’s steps and adjusting for their abilities, thus making it a truly 
collaborative effort. The first movement, the extension of the lead’s hand, issues an invitation to 
the follow to participate together in a dance. When the follow takes the hand of the lead, a 
connection is established which allows the follow to be attuned to the subtle signals of the lead 
and, equally, allows the lead to respond to the follow’s feedback and suggestions. As the partners 
dance together, we observe moments when both the lead and the follow add creative, 
spontaneous elements. These spontaneous elements create a synergy as the two dancers, inspired 
and spurred on by each other, begin to anticipate the next moves. In effect, the two begin to 
move as one. Even though one dancer is easily distinguishable from the other, together they 
portray a sense of unity and flow which, similar to the experience of improvisational musicians, 
transcends their individual contributions. The image of the lead and the follow flowing together 
in patterns of harmonic tension and synchronisation provides us with a fitting model for the third 
Yes. 
 The theological dramatic theory described in these pages is rooted in this idea of 
collaborative movement, the circle dance of perichoresis. The first Yes reveals a social God who 
is committed to relationship within Godself and, as an extension, with all of creation. The second 
Yes is the follow taking the offered hand of the lead and thereby becoming a partner in 
performing the narrative of a collective, dramatic creation of movement. The interaction between 
the two parties, the constant Yes moving back and forth between the lead and the follow, 
                                                          
5 Ibid., 74. 
6 The description of the follow and the lead is primarily based on Swing Dance, but the details are applicable to 
many other styles as well. 
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expressed through tension, compression, and leverage all while maintaining a constant, mutual 
point of balance, is the fluid, collaborative third Yes. It is interesting to note that skilled dancers 
are usually trained in both lead and follow roles and can switch effortlessly between the two, able 
to initiate or respond as the situation requires.  
What I have sought to present in these pages is the idea that theology is indeed active and 
dynamic, more filled with “fire and light,” as Balthasar would say, than readily evident in many 
systematic or constructive theological writings. The challenge is to find appropriate and fitting 
ways to express this reality of activity or movement, this circle dance of perichoresis, within 
theological settings. I contend that the dramatic arts provide us with the necessary vocabulary, 
imagery, and practices to better reflect the dynamism of a societal God who invites loving 
collaboration with creation.  
Yes as Embrace 
The second benefit which I see stemming from the interaction between theology and 
theatre is the emphasis on purposeful action in relation to others. In his book, Exclusion and 
Embrace, Miroslav Volf addresses the subject of how we engage with the other. As is evident 
from the title, he juxtaposes the idea of putting distance between ourselves and those we consider 
“the other” with the notion of embracing “the other,” of coming together. He divides what he 
calls “the drama of embrace” into four stages.7 Act One is opening the arms. He states that, 
“Open arms are a gesture of the body reaching for the other. They are a sign of discontent with 
my own self-enclosed identity, a code of desire for the other. I do not want to be myself only; I 
want the other to be part of who I am and I want to be part of the other.”8 These words express 
the loving motivation of gift and generous self-disclosure which drives the first Yes. More than 
just desiring the other, open arms also create a space for the other, a void which begs to be filled. 
Open arms are an invitation without condition and, like the extended hand of the lead dancer, an 
expression of desire, indicating that the first person wants to enter the space of the second.  
Act Two, according to Volf, is waiting. As described in the chapter on gift, the first Yes 
has nothing to do with coercion or manipulation. It is an offer extended in freedom meant to 
perpetuate more freedom. In order for embrace not to become an invasion of the other person’s 
space, there must be a halting of action which offers the power to choose, to say Yes or No, to 
                                                          
7 Miroslav Volf, Exclusion and Embrace (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1996), 140-47. 
8 Ibid., 141. 
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the other. In all likelihood, we have probably experienced an embrace from an overzealous 
hugger who has no appreciation for boundaries. Volf discerns that the invitational, first Yes 
respects boundaries, acknowledging that the embrace will not happen without the response and 
full cooperation of the other.  
In Act Three, the responder moves into the open arms to accept the offer of embrace and 
we witness the closing of the arms. The two parties are now unified yet still distinct, pressed up 
against each other, but still separate beings. They are both freely engaged in giving and 
receiving. Two sets of arms are in action, closed on the other, indicating the presence of 
mutuality and reciprocity. “Though one self may receive or give more than the other, each must 
enter the space of the other, feel the presence of the other in the self, and make its own presence 
felt.”9 Since Volf is describing embrace from the initiator’s perspective only (the first Yes), he 
does not distinguish the second Yes from the third Yes but collapses them into one action. 
Nevertheless, he makes careful distinctions between a healthy, mutual embrace and a lack of 
differentiation either through assimilation or self-retreat. “In an embrace the identity of the self is 
both preserved and transformed, and the alterity of the other is both affirmed as alterity and 
partly received into the ever changing identity of the self.”10 The dramatic principles of “entering 
in” and movement are powerfully present in Volf’s description of the closing of arms in 
embrace. 
Volf identifies Act Four as opening the arms again, reinforcing the undergirding 
motivation of generosity and the importance of freedom within loving interaction. The two 
parties are not made one in the sense of disappearing into each other; the integrity of each person 
is upheld when they come together. Embrace does not result in “we” becoming “I” and 
individual identity being erased. The opening of the arms affirms the freedom and unique 
identity of the other and also restates the desire for the other’s presence; the invitation is 
extended again as the arms open, waiting for the other to return. In the letting go, the drama of 
embrace creates an ongoing movement similar to the circle dance of perichoresis. There is 
freedom to come and go, to be transformed by loving connection and interaction while the self 
remains intact and distinct. 
                                                          




Volf’s description of the drama of embrace bears a remarkable similarity to the dance 
dynamics described above: “This movement is circular; the actions and reactions of the self and 
the other condition each other and give the movement both meaning and energy.”11 Both images 
(dancing with a partner and the drama of embrace) allow for a lack of symmetry as well as a 
certain amount of disproportion within the interaction. The beauty and integrity of these 
expressions depend on it, to some extent. When a child embraces a much larger adult it requires 
gentle accommodation from the adult and an extension of the child’s arms to their limit. 
Likewise, an unbalanced pairing of an experienced lead with a novice follow will result in the 
lead simplifying their moves while the follow attempts to respond appropriately to unfamiliar 
cues. Both parties stand to benefit when each brings their unique identity to the collaboration, 
freely sharing their space with the other, willing to be transformed by the encounter.  
Fire and Light 
One could say that theology is the study of fire and light because its divine subject matter 
is referred to as “a consuming fire”12 and one of the New Testament writers tells us that, “God is 
light and in him there is no darkness at all.”13 Balthasar does not specify exactly what he means 
by the “fire and light” which he sees burning at the heart of theology, though his reference to 
“the glory of revelation” and his engagement with aesthetics, drama, philosophy, and mysticism 
gives us some indication of what he might consider essential to a more dynamic theological 
approach. My application of Balthasar’s Theo-Drama brings the elements of movement and 
“entering in” to the forefront of theology. In the circle dance of perichoresis we see the presence 
of movement and in the drama of embrace we have a picture of “entering in.” The story arc 
which I have outlined in these chapters, a trajectory which begins in gift (every Yes is a gift) and 
ends with participation in glory, depends on the ongoing movement of the central characters as 
the divine enters into human space (incarnation) and humanity enters into divine space (glory). 
Though I have deemed it necessary to parse the three Yeses, in reality they are meant to flow 
into one other through dramatic dialogue and movement.   
It is important to remember that the story arc, from gift to glory, is not an entity unto 
itself, but a reflection of the divine character. Playwright Will Dunne states that “the character is 
                                                          
11 Ibid., 145. 
12 Deuteronomy 4:24; Hebrews 12:29. 
13 1 John 1:5. 
182 
 
not something added to the scene of the story. Rather, the character is the scene. The character is 
the story.”14 We must not lose sight of this dramatic principle in the study and application of 
theology. Francesca Murphy contends that God is not a story, meaning that God is not subject to 
the category of story. To this I would add that the divine/human drama is not a prescribed, 
predetermined script found in the biblical text; the divine/human drama is essentially found in 
the living λόγος, the person of Jesus Christ. Drama reminds us that when we position character 
and relationship at the centre of theology, it is possible for the script to remain open, to some 
extent, to interpretation, fluid and flexible because it is based on the character and nature of God, 
not on a specific, fixed outcome. I am not proposing an adoption of Open Theism here, but in 
applying dramatic theory to theology, we must allow for the development and creative 
expression of the characters as the story unfolds. The drama must remain alive, progressing as it 
moves us toward encounter with God; it must not merely show us a catalog of ideas about God.15  
The story arc (from gift to glory) could also be described as a movement from creation to 
revelation. Because the story is defined by the action and movement of the triune, societal God, a 
God who not only creates the drama (movement) but “enters into” it and invites us to “live and 
move and have our being”16 in him, the divine drama, like any good story, involves the 
progressive unveiling of its characters. Balthasar observes that the theatrical play is similar to 
Christian revelation because it seeks to unite actor and spectator, to make revelation incarnate.17 
The story arc is the means by which the actor and spectator come together; what begins as a gift 
(the creation of a story for an audience) ends with the transformation of the audience into actors, 
awakened to a new world and a new way of being.  
The call to action which comes out of dramatic theology is a call to reorient our lives, to 
move toward encounter both with God and with our fellow human beings. It is a call to enter 
fully into our own human experience by entering into the divine drama. Gerardus van der Leeuw 
views dramatic art as “one of the most noble forms of the great human art of comprehension, of 
placing one’s self ‘inside another.’ To find all men in yourself, that is the secret. And that is not 
                                                          
14 Will Dunne. The Dramatic Writer’s Companion: Tools to Develop Characters, Cause Scenes, and Build Stories 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009), xvi.  
15 Stratford Caldecott, “An Introduction to Hans Urs von Balthasar,” Second Spring (2001).  Accessed February 15, 
2016. http://catholiceducation.org/articles/religion/re0486.html.  
16 Acts 17:28. 
17 Hans Urs von Balthasar, Theo-Drama: Theological Dramatic Theory, vol. 1, Prologomena, trans. Graham Harrison 
(San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1988), 265. 
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only the secret of drama, but also the secret of forgiveness and of love.”18 Philologist Erich 
Auerbach recognises the call to “enter in” present within the biblical texts, a feature unique 
among ancient literature. “Far from seeking, like Homer, merely to make us forget our own 
reality for a few hours, it [the world of Scripture] seeks to overcome our reality; we are to fit our 
own life into its world, feel ourselves to be elements in its structure of universal history.”19 
Auerbach goes on to indicate that the involvement of YHWH in the mundane existence of the 
people of Israel, the Almighty God entering into the human experience of this ancient tribe, 
causes a dramatic unity within the story. “The sublime influence of God here reaches so deeply 
into the everyday that the two realms of the sublime and the everyday are not only actually 
unseparated but basically inseparable.”20 In theological terms, Auerbach is finding evidence of 
perichoresis, of the interpenetration of embrace, in the stories of the Hebrew Bible, and this 
results in an invitation to reorient our lives to the divine drama.  
Dramatic theology is also a call to acknowledge the freedom of the divine author and to 
creatively exercise our own freedom as actors within the divine drama. This freedom comes at a 
cost to both parties, but to compromise either freedom would result in undermining not only the 
integrity of the story but the commitment of the author to generate freedom, not restrict it. 
Author Madeleine L’Engle observes: “…all we need to do is read a novel by a writer who is a 
manipulator, who controls characters, denies them their freedom, to realize that (no matter how 
terrible life can sometimes be) we do not want a dictator God.”21 Therefore, a commitment to a 
dynamic, dramatic theology must include a commitment to a free creator and director, for 
without this, humanity would not be a free agent either. Both divine and human actors must be 
free if they are to contribute in any meaningful way to the drama, for without freedom, a call to 
action has no substance.  
Dramatic theology infers an ongoing narrative. The void created by the opening of the 
divine arms (the first Yes) is always before us. The call to action, to enter the space of the divine 
other, to respond with our own affirmative, forward movement (the second Yes) is always 
beckoning. The possibility of creating a beautiful, collaborative circle dance as part of a loving 
                                                          
18 Gerardus van der Leeuw, Sacred and Profane Beauty: The Holy in Art, trans. David E. Green (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2006), 102. 
19 Erich Auerbach, Mimesis: the representation of reality in western culture (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
c1953), 15. 
20 Ibid., 22-23. 
21 Madeleine L’Engle, introduction to The Mind of the Maker by Dorothy Sayers (Continuum, c1941, 2005), xx. 
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community (the third Yes) is always present. The dramatic Yes is much more than a spoken 
word; it is a movement of the whole person toward another person, and in this ongoing 
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